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I LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 



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f UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. J 



THE PHILOSOPHY 



OF 



§tol Mnmify & itol f mtom, 



IN TWO PARTS. 



PART FIRST. 

PRINCIPLES OF NECESSITY AND OF FREEDOM. 



PART SECOND. 

PRINCIPLES OF HARMONY ; RECONCILING PARTICULARLY 
MAN'S MORAL FREEDOM WITH 



lilmu JwtotoUJwj* ani f rttetoiiflti 



BY REV. J. LAGRANGE. 



AUBURN, N. Y. 

WILLI AM V MOSES. 

1854. 



& 






Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1S51, by 

J . LAGRANGE, 

In th9 Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Northern District of 
New-York. 



STEREOTYPED BY 
WILLIAM J. MOSE 
AUBURN, N. Y. 



PREFACE. 



To all finite minds, the development of truth is progres- 
sive. Those portions which are most open to observation, or 
which are most easy to comprehend, are first perceived; and 
afterwards those which are more recondite and abstruse. 
This process may be indefinitely extended; and it may take 
place in respect to almost or quite, every subject of human 
belief or knowledge. The facts appertaining to our 
moral agency, are not exceptions to the general rule. Like 
natural objects, they are discovered successively; and their 
true relations are unfolded gradually. Therefore, even at 
this late and enlightened period, a more complete view of the 
principles of moral Necessity and moral Freedom, than has 
hitherto been presented, may perhaps be possible. That it 
is attainable, very many believe ; and that it should be af- 
forded, if possible, is demanded by the age in which we live. 
This desideratum, the author thinks, is supplied in the fol- 
lowing pages; but whether his opinion be correct or not, 
must remain for others to decide. 

The work at least is not a hasty production. It is the 
result of reading, reflecting, conversing, and writing, in so 
far as the duties of the ministry would permit, during about 



4 PREFACE. 

fourteen years. Its plan is simple, but comprehensive: 
being a statement of principles, together with their proof, in 
two parts. In executing it, such language has been employed 
as is easily understood, if read from the beginning, or in due 
order. Care has been taken to distinguish those things 
which differ, to identify those which are not distinct, to 
analyze ideas which are compound, and to harmonize those 
relevant Bible truths which appear to conflict. 

Bible doctrines are harmonized when they are properly 
explained; for when they are truly understood, their exact 
relations are clearly perceived. 

In respect to critical differences of opinion, an effort has 
been made to ascertain the real points in dispute, to distin- 
guish their relevant from their irrelevant bearings, to dis- 
criminate between sound argument and sophistry, and to 
"hold fast that which is good;" but as it was not intended 
to impart to the following pages the character of a review, 
the theories of others have not been extensively obtruded 
on the reader's attention. However, the most important and 
plausible errors relating to the subject, have been exposed; 
and the most cogent arguments by which they are attempted 
to be sustained, have been refuted. What it was thought 
essential to do, has been accomplished; not in the perfection 
of which the. subject is worthy, but as the author was able. 



CONTENTS 



PART FIRST. 

Principles : Page. 

I. Human beings exercise Agency, .'..., 9 

II. Agency is distinguished into Natural and Moral, .... 9 

III. Natural Agency is the exercise of natural powers, ... 10 

IV. Moral Agency is the exercise of natural powers or facul- 

ties, under obligations of Law, 11 

V. Moral Agency is two-fold: essential and adventitious, . . 12 

VI. Moral Agency implies adequate capacity, 16 

VII. Capacity as positive, consists of the faculties of thinking, 

feeling, and acting, 16 

VIII. Capacity as relative, consists of the availability of the 
faculties, as enjoyed through appropriate relations, . . 20 

IX. Capacity for Moral Agency is moral capacity, 27 

X. Moral capacity is enjoyed by mankind in general, .... 29 

XI. Moral capacity may vary in degree, 81 

XII. In each degree, moral capacity may be either unigenous 

power, or diversified power, 32 

XIII. Unigenous power admits of distinct proof, 34 

XIV. Diversified power admits of distinct proof, 44 

XV. Unigenous power implies the predominance of a given 

motive or motives, 55 

XVI. The predominance of a given motive may have its origin 

extrinsic of the agent affected, 57 

XVII. When the predominance of a given motive has its ori- 
gin extrinsic of the agent affected, the agent is subject 

to extrinsic causation in a two-fold respect, .... 59 

XVIII. Causation by motives is moral causation, 60 

XIX. Subjection to extrinsic moral causation is moral necessity, 62 



6 CONTENTS. 

Principles : Page. 

XX. Moral necessity may respect agency in the abstract only, 

or also in the concrete, 65 

XXI. Moral necessity in the concrete of moral agency, may 

be either factitious or radical, . 66 

XXII. Radical moral necessity, in the concrete of moral agen- 
cy, may be conceived of as being either adventitious 

or absolute, 69 

XXIII. Absolute radical moral necessity in the concrete of 
moral agency, cannot be proved to exist, 70 

XXIV. Moral necessity is a proper necessity, 73 

XXV. Diversified power implies the existence and influence 

of diverse motives, 84 

XXVI. Motives in favor of moral right, and others in favor 
of moral wrong, may consentaneously affect a sinful 
agent, 87 

XXVII. Motives in favor of moral right, and others in favor of 
evil, nay consentaneously affect an innocent or holy 
being, 88 

XXVIII. Both good and evil influences were experienced pre- 
viously to the existence of sin, 90 

XXIX. Diversified power implies an equilibrium of diverse 
motives, 93 

XXX. Motive equilibrium admits of distinct proof, .... 98 

XXXI. The equilibrium of diverse motives involves exemp- 
tion from extrinsic causation, 113 

XXXII. Exemption from extrinsic moral causation, is moral 
freedom, 116 

XXXIII. Moral freedom may be distinguished into generic 

and specific, 122 

XXXIV. Moral freedom may be distinguished into essential 

and non-essential, 124 

XXXV. Moral freedom, as exemption from extrinsic causation, 
involves intrinsic causation, 125 

XXXVI. Intrinsic causation involves accountability, . • . . 131 
XJ XVII. The modus operandi of the soul in causation, is be- 
yond the sphere of philosophy, or of legitimate in- 
quiry, ..... 135 



CONTENTS. 



PART SECOND. 

Principles : Page. 

I. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine foreknowledge, . . 137 

II. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predestination, . 167 

III. Moral freedom is consistent with election, \ 188 

IV. Moral freedom is consistent with the fact, that salvation 

is of grace, 199 

V. Moral freedom is consistent with the fact, that regenera- 

tion is a Divine work, 201 

VI. The moral quality of a given volition, may differ from the 

previous moral state of the agent, 204 

VII. Moral freedom is consistent with the agent's susceptibil- 

ity of moral suasion, 207 

VIII. The ideas of freedom and necessity are correlatives, . . 210 

IX. Freedom and necessity arc correlated in the same quality, . 210 

X. Moral quality is gencrically natural, 211 

XI. Liability to evil and capacity for good are correlatives, . 212 

XII. Liability to evil and capacity for good, are primarily cor- 

related in the same state, 21G 

XIII. Liability to evil and capacity for good, as correlated in 

the same state, are equal, 217 

XIV. Liability to evil is imposed only for the sake of the cor- 

related capacity for good, 219 

XV. The correlation of liability to evil, and capacity for good, 

is temporal, 221 

XVI. The loss of an adequate representation in Adam, and 
the enjoyment of an adequate representation out of 
Adam, are correlatives, 222 



8 CONTENTS. 

Principles : Page. 

XVII. An adequate representation of all mankind in Christ, 
and the salvation of all who die in their infancy, are 
correlatives, 228 

XVIII. An adequate representation of all mankind in Christ, 
and the possibility that Pagans may he saved, are cor- 
relatives, .....% , 233 

XIX. Moral freedom consists not in the possession of intellec- 

tual and moral faculties, 244 

XX. Moral freedom consists not in the exercise of volition, . 245 

XXI. Moral freedom consists not in power to execute volition 

or choice, 249 

XXII. Moral freedom consists not, and is not implied, in igno- 
rance of God's decrees, 265 

XXIII. Moral freedom consists not of legal or moral right, . . 267 

XXIV. Moral freedom consists not of itself, in deliverance 
from the bondage of Satan, 268 



PART FIRST. 

PRINCIPLES OF MOKAL NECESSITY AND 
OF MOKAL FREEDOM. 



CHAPTER I 



©it t\)t Sa-kjwi 0f gpntj, 



PRINCIPLES. 

I. Human beings exercise agency. That is to say, 
they act, or exert power : they produce results, or 
effects. 

"The Lord God formed man of the dust of the 
ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of 
life, and man became a living soul ;" and in becoming 
a living, sentient being, he became an agent or actor. 
Agency may be either internal, or internal and exter- 
nal conjoined. 

II. Agency is properly distinguished into Natural 
and Moral. 

If of a given number of subjects which have properties 
in oommon, some possess a property which is peculiar, 
there must obtain between them some difference of 
quality ; and any distinction which intelligibly ex- 
presses this difference, is correct and proper. The 
1* 



10 AGENCY. 

appropriate office of language is simply to convey 
truthful ideas. 

But all agencies have properties in common, such as 
power, limitation, and dependence ; while some possess 
also a property which is peculiar. Hence, between 
them must obtain some difference of quality ; and this 
difference is intelligibly expressed by the distinction 
of Natural and Moral. 

III. Natural agency is the exercise of natural 
powers. 

1. It is the exercise of such powers as preclude the 
obligations of law. Such is the action of infants, 
idiots, lunatics, madmen. It is performed on princi- 
ples of instinct, imitation, education, habit, or illusion ; 
and it implies a fundamental ignorance, or a radical 
privation of the use of knowledge. In this sense, 
Natural is opposed to Moral. 

2. In a more extended sense, it is the exercise of 
such powers or faculties as are not miraculous. As 
thus defined, it is any action or exercise of any order 
of innate faculties or endowments ; and hence it may 
be the deliberate action of a rational and mature mind. 
What the occasion may be, enters not into the account. 
It may be superhuman, or miraculous, like the Savior's 
ejectment of demons, or re-animation of the dead ; 
but the action elicited from the beholder, being merely 
the exercise of natural endowments, is natural agency. 
If the occasion consists of the direct influences of the 
Holy Spirit, the case is not altered, so long as those 
influences merely remove obstruction or embarrass- 



AGENCY. 11 

nient, by counter working other influences which are 
adverse ; or so long as they impart no new faculties, 
and no superhuman vigor. The ability thus secured 
may in a sense be gracious ; but in contra-distinction 
from miraculous or foreign, it is natural ; and hence 
its exercise is natural agency. In this sense, Natural 
is not opposed to Moral. 

IV. Moral agency is the exercise of natural powers 
or faculties, under obligations of divine law. 

Its relation to law constitutes its peculiar property, 
and imparts its distinctive quality ; for in proportion 
as we recede from the light of divine law, moral dis- 
tinctions become confused, and fade away. Every 
possible moral action, like every other act, requires to 
be performed by natural powers, because moral agents, 
as such, possess no other faculties than those which 
are inherent in their nature ; and every possible moral 
action requires to be performed under obligations of 
law, because it must be either right or wrong. Moral 
agency, therefore, is natural agency of a particular 
order ; or natural agency under peculiar circumstances. 
It is a species, of which natural agency is the genu-, 
That moral distinctions have reference to divine law, 
is a doctrine of the Bible. It is written, "Sin is the 
transgression of the law ;" and again, " Where no law 
is, there is no transgression." 1 John 3 : 4. Kom. 
4 : 15. The same thing is implied in what our Lord 
said on the subject of divorce. According to his 
teaching, a separation for slight reasons is a moral 
wrong ; and yet he allows, at least tacitly, that while 



12 AGENCY. 

the permission of Moses on this subject was law, it was 
not a sin. See Matt. 19 : 3-9. 

V. Moral agency is two-fold : essential and adven- 
titious. 

1. Essential moral agency is that action in which 
moral quality has its beginning. This action is voli- 
tion or choice. As exercised under law, which as 
moral action it must be, it may be termed moral voli- 
tion. Independent of moral volition, outward actions, 
though they may be either favorable or injurious, are 
neither virtuous nor vicious, right nor wrong. The 
act of destroying life is not murder, that of taking 
another man's money is not robbery, and that of burn- 
ing another's dwelling is not arson, if in each case the 
act be not willed, or not willed with a sane mind ; 
whereas the act of deliberately willing murder, or rob- 
bery, or arson, with a sane mind, or so as to act under 
law, is in each case a moral act, involving the agent in 
guilt, though the volition be not carried into effect. 
On the same principle, he who utters a falsehood, be- 
lieving his statement to be true, is not guilty of a lie ; 
but he is guilty of a lie, who utters what is true, be- 
lieving his statement to be false. 

Therefore, in moral agency, volition or choice is the 
essential action. Volition, choice, preference, purpose, 
and determination, are respectively so many acts of 
essential moral agency ; not in those attributes in which 
they differ, but in that respect in which they are identi- 
cal as acts of willing. The difference between them is 
not generic, but specific ; and perhaps we should say. 



AGENCY. 13 

merely circumstantial. For example ; a man chooses 
not to live : lie chooses death. This choice extends 
itself into a choice of suicide ; and then we call it a 
purpose or determination. In the interim between 
the choice and the consummation, he experiences strong 
influences in favor of life ; but his mind remaining 
unchanged, we now call his choice, preference : we 
say, he still prefers death. When the fatal moment 
arrives, his choice, as extending itself to the method 
as well as to the end, is denominated a volition. This 
volition his hand obeys, and he dies. Thus his hand 
obeys the volition, the preference, the determination, 
the purpose, the choice ; which is simply saying, it 
obeys the soul's act of willing, as repeated under dif- 
ferent circumstances, and with a variation in its refer- 
ences. 

The most important difference obtains between 
choice and preference. " We always choose in prefer- 
ring, but we do not always prefer in choosing. To 
choose, is to take one thing from among others : to 
prefer, is to take one thing before or rather than an- 
other. We choose a thing for what it is, or what we 
esteem it to be of itself : we prefer a thing for what 
it has, or what we suppose it has, superior to another. 
1 Judgment was wearied with the perplexity of choice, 
where there was no motive for preference.' " — John- 
son. — Cr abb's Synonymes. 

Choosing and refusing are likewise specifically dif- 
ferent, but generically the same. They are exercises 
of the same faculty, and are therefore the same in 



14 AGENCY. 

their nature. Indeed, to refuse an object, is but to 
choose not to have it ; and to choose an object, is to 
refuse its alternative. 

That the exercise of willing is the essential agency, 
agrees with the following Scriptures. "If there be 
first a willing rnind, it is accepted according to that a 
man hath, and not according to that he hath not." — 2 
Cor. 8 : 12. " Ye will not come to me, that ye might 
have life."— John 5 : 40. 

2. Adventitious moral agency is action which is in- 
cidental or contingent. It is action which constitutes 
a subordinate part of moral agency ; not necessarily 
or invariably, but conditionally and generally. It is 
the action of execution : that in which an act of wil- 
ling is carried into effect. It is not essential, because 
moral volition or choice may exist without it. The 
principle has its illustration in the offering up of Isaac. 
The purpose was accepted for the deed. " By myself 
have I sworn, saith the Lord, for because thou hast 
done this thing, and hast not withheld thy son, thine 
only son, that in blessing I will bless thee, and in 
multiplying, I will multiply thy seed as the stars of 
the heaven, and as the sand which is. upon the sea 
shore, and thy seed shall possess the gate of his ene- 
mies. And in thy seed shall all the nations of the 
earth be blessed, because thou hast obeyed my voice." — 
Gen. 22 : 16-18. • 

By affirming that the action of execution is not the 
essential, but the adventitious part of moral agency, 
we do not intend to convey the idea, that the action 



AGENCY. 15 

of execution is a matter of indifference. It may in 
some instances be essential to the agent's salvation ; 
" for not the hearers of the law are just before God, 
but the doers of the law shall be justified." Even 
" faith without works is dead, being alone." In using 
the term adventitious, our meaning is, that the action 
to which it applies, is but a duplicate of a primary 
action which precedes it, and which covers the same 
subject ; and that this duplicate is not necessary to 
the existence and moral quality of the primary and in- 
ternal action. 



CHAPTER II 



®n % Subject 0f tfapots. 



PEINCIPLES. 

VI. Mokal agency implies adequate capacity. 

It implies power, appropriate power, and appropri- 
ate power in sufficient degree ; or it implies the 
existence of adequate faculties, and the requisite con- 
ditions of their exercise. It implies, therefore, a 
capacity which, in its existence, is two-fold : positive 
and relative. 

VII. Capacity as positive, consists of those facul- 
ties of a rational being which are exercised in think- 
ing, FEELING, ACTING. 

" All the facts which fall under the consciousness 
of man, and consequently under the reflection of the 
philosopher, resolve themselves into three fundamental 
facts, which contain all others. These facts, (which 
beyond doubt are never in reality solitary, and separate 
from each other, but which are essentially not the less 
distinct, and which a careful analysis ought to distin- 
guish without dividing, in the complex phenomena of 
intellectual life,) these three facts are expressed in the 
words to feel, to think, to act." — Cousin. 



CAPACITY. 17 

" Is this a full and correct classification of the phe- 
nomena of the human mind ? Are these distinctions 
real? Are all mental phenomena included in these 
fundamental facts ?" These questions I answer in the 
affirmative, for the following reasons : 

1. jSTo mental phenomena can be conceived of, 
which do not fall under one or the other of these facts. 
What mental operation can we conceive of, which 
is not a thought, feeling, or choice, purpose, or deter- 
mination ? 

2. These classes of phenomena differ from one another, 
not in degree, hut in kind. 

How entirely distinct, for example, is thought, in every 
degree and modification, from feeling on the one hand, 
and mental determination on the other. Feelings also, 
of every kind and modification, stand at an equal remove 
from thoughts, and mental acts, or determinations. So 
of the class last mentioned. Choice, in every degree 
or form, makes, in its fundamental characteristics, no 
approach whatever to thoughts or feelings. 

3. All men recognize the states of mind designated by 
the above expressions, as actually existing in human con- 
sciousness, and as clearly distinguishable from each other. 
When I affirm to the peasant, or to the philosopher, 
at one time that I think so and so, at another that I 
have particular feelings, and at another still that I have 
resolved or determined upon a particular course of con- 
duct, both alike readily apprehend my meaning, and 
understand me as referring to states of mind perfectly 
distinct. 



18 CAPACITY. 

4. In all known languages, there are terms employed 
to designate these three classes of phenomena ; terms, 
each of which is applied to one class exclusively, and 
never to either of the others. Thus, the term thought 
is never applied to any mental phenomena but those 
designated by the words to think. We never use it to 
designate feelings, or mental determinations of any Mnd. 
The terms sensation or emotion, are never applied to 
any but the phenomena oi feeling. In a similar man- 
ner, we never apply the terms purpose, willing, deter- 
mining, &c, to the phenomena of thought or feeling ; 
but exclusively to those designated by the words to act. 
The existence of such terms, undeniably evinces that 
the different classes of phenomena under consideration, 
are recognized by universal consciousness, not only as 
existing, but as entirely distinct from one another. 

5. As. a final reason, I would adduce an argument 
presented in a work , recently published on the will: 
"The clearness and particularity with which the uni- 
versal intelligence has marked the distinction under 
consideration, is strikingly indicated by the fact, that 
there are qualifying terms in common use, which are 
applied to each of these classes of phenomena, and 
never to either of the others. It is true that there are 
such terms, which are promiscuously applied to all 
classes of phenomena. There are terms, however, 
which are never applied but to one class. Thus we 
speak of clear thoughts, but never of clear feelings or 
determinations. We speak of irrepressible feelings 
and desires, but never of irrepressible thoughts or 



CAPACITY, 19 

resolutions. We also speak of inflexible determina- 
tions, but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. 
With what perfect distinctness, then, must the univer- 
sal consciousness have marked thoughts, feelings, and 
determinations, as phenomena entirely distinct from 
one another — phenomena,, differing not in degree, but 
in kind. 

"The threefold classification of mental phenomena 
above established and elucidated, clearly indicates a 
tri-unity of mental faculties and susceptibilities, 
equally distinct from one another. These faculties 
and susceptibilities we designate by the terms intel- 
lect or intelligence, sensibility or sensitivity, and will. 
To the Intellect we refer all the phenomena of thought, 
of every kind, degree, and modification. To the Sen- 
sibility we refer all feelings, such as sensations, 
emotions, desires and affections. To the Will we refer 
all mental determinations, such as volitions, choices, 
purposes, &e. When I speak of a diversity of mental 
faculties, I would by no means be understood as 
teaching the strange dogma, that the mind is made up 
of parts which may be separated from one another. 
Mind is not composed of a diversity of substances ; it 
is one substance, incapable of division. Yet this simple 
substance, remaining as it always does, one and iden- 
tical, is capable of a diversity of functions or opera- 
tions, entirely distinct from one another. This diver- 
sity of capabilities of this one substance, we designate 
by the words mental faculties. As the functions of 
thought, feeling, and willing, are entirely distinct from 



20 CAPACITY. 

each other, so we speak of the powers of thought, 
feeling, and willing, to wit, the intelligence, sensibil- 
ity, and will, as distinct faculties of the mind. 

"The remarks made above, respecting the mind itself, 
will at once appear equally applicable to the mental 
faculties which have been enumerated. As we speak 
of the intelligence, for example, as a faculty of the 
mind entirely distinct from those of the sensibility and 
will, without supposing that the mind is not strictly 
one substance, so we may speak of the different powers 
or faculties of the intelligence itself, without implying 
that that faculty is composed of a diversity of parts. 
The term faculty, whether applied to the whole mind, 
or to any of the departments of the mind, implies a 
diversity of functions of the same power or substance, 
and not a diversity of substances or parts/' — Mohan. 

VIII. Capacity as relative, consists of Hie avail- 
ability of the faculties, as enjoyed by means of appro- 
priate relations. 

1. It implies the relation of an object or objects. 
Capacity for moral agency, as such, cannot exist, 
except under such circumstances that the exercise of 
the faculties shall be moral agency. But the exercise 
of the faculties cannot be moral agency, unless it be a 
rational exercise ; and it cannot be a rational exercise, 
unless it be performed in view of something which the 
agent recognizes as sustaining to him the relation of 
an object. An utterly aimless action must necessarily 
be as truly void of moral quality, as the fall of a snow- 
flake, or the devastation of an earthquake. 



CAPACITY. 21 

The object may be considered as two-fold. It com- 
prises something to be obtained or produced, and the 
result of its beirig obtained or produced. The former 
is the proximate, and the latter is the remote object. 

2. Capacity, as relative, implies also the relation of 
a motive or motives. The motive is identical with the 
object, and hence it is also twofold — proximate and 
remote. The one resides in the other, or is insepara- 
bly connected with it, as the result, with its occasion. 
In other words, the distant motive is some result or 
results, to be derived from a possession of the object, 
as such, which constitutes the proximate motive. That 
in view of which an action is performed, whether it be 
designated object, or motive, or both, is essential to a 
capacity for moral agency, because it is that alone by 
which the action is distinguished from the vagary of 
lunacy and madness. When we speak of the motive 
in favor of a volition or action, we may either mean the 
proximate, or the remote object ; but when we speak 
of the motive in favor of the object, we mean by object, 
the proximate object, and by motive, the remote object. 

We may further remark, that motives may evidently 
be as various as proximate objects and their results. 
The proximate motive may be anything which exists, 
or which, may exist ; and the distant motive may be 
the positive or comparative absence of suffering, the 
enjoyment of happiness, the disinterested performance 
of duty, or the recognition of intrinsic worthiness. 
The motives of finite beings are generally recognized 
in forms of misery or happiness ; but not always. 



22 CAPACITY. 

These results, as relating to themselves, moral agents 
frequently disregard ; as when they consider only the 
proximate object, and their own duty to God and 
man. The motives of the Supreme Being, for his 
acts of creation, providence, and grace, exist not in 
any danger of suffering, nor in any susceptibility of 
greater happiness, nor in any sense of duty to a supe- 
rior, but in the recognition of his own infinite worthi- 
ness. 

Because of the contusion which exists in the specu- 
lations of some writers, it may be well to remark, in 
this place, what motive is not ; though after what has 
been said, it would seem to be scarcely necessary. 
Motive is not any exercise of the affections. Such 
exercise is action ; and motives are not action, 
but only incentives to action. Again, motive is not 
susceptibility. The sours susceptibilities are simply 
its adaptations to be impressed by motives. Finally, 
motive is not identical with an existing state or con- 
dition. The state of the mind, as existing, is present, 
whereas the motive, as such, is an object which is fu- 
ture ; and besides, the state of the mind may be 
changed by motive, but it cannot be changed by 
itself. 

3. Capacity as relative, implies the relation of sub- 
jection to motive influence. Motive influence is neces- 
sary to a capacity for moral agency, for the same 
reason that the object is necessaiy ; or because it 
constitutes the force or power, which the object exerts 
on the agent's mind. 



CAPACITY. 23 

It is on account of its influence, that the object is 
denominated motive ; but the two are not therefore 
identical. It is on account of his action, that a ra- 
tional being is called an actor ; but the actor and his 
action remain forever distinct. That motives and mo- 
tive influences are distinct, appears in that the latter 
are experienced^ before the former, as ends are gamed. 
Motive influence is enjoyed previous to the action, and 
of course is experienced independently of the action ; 
whereas the object which constitutes the motive, is 
enjoyed only in the action, or. after it, and in conse- 
quence of it. 

4. Capacity, as relative, implies the relation of sub- 
jection to extrinsic causation. That is to say, sub- 
jection to extrinsic causation in the abstract of moral 
agency. The existence of motive influences depends 
not primarily on the agent affected ; nor can he pos- 
sibly avoid being a subject of such influences. Wheth- 
er he will or not, he must constantly experience them 
in some form, and of some kind or other ; and thus, 
as also by the very nature of his own mind, he is ab- 
solutely and irresistibly caused to act : caused to be 
an agent. As the author of his faculties, and of mo- 
tive influences, is extrinsic of himself, so the causation 
is extrinsic of himself ; and as moral agency can 
exist in no other way, it follows that capacity implies 
this subjection to extrinsic causation. In so far as 
the subjection is produced by motive influence, it is 
implied in capacity as relative. 

Having mentioned causation, it may perhaps be 



24 CAPACITY. 

well to remark in this place, that we employ the term 
cause, in itj stiict and proper sense. Metaphysical 
truth is as exact as mathematical truth, and hence the 
terms employed to express it, like those of mathemat- 
ics, must be understood in an exact sense. The lack 
of exactness in this respect, has brought metaphysics 
into contempt ; nor could the result very well have 
been otherwise. Such writers as President Edwards, 
for example, employ " the word cause, to signify any 
antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, 
on which an event, or the manner of the event, de- 
pends, whether the antecedent has any positive influ- 
ence or not ;" and hence they give the term cause, at 
least three or four different meanings in one. This will 
appear, if we consider for a moment, the antecedents 
on which depends an accountable human action. Grod 
is an antecedent, the finite agent is an antecedent, the 
motive influence is an antecedent, and the medium of 
that influence is an antecedent, on which a given moral 
action depends. 

The author who is allowed to employ the term un- 
der consideration, with such latitude, enjoys an advan- 
tage which renders hi m invincible in any cause, 
whether good or bad, true or false : he is not to be 
overcome, in such a case, by logic nor by Scripture ; 
for he may employ the term in one sense in the major 
premise, and in another sense in the minor premise, 
and then draw his conclusion as if the one meaning 
were equivalent to the other. If it be allowed, there 
is an end of reasoning. All that remains is a sort of 



CAPACITY. 25 

Insane and profitless disputation. " It is sufficient for 
my present purpose to remark, that Edwards has in- 
cluded a number of different ideas in his definition of 
cause ; and that he turns from the one to the other 
of these ideas, just as it suits the exigencies of his ar- 
gument/' — Bledsoe. 

In this work, by causation is not meant occasional- 
ity. The terms, cause and occasion, express entirely 
different relations ;. and the distinction between those 
relations, is one of vital importance. These facts may 
appear from a comparison of different agencies, which 
relate to a given result. Cain, for instance, caused 
the death of Abel ; but God, by a rejection of Cain's 
offering, occasioned the death of Abel. To reverse 
the statement, and say that Cain occasioned, and that 
God caused the murder, would be a gross misrepresen- 
tation. Again, the martyrs, by their faithfulness, oc- 
casioned many bloody persecutions ; but wicked men 
and devils caused those persecutions. The former, fox 
presenting the occasion of this wickedness, were in the 
highest degree praiseworthy ; whereas the latter, for 
causing it, were in the highest degree criminal. Why 
obtained this moral difference ? Simply because of 
the difference between cause and occasion. 

A similar difference exists between cause and means, 
and between cause and subject ; and it possesses a 
similar importance. To illustrate these distinctions, 
we may remark, that the mower, his want, his scythe, 
the grass, and the cutting of the grass, instance the 
cause, the occasion, the means, the subject, and the 
2 



2G CAPACITY. 

effect. The cause improves the occasion, by employ- 
ing the means, to operate on the subject, and to pro- 
duce the effect. In a general way, the means and the 
subject are included in the occasion, as occasion is un- 
derstood when it means both need and opportunity ; 
and hence when we speak of the means as producing 
the result, we may say that they occasioned it, but not 
that they caused it. 

An event is an effect only to its cause : to the occa- 
sion, the subject, and the means, it is merely a result. 
That moral action takes place instead of no action, is 
to man, and to the motives operating on him, a re- 
sult : to Him who gave man his being, and subjected 
him to motive influence, it is an effect. Therefore, in 
respect of a given result, the term cause ; designates 
the primary and sovereign mover. The agent's being 
subject to extrinsic causation, in so far that he must 
act instead of not acting, is not to be understood to 
imply, that he is so subject to extrinsic causation, 
that he must act in a given manner. The two states 
have no necessary connection. 

5. Capacity, as relative, implies the relation of sub- 
jection to law. It is this relation which renders 
national action moral action ; for it is this which ren- 
ders it either right or wrong. If this relation did not 
exist, no agency whatever could have moral quality ; 
and if no agency could have moral quality, no agent 
could have a capacity for moral agency. Subjection 
t o law, therefore, is absolutely indispensable to relative 
power for moral agencv, 



CAPACITY. 27 

This subjection implies the existence of a universal 
principle of law ; and by such a principle is meant, a 
universal ground for the distinctions of right and 
wrong. This ground of distinction exists in the rela- 
tions of being. 

6. Capacity, as relative, implies a perception or 
knowledge of the principle of law. An agent cannot 
truly possess a capacity for moral action, who cannot 
be a subject of praise or blame ; and he cannot be a 
subject of praise or blame, who has never attained to 
the idea of right and wrong ; and he has never at- 
tained to this idea, who has never attained to the 
knowledge of the principle of law. Therefore, utter 
privation of this knowledge involves, relatively, utter 
privation of a capacity for moral action ; as it is writ- 
ten, " If ye were blind, ye should have no sin." — John 
9 : 41. Consequently, capacity, as relative, hnplies 
that the knowledge exists. 

IX. Capacity for moral agency is moral capacity. 
It is such in a two-fold sense. 

1. It is moral, because it is power to perform such 
actions, as shall possess the quality of being either 
right or wrong. Webster defines the term moral, 
thus: "Moral, 1. Relating to the practice, manners 
or conduct of men as social beings in relation to each 
other, and with reference to right and wrong." In 
this sense it is contra-distinguished from natural. 
The distinction here made, is however specific, and not 
generic ; for moral capacity is merely natural capacity, 
as enjoyed under obligations of law. It is natural, as 



28 CAPACITY. 

being not miraculous ; and it is gracious, as being not 
original. As personally enjoyed by us, it was forfeited 
in Adam, and restored through Christ. "For when 
we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died 
for the ungodly." — Kom. 5:6. 

2. It is moral also, because it appertains particular- 
ly to the soul, and has respect to motive influence. 
In this sense, it is moral in contra-distinction from 
physical ; and may be predicated without any reference 
to right and wrong. We say " moral capacity" in the 
former sense, when we mean power to obey or disobey 
God ; whether that power be predicated of the soul 
only, or also of the body. We say "moral capacity" 
in the latter sense, when we mean that internal power 
to perform a given action, which depends on the ex- 
istence and relation of motive influence. In this 
sense, the term moral, means much the same as in 
the phrases, moral certainty, moral impossibility, 
moral courage, moral suasion, and the like ; in which 
are suggested, not the distinctions of right and wrong, 
nor the operations of material force, but siruply the 
influences of motives. 

In this sense, then, capacity, as moral, means sim- 
ply capacity in so far as influences are concerned : in 
so far as they are concerned in their existence, their 
relevancy, and their degree. By denominating capac- 
ity in this respect moral, it is not intended to say, that 
influences are not impulses ; but that they are the 
impulses of ideas in the mind, and not immediately 
of physical contact with extrinsic physical means. 



CAPACITY. 29 

Neither is it intended to say, that these impulses are 
not effects upon the soul as substance ; but that they 
have not an immediate, and hence not always a neces- 
sary, connection with the will and the affections. Our 
Lord " was in all points tempted like as we are, yet 
without sin/' Pie experienced therefore influences in 
favor of evil, hi all their primary force ; yet they had 
no physical effect at all on his will or his affections. 
It is not essential what we call the capacity under 
consideration, only so we understand that it is capacity 
in so far as influence is required, or is in any way con- 
cerned. 

X. Moral capacity is enjoyed by mankind in gen- 
eral. 

1. Mankind in general possess positive capacity. 
They are generally endowed with the facidties of think- 
ing, feeling, and acting ; and they are constantly sur- 
rounded with the objects, and subjected to the 
influences, which induce thinking, feeling, and acting. 
It is a capacity which depends neither on men's agency, 
nor on their situation in life ; being an unconditional 
gift of the Creator, bestowed alike on the civilized and 
barbarous. 

2. Mankind in general possess relative capacity. 
Fust, a principle of law exists ; and mankind enjoy a 
knowledge of it. A revelation of it is given in the 
Holy Bible. " All Scripture is given by inspiration of 
God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for cor- 
rection, for instruction in righteousness, that the man 



30 CAPACITY. 

of God may be perfect, thoroughly- furnished unto all 
good works."— 2 Tim. 3 : 16, 17. 

A revelation of the principle of law, is imparted 
also in the relations of being. These relations cannot 
fail of being more or less clearly understood ; and 
hence the idea of moral obligation, and of divine law, 
cannot fail of being in some measure developed in ev- 
ery rational mind. 

The Pagan Hindoo exclaims, " I am sin, I commit 
sin, my nature is sinful ; mercifully deliver me, 
Godavar." But " sin is the transgression of the law m " 
and hence the Pagan's knowledge of sin, proves his 
knowledge of Divine law. u When the Gentiles, who 
have not the [written] law, do by nature the things 
contained in the law, these having not the law, are a 
law unto themselves, which show the work of the law 
written in their hearts ; their conscience also bearing 
witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, 
or else excusing one another." — Rom. 2 : 14, 15. 

Again, God regards and treats mankind in general, 
as beings who are endowed with moral capacity ; and 
they must possess that which his treatment implies. 
" Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he 
will judge the world in righteousness, by that man 
whom he hath ordained ; whereof he hath given as- 
surance unto all men, in that he hath raised him 
from the dead/'— Acts 17: 31. " For we must all 
appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every 
one may receive the things done in his body, according 



CAPACITY. 31 

to that he hath clone, whether it be good or bad." — 2 
Cor. 5 : 10. 

XI. Moral capacity may vary in degree. 

1. It may exist in a high degree. Among mankind, 
it is enjoyed in its highest measure by enlightened 
Christians : by such men as the apostles, the martyrs, 
the reformers. They possess the power to be exten- 
sively useful and greatly good, or eminently injurious 
and wicked ; for their influence extends onward 
through all ages and all lands, and their knowledge of 
right and wrong is equal to their influence. They are 
the persons " to whom much has been given :" the 
servants to whom then Lord has committed the " five 
talents." 

2. Moral capacity may exist in a very low degree. 
As enjoyed by Pagans, especially the less informed of 
them, it must exist in its smallest measure ; for if 
there are any to whom little has been committed, it is 
they who are destitute of God's written revelation, 
and of its attendant means of grace. They are, how- 
ever, moral agents ; and as such, they cannot but pos- 
sess a measure of moral capacity. If they act beyond 
their measure of such capacity, they in so far act not 
as moral agents, and in so not accountable. 

3. Moral capacity may exist in an intermediate de- 
gree. Unenlightened Christians, and sinners who 
enjoy but the few advantages which some nominally 
Christian countries afford, may perhaps be mentioned, 
as possessing moral capacity in this degree. Their 
state is not absolutely that of paganism, and yet, in 



32 CAPACITY. 

so far at least as the latter are concerned, it is but lit- 
tle different. They are indeed not limited to the pos- 
session of the one talent ; nor are they entrusted with 
the five. The degrees of moral capacity, as enjoyed 
by mankind in general, must in reality be very numer- 
ous ; but in these three classes, high, low, and inter- 
mediate, they are all comprehended. 

XII. In each degree, moral capacity may be either 
unigenous power, or diversified power, 

1. It may be simply unigenous power. That is to 
say, it may be a moral power, to perform in a given 
Instance, that particular agency, and that only, which 
is actually exercised ; or to choose that particular ob- 
ject, and that only, which is actually chosen. 

2. It may also be diversified power. By diversified 
power is not meant a power to choose either one of 
two contrary objects, at or in the moment of a given 
choice ; because at this moment, the choice which ob- 
tains, renders a contrary choice impossible. An agent 
cannot in the same sense and respect, and at the same 
time, choose both life and death ; nor any other two 
objects which are contrary. But by diversified power 
is meant, a moral power to choose or refuse a given 
object, or either one of a number of objects, until the 
object no longer remains for the agent to choose or re- 
fuse, but is chosen or refused. It is an alternative 
power, which terminates when the alternative ceases ; 
and the alternative ends, when the relevant volition or 
choice is exercised. In the relevant choice, it has for 
the time accomplished its end and ceased ; and in so 



CAPACITY. 33 

far as the choice is decisive or irretrievable, that cessa- 
tion is so likewise. It has ceased, because the agent, 
so to speak, has used it up ; and thus it is only his 
own action, which even then precludes the possibility 
of a different volition. 

Diversified power has by some been termed, the 
power of contrary choice ; by which is simply meant, 
that under certain circumstances, the agent exercising 
a given choice, had power to will otherwise than he 

does. 

2* 



CHAPTER III. 



PRINCIPLES. 

XIII. — Unigexous power admits of distinct proof . 

1. It is proved by the agent's subjection to a natural 
law of reason. 

All moral action must be rational ; or, it must be a 
result of some reason which influences the agent's mind. 
In so far as outward, or corporeal action is concerned, 
the reason lies in the will. The body, while in the 
ordinary state, must obey the soul's volition. If the 
volition be to raise the hand to the mouth, as in the 
act of taking nourishment, the hand must comply ; or, 
if the volition be to recline the hand upon a table, the 
hand must still obey. 

This principle of subordination to the will, is true 
of the body in general ; and by subordination to the 
will, we mean subordination to the soul in willing. But 
in a given respect, the soul in willing, is also subject. 
It is subject to what the agent knows and feels to be 
either positively or comparatively 'desirable. We do 
not say that he must desire every object which he real- 



UNIGENOUS POWER. 35 

izes to be desirable — for Christ did not, when he was 
tempted — nor that he must love every object which he 
realizes to be in itself lovely; but that every object 
which he does love, desire, or choose, must appear to 
have in it, or in its results, something to love, desire, 
or choose. This condition of the soul's action, or this 
demand of its nature, is the law of reason : of reason, 
not as it lies in the intelligence only, but as it exists in 
both the intelligence and the sensitivity; and, being 
the law of reason, it cannot be transcended in rational 
action. 

He who should choose, or otheiwise act, in opposi- 
tion to this law, would prove himself to be, not a 
rational agent, and not even a being of sane or natural 
instincts. He would be like a lost world — a world bo 
far out of its orbit as to be beyond the regulating forces 
of the universe. But if this law of reason cannot be 
transcended in rational action, it cannot be transcended 
in moral action ; for all moral action must be rational 
action. That is to say, it must be rational to the actor, 
at the time, and under the circumstances of the case. 
To others it might appear irrational, and if performed 
by them might really be so ; because they may enjoj 
altogether a different sense of the relevant reasons. Bu t 
if it is impossible to them as rational action, it is, for 
that reason, impossible to them as moral action ; and 
so it still holds good, that in moral action the law of 
reason cannot be transcended. 

If, then, this essential law of our being, as moral 
agents, shall in any instances operate wholly in a given 



36 UNJGENOUS POWER. 

direction, it must be wholly irresistible in that direction. 
That is to say, if several objects of choice be presented, 
and this law of our being operate wholly in favor of a 
given one, and thus wholly against the others, that given 
object must be chosen. We have no more power to 
refuse, than the hand has power to disobey the will ; 
for the relevant law of our being is in each case equally 
binding. If it were not binding, it would not be law ; 
and rationality in practice would be mere accident, and 
accountability would be the same, if indeed they were 
at all possible. 

The law of reason is equally irresistible, when it 
operates not wholly, but mostly in a given direction, or 
when the intelligence and the sensitivity point mainly 
in the direction of a given object, but also to some 
extent in the direction of another object or objects. It 
operates then like the strong current of a swollen river, 
in which many an eddy may be discerned, but which, 
nevertheless, bears irresistibly on the timber which floats 
on its bosom. Subjection to the law of reason, precludes 
the agent from choosing that which, in view of the in- 
telligence and the sensitivity both, is to him, upon the 
whole, unreasonable. Hence it follows that a moral 
agent can choose against a lesser reason in favor of a 
greater, because that would not be unreasonable ; and 
that he can choose against a given reason in favor of 
an equal reason, because that also would not be unrea- 
sonable ; but that he cannot choose against a greater 
reason in favor of a lesser, for that would be unrea- 
sonable. It would be unreasonable, because in so far 



UNIGENOUS PQWEK. 37 

as the greater should exceed the lesser, he would choose 
against reason, in favor of no reason ; which by the 
law of rationality is impossible. We repeat, therefore, 
that whenever the law of reason operates wholly or 
mostly in a given direction, it is in that direction irre- 
sistible. 

But may this law of our being, as moral agents, 
operate wholly or mostly in one given direction ? We 
answer in the affirmative. That it may, is proved by 
our own consciousness. We are all conscious, that in 
many instances of an alternative, our understanding 
and feelings are such, that our sense of the desirable 
is wholly or mostly in favor of a given choice, or against 
it. For example, if suicide be proposed to those who 
love life, and are happy in it, they are immediately 
conscious that their sense of the desirable, or the law 
of reason within them, operates wholly against the act, 
and in favor of life. Or, if blasphemy against the Holy 
Spirit be proposed to those who love God more dearly 
than the world, or their life, they are immediately con- 
scious that the law of reason operates in them wholly 
against it ; for they realize only a desirableness to for- 
bear the horrible crime. 

It follows, therefore, that the power of choice is 
sometimes unigenous. As the laws of the universe 
hold back the earth from flying off into infinite space, so 
the laws of our being may hold us back from much that 
is good, or, by the grace of God, from much that is evil ; 
and that not only outwardly, but in the very disposi- 
tions of the heart, and in the exercise of the will. 



38 UNIGENOUS POWER. 

2. Unigenous power accrues to ail who commit un- 
pardonable sin. " Whosoever speaketh a word against 
the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither 
in this world, neither in the world to come/' — Mat. 
12: 32. 

They who can never be forgiven, can never be "in 
Christ;" and. hence they can never bring forth good 
fruit. "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, 
except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye 
abide in me/' — John 15 : 4. They who cannot bring 
forth good fruit, must necessarily bring forth evil fruit. 
But- to bring forth evil fruit, as such, it must be cho- 
sen • and hence they who must necessarily bring forth 
evil fruit, must necessarily choose to do so. 

They who in any respect must necessarily choose to 
do evil, cannot, in the same respect, choose holiness; 
and hence, in that respect, their power of choice must 
be unigenous. If they are not severed from Christ, as 
branches which were in him by faith, they are at least 
severed from his mercy, and have therefore only power 
to wither and season as fuel for the fire. 

Again, it is written of some, "G-od shall send them 
strong delusion, that they should believe a he, that they 
all might be damned who believed not the truth, but 
had pleasure in unrighteousness/' — 2 Thess. 2 : 11, 12. 
In such cases, the light of truth becomes extinct, and 
a judicial blindness takes its place, on a fundamental 
point or points of faith ; or, such persons are abandoned 
to a previously beloved He, with the purpose that the 
abandonment shall be final, and the error fatal. Here 



UNIGEXOUS POWER. 39 

is recognized no relevant alternative power, but only a 
power sg to believe as to perish. 

We read again, "It is impossible for those who were 
once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, 
and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, if they 
shall fall away, to renew them again to repentance ; 
seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God 
afresh, and put him to an open shame/' — Heb. 6 : 4, 6. 
The persons here spoken of, have no poAver to repent ; 
but they have power not to repent. Therefore, in re- 
spect .to the act of repentance, they possess no other 
than mere unigenous power. 

It may perhaps be said, the passage simply teaches 
that God cannot consistently pursue them any longer 
with favorable influences, and that, consequently, He 
cannot renew them to repentance; but that they can 
of themselves repent. For we are told by certain 
teachers, that even the lost in hell are under obliga- 
tion to repent and love God, and that therefore they 
can do so. 

In reply, we would cite the following scriptures: 
"Him hath God exalted with Iris right hand, to be a 
Prince and a Savior, for to give repentance to Israel, 
and forgiveness of sins." — Acts 5: 31. "Then hath 
God also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life." 
. — Acts 11 : 18. "In meekness instructing those that 
oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them 
repentance to the acknowledging of the truth/*' — 2 
Tim. 2 : 25. These passages affirm a divine agency in 
repentance. Either that agency is essential, or it is 



40 UNIGENOUS POWER. 

not. If not, God does an unnecessary thing ; and, 
indeed, a great part of the scheme of salvation is then 
unnecessary — a mere work of supererogation. On the 
other hand, if the scheme of salvation is essential in all 
its parts, and if the divine agency for which it provides is 
indispensable, then repentance is impossible, when God 
cannot consistently have an agency in it. What the 
obligations of the lost may be, affects not the ques- 
tion ; because their abandonment is self-produced, in 
spite of their obligations, by abusing the grounds of 
those obligations. 

3. Unigenous power may result from habit. " Can 
the Ethiopian change his skin? or the leopard his 
spots ? then may ye also do good, that are accustomed 
to do evil." — Jer. 13 : 23. This passage is very plain. 
The African we know has power to retain his color, 
but no power to dispense with it; and hence his 
power respecting it, like that of the leopard concern- 
ing his spots, is unigenous. And such, if we may 
believe Jeremiah, was the power of some, respecting 
moral evil. Isaiah and Paul were of the same opin- 
ion ; as appears from the following passage: "And 
when they agreed not among themselves, they . depart- 
ed, after that Paul had spoken one word. Well spake 
the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet unto our fathers, 
saying, Go unto this people and say, Hearing ye shall 
hear, and shall not understand, and seeing ye shall 
see, and not perceive. For the heart of this people 
is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and 
their eyes have they closed, lest they should see with 



UNIGENOUS POWER. 41 

their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand 
with their heart, and should be converted, and I 
should heal them." — Acts 28 : 25-27. Men have no 
power to improve that which they do not understand, 
and which they neither hear nor see ; and they may 
put themselves into that condition, relative to the 
means of grace. With, this fact agrees the following- 
language of our Savior: "And when he was come 
near, he beheld the city and wept over it, saying, If 
thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, 
the things which belong unto thy peace ! but now they 
are hid from thine eyes/' — Luke 19 : 41, 42. 

4. Unigenous power may result from God's sover- 
eign providence. "The Lord hath prepared his 
throne in the heavens, and his kingdom ruleth over 
all." — Ps. 103 : 19. " The kin^s heart is in the hand 
of the Lord, as the rivers of water ; he turneth it 
whithersoever he will." — Prov. 21 : 1. 

In so far as God turns the heart of a ruler, he does 
it for practical purposes; and hence the turning of 
the heart must include the turning of the will. In 
so far as God turns the mind or will of the agent for 
practical purposes, he does it with a design not to fail, 
but to succeed ; and that design the finite agent cannot 
overcome or defeat. The relevant language of Jehovah 
is, "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my plea- 
sure." In so far, therefore, as God, in this sovereign 
manner, turns the will of the finite agent, that agent 
possesses no power to will otherwise than he does ; and 
hence, in so far he possesses only unigenous power. 



42 TJNIGENOUS POWER. 

5. Unigenous power is clearly instanced. "And 
the Lord said unto Moses, When thou goest to return 
into Egypt , see that thou do all those wonders before 
Pharaoh, which I have put into thine hand ; but I 
will harden his heart, so that he shall not let' the 
people go." — Ex. 4 : 24. 

In these Avoids assurance was given, that Pharaoh 
should, for a time at least, have moral power to re- 
fuse, but no such power to grant, what Moses was 
commissioned to demand ; and consequently, that he 
should morally possess only power to choose and com- 
mand as he actually did. To do otherwise, he could 
not, because he could not overcome the power and 
purpose of Groci ; which were as truly concerned in 
hardening him, as in sending the plagues. The 
hardening of his heart was simply fixing or confirming 
him judicially, either directly or indirectly, in his 
sense of the desirable ; or it Was a perpetuating, or a 
forbearing to destroy, that operation of the law of 
reason, as it existed in Pharaoh, which was adverse to 
his choosing the release of the Hebrews. This law 
of his being, like every other to which he was subject, 
he could neither suspend nor transcend ; and hence 
while it operated mainly against the liberty of his 
bondmen, he had not, upon the whole, power to 
choose or command their liberty. For him to have 
chosen it, without a corresponding change in the ope- 
ration of the law of reason within him, would have 
been as truly a miracle as any which Moses wrought. 
It is true, Pharaoh himself may have been the cause 



UNIGEXOUS POWER. 43 

why this law began to operate as it did, but this does 
not prove thai he could suspend or rise above it ; 
which he would have had to do ; in order to change his 
action, or to choose in opposition to its main opera- 
tion. No moral agent, unaided by the grace of God, 
can deliver himself from the sequences of his sins ; 
and hardness is one of those sequences. In the case 
of Pharaoh, the requisite grace could not, at the time 
of which we speak, be afforded ; and so God caused, 
that the plagues should not, upon the whole, bring 
that grace to his heart. The object of the plagues, 
in so far as Pharaoh and his people were concerned, 
was not grace, but punishment ; and to break their 
grasp upon the children of Israel. 

Pharaoh's case was not singular ; for it is written, 
" Sihon, King of Heshbon, would not let us pass by 
him ; for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and 
made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him 
into thy hand, as appeareth this day/' — Deut. 2 : 30. 

Here we are taught, that God determined to destroy 
Sihon ; that he determined, to this end, to deliver him 
into the hands of the Israelites as their enemy ; that 
he determined, to this end, that Sihon should refuse 
to let Israel pass ; and that to this end, he purposely 
hardened him. But what God determined, the king 
of Heshbon could not avoid or prevent. Therefore 
he could not avoid refusing to let Israel pass ; or 
he could not avoid choosing to oppose them. Conse- 
quently, in respect to Israel's passage through his 
country, he possessed only unigenous power of choice. 



44 UNIGENOUS POWER. 

By these examples, let every one be admonished, 
and fear to offend against God ; and let no sinner boast 
of an absolute self-control. 

XIV. Diversified power admits of distinct proof. 
That is to say, it may be distinctly shown that such 
power is enjoyed at times. 

1. It is proved by the fall of our first parents. 
" God saw everything that he had made, and behold, 
it was very good." If Adam and Eve were constituted 
very good, they must have been made very good, as 
moral agents. If they were made very good, as moral 
agents, they were endowed, in every respect, with 
power to obey God, under all the actual circumstances 
of their primary probation. If they were thus en- 
dowed, they had power to resist the temptations of sa- 
tan. If they had power to resist the temptations of 
satan, they had diversified power ; for they proved 
by their fall, that they possessed also the power 
not to resist. If they had not power to resist, 
they were so made as to sin of necessity, or of a 
moral inability, arising from a defective creation. In 
that case, the work of their creation could not have 
been pronounced " very good." This conclusion is the 
more evident, when we consider, that such a defect in 
them must unavoidably overwhelm their posterity with 
the miseries of sin and death. They were constituted 
the representatives of the entire human race ; and 
hence, by their conduct and fate, they deeply affected 
all mankind in the interests of soul and body, life and 
death, time and eternity. If, as representatives in a 



DIVERSIFIED POWER. 

position the most responsible that finite beings could - \ 
occupy, they were worthy of the high encomium 
passed upon them ; they must have been competent to 
preserve the interests committed to their trust ; and 
they must have been competent, if in placing them in 
so important a post, God was faithful to the unborn 
millions of mankind. That the encomium, was appro- . 
priate, and that God was faithful, we cannot doubt ; 
and hence, that our first parents were competent, we 
cannot doubt. But in being essentially competent to 
preserve the interests committed to their trust, they 
must have possessed the moral power to avoid moral 
evil. We conclude, therefore, that Adam and Eve 
enjoyed the requisite power to resist the devil, and to 
obey God • and because they exercised the opposite 
power, we conclude that they possessed this also. But 
power -to obey God, in connection with power not to 
obey, is diversified power. 

2. Diversified power is proved by natural conscious- 
ness. A consciousness of this power is indicated in 
legislation. First, legislation is applied to such per- 
sons as are presumed to be competent to obey. This 
is evident, from the fact that laws do not appeal to in- 
fants, idiots, madmen, or inferior animals ; who are 
incompetent to that self-control which it requires. 
Second, legislation is applied to such persons as are 
presumed to be competent to disobey. This is implied 
in its penalties, and indeed in its very existence. It 
proclaims, therefore, diversified power : power to obey, 
and power to disobey. 



46 DIVERSIFIED POWER. 

But legislation is in a sense universal. It prevails 
in all ages, and among all nations. It is therefore in- 
dicative of diversified power, as recognized primarily 
in natural consciousness. 

Praise and blame are indicative of the same thing. 
They are employed among mankind universally ; 
which is evidence of a natural consciousness, that they 
are pro£>er in themselves, and truthful in their essen- 
tial implications. But in their application to mankind, 
they imply that the good and evil actions of men 
might have been other than they are, or have been ; 
and this is a direct implication of diversified power. 
A man is not praised for having been born the heir of 
an estate, but for having acquired one by industry and 
economy ; and he is not blamed for losing his estate 
through an unavoidable dispensation of Providence, 
but for losing it through imprudence or neglect. 
"Why is this difference made ? Manifestly, because in 
the one case the agent is so circumstanced, that only 
one thing is possible ; whereas in the other, he is pre- 
sumed to have been so situated, that either one of two 
things were possible. 

Finally, every unsophisticated individual is con- 
scious of having omitted many duties which he might 
have performed, and of having done many things which 
he mighthave omitted. Even when the power of contra- 
ry choice has terminated, the consciousness of its ha vino- 
been enjoyed, still remains ; and it seems to become 
more deep and pungent as life wears away. Hence it 
is that the despairing are led to exclaim, " The time 






DIVERSIFIED POWER. 47 

was when I might have repented ; but now it is too 
late." 

3. Diversified power is proved by the fact, that the 
human will may be exercised in opposition to the Di- 
vine will. The Divine will may be opposed, or it may 
not. If it may not be ojyposeel, it is in all things, in 
all respects, and by all mankind obeyed ; and then all 
mankind are children of God, and will be finally glori- 
fied in heaven. For it is written, " He that doeth the 
will of God, abideth forever." — 1 John 3 : 17. And 
Christ said, " Whosoever shall do the will of God, the 
same is my brother, and my sister, and mother." — 
Mark 3 : 35. 

But all are not Christ's brothers and sisters. He 
says of some, " Ye are of your father the devil, and 
the lusts of your father ye will do." — John 8 : 44. 
And again, " That servant who knew his Lord's will, 
and prepared not himself, neither did according to his 
will, shall be beaten with many stripes." — Luke 12 : 47. 
Therefore, though it is written of "the Most High," 
" He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, 
and among the inhabitants of the earth," so that we 
may say, " Who hath resisted his will," as it is con- 
tained in his purposes concerning his own action, it 
still is true, that his will, as it is expressed in his com- 
mandments concerning the moral actions of his ra- 
tional creatures, may be, and is opposed. If God's 
will is opposed by sinners, it must be that he wills 
they should do otherwise than they do ; and if so, 



48 DIVERSIFIED POWER. 

he wills that they should possess the power to do oth- 
erwise. 

To suppose that he wills the one and not the other, 
is to suppose a contradiction in the Divine mind. It 
is like supposing that a father is willing his child 
should eat, but not willing that he should have power 
to eat. If such inconsistency cannot be true of a man, 
much less can it be true of God. 

But if God wills that sinners should possess the 
power to do otherwise than they do, then, at times at 
least, they actually enjoy that power ; for their pos- 
session of it depends primarily on the Divine agency, 
and in respect to his own agency in a given matter, 
God's will is in every instance accomplished. " None 
can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou V 
But if sinners possess at times the power to do other- 
wise than they do, since they certainly have power at 
all times to do as they do, then, at times at least, they 
actually enjoy diversified power. 

All power is from God ; and to say that he imparts 
to sinners the power to oppose his will, but withholds 
from them the power not to oppose, is to say that in 
his operations God is divided against himself. It is 
to say, that he has at the same time, and in the same 
respect, a will that they shall do as they do, and a will 
that they shall not do as they do ; and that in those 
very actions in which they oppose the Divine will, they 
are entirely subject to the Divine will, and do not op- 
pose it. On this plan, the Supreme Being opposes 
himself through the moral actions of his creatures, 



DIVERSIFIED POWER. 49 

(which "infers a moral necessity of those actions/') 
and then, because he pressed them into his thankless 
service, he is angry with them, and delivers them over 
to the eternal pains of the second death ! 

No wonder that the necessitarian, unable to perceive 
any consistency in these views, should denominate them 
a " mystery/' They constitute indeed a mystery : not 
the " mystery of godliness/' nor the " mystery of iniqui- 
ty," but the mystery of " philosophy falsely so called.' 

In his lamentation over Jerusalem, our Lord said. 
" How often would I have gathered thy childre: 
together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under 
her wings, and ye would not." Hear his solemn 
protestation, in words so plain that a child may under- 
stand him, and behold his tears in proof of his sincer- 
ity ; and then say that his will was not opposed ! The 
man who can do it, is not to be reasoned with : he 
labors under a metaphysical monomania, which would 
prompt him to act the part of Peter, and to merit the 
rebuke which he received, when he attempted to cor- 
rect our Savior, and said, " Be it far from thee, Lord: 
this shall not be unto thee." 

4. Diversified power is proved by future punish- 
ment. " If men are to be punished in another world, 
God must be the punisher. If Grocl be the punisher, 
the punishment must be just. If the punishment be 
iust, the punished must be guilty. If the punished 
be guilty, they could have done otherwise ; if they 
could have done otherwise, they were" possessed of 
diversified power. 



50 DIVERSIFIED POWER. 

5. Diversified power is proved by particular pas- 
sages of Scripture. " God so loved the world, that he 
gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in 
him should not perish, but have everlasting Hie ; for 
God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the 
world, but that the world through him might be 
saved." — John 3 : 16, 17. The term world, either 
means the elect, or all mankind. It does not mean 
simply the elect. If it did, the phrase, " that whoso- 
ever believeth in him should not perish," would mean, 
that whosoever of the elect believeth in him, should 
not perish ; and then the passage would imply, that 
some of the elect would disbelieve and perish. Thus 
it would involve a contradiction. Therefore the term 
world, does not mean the elect only, but all mankind ; 
and in this sense it agrees with the next verse : " He 
that believeth not, is condemned already." 

The verb, " might be saved," can have but one of 
two meanings. Either it means that God sent his 
Son into the world to make salvation possible to all 
mankind, or else that he sent Mm to make it sure to 
all. It does not mean the latter ; because all are not 
saved, though Christ accomplished the Divine purpose, 
and could say, " I have finished the work which, thou 
gavest me to do." — John 17 : 4. It means, therefore, 
the. former. But if salvation is possible to all man- 
kind, then all ' have power to be saved ; and as they 
who are lost have also power not to be saved, it follows 
that they, a least, are at some time or other possessed 
of diversified power. 



DIVERSIFIED POWER. 51 

Again, " To him that knoweth to do good, and 
doeth it not, to bfm it is sin." — James 4 : 17. The 
term "knoweth/' is translated from eido, (Ejfe). In 
Mat. 7: 11, this word is rendered, "know how." 
" If ye then, being evil, Jenoiv how to give good gifts 
unto your children." In Luke 12 : 56, it is translated 
can. " Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the 
sky." In James it cannot mean less ; because it is 
employed to exjoress an essential ground of moral ob- 
ligation. But power to do good, in connection with 
power not to do it, which is also implied in the pas- 
sage, is diversified power. 

Again, " Seek ye the Lord while he may be found : 
call ye upon him while he is near." — Isa. 55 : 6. This 
passage implies at once a possibility to find the Lord, 
and a possibility not to find him ; which constitutes a 
two-fold power. The same power is implied in 
the following passages : " She hath done what she 
could." — Mark 14: 8. " Ye did run well ; who did 
hinder you ?"— Gal. 5 : 7. " Thou shalt love the 
Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy 
soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy 
strength." — Mark 12 : 30. Is this command reasona- 
ble? Is obedience possible? Christ says, "My yoke 
is easy, and my burden light." — Mat. 11 : 31. It is 
therefore possible. But is it possible to those who 
have but little strength ? It is ; for the injunction 
requires, in that case, only the exercise of that little. 
But again, is disobedience possible to those to whom 
obedience is possible ? Is it possible that they should 



52 DIVERSIFIED POWER. 

not love God ; or that they should not love him with 
all their strength ? It is, for it is written, " The love 
of many shall wax cold." — Mat. 24 : 12. And again, 
" Ye did run well ; who did hinder you ?" — Gal. 5 : 7. 
This two-fold possibility constitutes diversified power. 

" Unto the angel of the church of Ephesus write : 
These things saith he that holdeth the seven stars in his 
right hand, who walketh in the midst of the seven golden 
candlesticks : I know thy works, and thy labor, and 
thy patience, and how thou canst not bear them which 
are evil ; and thou hast tried them which say they 
are apostles, and are not ; and hast found them liars : 
and hast borne, and hast patience, and for my name's 
sake hast labored, and hast not fainted. Nevertheless, 
I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left 
thy first love. Kemember therefore from whence thou 
art fallen, and repent, and do the first works ; or else 
I will come unto thee quickly, and will remove thy 
candlestick out of his place, except thou repent." — 
Kev; 2 : 1-5. 

Those who were addressed in this Scripture, had 
power to do that which was laid to their charge : they 
had power to fall from this first love. Had they also 
power not to fall ? They had ; for it is written, " God 
is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted 
above that you are able ; but will with the temptation 
also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear 
it." — 1 Cor. 10 : 13. They possessed, therefore, diver- 
sified power. 

We may perhaps be reminded, by way of objection, 



DIVERSIFIED POWER. 53 

of the following passages : " The carnal mind is en- 
mity against God ; for it is not subject to the law of 
God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in 
the flesh, cannot please God/' — Kom. 8 : 7, 8. "A 
good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a 
corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." — Mat. 7 : 18. 

In view of these passages, the objector may inquire, 
how can a sinner be supposed to have any relevant 
power to exercise a right volition ? We answer, on 
the same principle that a Christian may be supposed 
to have a relevant power to exercise a wrong volition ; 
for, that " a corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit," 
is not any truer, than that " a good tree cannot bring 
forth evil fruit." The figure of the tree refers to what 
moral agents are, in their positive disposition ; and it 
teaches that with this internal disposition, the exter- 
nal conduct must agree. This is what is meant by 
St. Paul when he says, " So then they that are in the 
flesh cannot please God." The " carnal mind," and 
the "carnally minded" soul, are not identically the 
same thing. The carnal mind is a sensual or wicked 
disposition, and such a disposition is enmity against 
God ; and hence the soul cannot please God in this 
disposition. On the same principle, a moral agent 
cannot displease him in a spiritual disposition. Yet 
Christians may sin, and displease their Maker ; for 
they have done it. They must therefore have been so 
tried or operated on, that, in a given respect, all posi- 
tive disposition was removed before they sinned : and 
thus the hindrance was removed before their state was 



54 DIVERSIFIED POWER. 

changed. The same thing may take place with the 
sinner. He may be so influenced, that, in a given 
respect, all positive disposition shall be removed before 
he chooses aright ; and thus all hindrance may be re- 
moved before his state is changed. 

Having shown that capacity may develope itself in 
either of two distinct forms of power, unigenous or 
diversified, we shall now proceed to trace out the facts 
which are connected with each separately. We begin 
with unigenous power. 



CHAPTER IV, 



©it % f retonmraa of prtto & faxixfam fymiwn 



PRINCIPLES. 

XV. Unigenous power implies the predominance 
of a given motive or motives. 

There are those who contend that in every instance 
of moral agency, and therefore in every instance of 
moral capacity, some one motive predominates over 
all others, and in every respect determines the agent's 
choice. We believe, that some one motive predomi- 
nates only in cases of unigenons power. They who 
believe a predominance to obtain in every instance of 
moral agency, as the occasion of such agency, are con- 
strained to sustain their position by reasoning ir- a 
vicious circle. 

" They first assume gratuitously, that the mind acts 
mechanically, like the body ; and that it never can 
act, unless the motive which occasions the action, L? 
greater than any other then existing in the mind. 
Any particular volition is then declared to be necessary. 
because the motive which occasioned it was the 
strongest then in the mind. But when asked for the 
proof that this motive was the strongest, they simply 



56 MOTIVE PREDOMINANCE. 

refer us to the volition, which otherwise (say they) 
could not have taken place. That is, the volition was 
necessary, because it was produced by the strongest 
motive ; and the motive must have been the strongest, 
because -the volition was produced/' — Sedge's Logic. 

Any doctrine which requires to be supported by 
such reasoning, cannot be true. We believe, however, 
that some one motive predominates in all instances of 
moral capacity, as unigenous power. This form of ca- 
pacity is a moral power, in a given case, to will or act 
exclusively in one given direction. It involves, there- 
fore, a moral inability for any other action ; for it is 
this which renders it unigenous. As a moral power, to 
exercise a given volition, it implies an adequate motive 
as the ground of its specific existence ; and as involv- 
ing a moral inability for any other volition in the case, 
it implies an absence or deficiency of motive influence 
for any other. 

But the motive which, in a given case, is adequate to 
the power of action, must be greater than those which 
in the same case are not adequate. That is to say, it 
must be greater in its influence on the agent. What 
it may be in itself, affects not the question. 

Therefore, moral cajDacity, as unigenous power, im- 
plies that the motive which operates in the direction 
of its existence and action, is predominant. 

To act in favor of the weaker, and against the 
stronger of diverse motives, is impossible, because it 
would involve a contradiction. It would imply, that 
the agent is at least as powerfully moved by that 



MOTIVE PREDOMINANCE. 57 

which influences him less, as by that which influences 
him more ; which is an absurdity. The predominance 
of a given motive, and the existence of unigenous 
moral power, do therefore mutually imply each other. 
If an agent could be subjected to unigenous power of 
moral action, independently of the predominance of a 
given motive, he might be limited to a given course of 
volition or action, independently of his convictions and 
affections ; and if so limited, Iris action would be purely 
mechanical. If his action were merely mechanical, it 
could not be properly rational ; and if it could not be 
rational, it could not be moral action. Therefore, if 
an agent could be subjected to unigenous power of 
moral action, independently of the predominance of a 
given motive, then might that which to him is moral 
action, be to hini at the same time not moral action. 
On the other hand, if this absurdity cannot obtain, 
then unigenous power involves the predominance of 
motive influence in a given direction. 

XVI. The predominance of a given motive may 
have its origin, extrinsic of the agent affected. 

1. This sentiment is rational. Reason teaches us 
the existence of a Supreme Being ; and that he exer- 
cises not only a physical, but a moral government over 
mankind. It teaches also, that in the exercise of such 
a government, he must employ motives ; that motives 
may possess such positive and relative strength as he 
p 1 eases ; and that he may please they shall, in their 
influence, at times at least, and in given cases, be un- 
equal. If the Divine Being were excluded from this 



58 MOTIVE PREDOMINANCE. 

control over the diverse influences of good and evil, 
he would be almost entirely without a moral govern- 
ment ; and then either finite beings or blind fortuity, 
would bear almost unlimited rule. Even then, how- 
ever, given motives might, in given instances, predom- 
inate ; and their predominance might have its origin, 
extrinsic of the agent affected. 

2. This sentiment is also scriptural. "And the 
Lord said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go 
up and fall at Eamoth Gilead? And one said on this 
manner, and another said on that manner. And there 
came forth a spirit, and stood before the Lord, and 
said, I will persuade him. And the Lord said unto 
him, wherewith ? And he said, I will go forth, and I 
will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. 
And He said, thou shalt persuade him, and prevail 
also. Go forth and do so." — 1 Kings, 22 : 20-22. 

Some contend, that in all cases the result of motives 
might have been avoided, or that the strongest influ- 
ences may be resisted; but this idea appears to be 
disproved by the case of Ahab. When God had de- 
termined to destroy him at Karoo th Gilead, he actu- 
ated him by a predo urinating motive influence, to go 
up to that place; and that he could not resist this 
influence, we infer, not only from the predominance 
of the influence, but from the Divine purpose, which 
would have been defeated, if the influence had been 
resisted. "The king's heart is in the hand of the 
Lord, as the rivers of water : he turneth it whitherso- 
ever he will." — Prov. 21 : 1. 



EXTRINSIC CAUSATION. 59 

XVII. When the predominance of a given motive, 
in respect to a given action, has its origin extrinsic of 
the agent affected, the agent is, in a two-fold respect, 
subject to extrinsic causation. 

1. He is subject to extrinsic causation in the abstract 
of bis action. . That is to say, through the means of 
the existing motive, and by some power distinct from 
himself which employs that motive, he is caused to 
act, instead of being permitted to forbear acting. It 
precludes the possibility of his being not an agent. 
This result, however, is not confined to motives in pre- 
dominance ; because it depends not on what motives 
are relatively, but on what they are in themselves. 
What we mean to say, is, that man is caused to act 
by means of motives ; and that this is particularly 
true of motives in predominance. 

2. The agent is, at the same time, subject to extrinsic 
causation in the concrete of his action. That is to 
say, under a predominance of motive influence, he is 
not only caused to act, but he is caused to act in a 
particular manner; so that his action, as distinct and 
specific, is the effect of an extrinsic cause. He is 
caused to act as he does, instead of being permitted 
to act otherwise. In accordance with this view, we 
read, " I will send my fear before thee, and will de- 
stroy all the people to whom thou shalt come, and I 
will make thine enemies turn their backs unto thee." 
— Ex. 23 : 27. "Now the Lord had told Samuel in 
his ear, a day before Saul came, saying, To-morrow 
about this time, I will send thee a man out of the land 



60 MORAL CAUSATION. 

of Benjamin, and thou shalt anoint him to be captain 
over my people Israel." — 1 Sam. 9 : 15, 16. Was it 
possible for Saul to falsify this word of God to Sam- 
uel, or to prevent Jehovah from doing his pleasure in 
this matter? If not, then the influences under which 
Saul acted in visiting Samuel, were irresistible, as well 
as divinely originated. 

XYIII. Causation by means of motives, is moral 
causation. 

As are the means, and as is the nature of their op- 
eration, such is the effect ; and when the means con- 
sist of motives, they are properly moral means. 

Physical events or conditions are not precluded, but 
their agency in moral causation, is in a sense remote. 
They conspire to render the agent susceptible of the 
motive influence on which the effect depends, or they 
contribute to produce that influence ; but their con- 
nection with the effect is not immediate. The influ- 
ence intervenes as the connecting and essential link, 
and it is this which distinguishes the result from a 
merely physical or mechanical effect ; or it is this 
which constitutes it a moral effect. 

The subject is illustrated in the manner in which 
Saul was divinely caused to visit Samuel, that the 
purpose of God might be accomplished in his being 
anointed king over Israel. God told Samuel the day 
before, that he would send him " a man out of the 
land of Benjamin," and the youthful Saul was that 
man whom the prophet was to anoint ; but God said 
nothing of this to Saul, and neither did he physically 



MORAL CAUSATION. 61 

necessitate him to go. Yet the event was brought to 
pass. It was providentially so arranged that "the asses 
of Kish, Saul's father, were lost ; and Kish said to 
Saul his son, Take now one of the servants with thee, 
and arise, go seek the asses/' 

Here was, at the right time, a motive, predominant 
and irresistible to a dutiful son, in favor of setting out 
on what proved to be a considerable journey, which 
motive was from time to time modified by new cir- 
cumstances, in such a manner as to consummate the 
Divine purpose. He was influenced of God to seek in 
the right direction, not to find the animals, but to find 
the prophet ; and when he was disposed to turn back, 
the servant was prompted to suggest a visit to the man 
of God, to inquire of him, in whose vicinity they had 
now arrived. Besides, it was so arranged that Saul 
should have no insuperable objection to the proposed 
visit, and that the servant's suggestion should strike 
his mind with peculiar force. " Then said Saul to his 
servant, But behold, if we go, what shall we bring to 
tjie man? for the bread is spent in our vessels, and 
there is not a present to bring to the man of God : 
what have we ? And the servant answered Saul again, 
and said, Behold, I have here at hand the fourth part 
of a shekel of silver ; that will I give to the man of 
God, to tell us our way. Then said Saul to his ser- 
vant, Well said : come, let us go : and they went unto 
the city where the man of God was." 1 Sam. 9 : 3, 7, 
8, 10. * 



CHAPTER V. 



PRINCIPLES. 

XIX. Subjection to extrinsic moral causation, is 
moral necessity. 

1. It is necessity. This term always expresses some 
one essential idea, which is obvious to mankind in gen- 
eral. That idea lies not in the nature of the cause, the 
subject, or the effect; for in the . application of the 
term necessity, the nature of things is not regarded. 
Neither is the idea realized in the opposition of the 
subject ; for that is also disregarded in the use of the 
word. The iden of necessity, must, therefore, lie in 
subjection, or in the state of the agent as subject. * 

Necessity cannot be more than subjection, and it 
cannot be less. When a cause has done its work to 
the utmost, and has created its largest effect, if the 
agent acted on, is not literally annihilated, it has only 
produced his subjection ; and when it has created its 
smallest effect, it has still produced his subjection, in 
so far as the effect extends. To suppose an extrinsic 
cause of the agent's action to exist, exclusive of his 
subjection to that cause, is to suppose that the cause 



MORAL NECESSITY. 63 

of his action is not the cause. To avoid this absur- 
dity, we must admit, that as the cause never produces 
to the agent more than subjection, so it never produ- 
ces to him less than subjection ; and, at the same time 
we must admit, that it never produces more nor less to 
him, than necessity ; and hence, that in so far as the 
agent's state is concerned, it produces nothing differ- 
ent from necessity. The agent may be free in placing 
himself within the range of the cause, but not free, 
perhaps, to retreat, nor free, when the cause seizes him, 
to break or prevent the relation between cause and 
effect. In this lack of freedom lies his subjection, and 
in this subjection lies his necessity. 

2. It is moral necessity. It is such, because it is 
produced by motive influence, as the means ; or, be- 
cause it is properly a necessity of the mind. Motive 
influence, when it is evil, is the charm of that "old 
serpent the devil ;" which, when it predominates, though 
it leaves its subject in possession of limbs to escape, 
yet so controls his mind as to render flight impossible. 
When the predominating influence is holy, the neces- 
sity which it involves, is like that which confirms the 
glorified saints and angels in their happy state of obe- 
dience. We may here remark, 

First. If subjection to extrinsic causation is alone ne- 
cessity, unigenous power is not. A wide and marked 
difference exists between the two. It is the difference 
between a possession of power, and a concomitant lack 
of power ; or rather between power, and a concomi- 
tant subjection, in its exercise, to the power of another. 



64 MORAL NECESSITY. 

The two may co-exist, and in moral agency may mutu- 
ally imply each other, but they are not, on that account, 
identical. 

Second. If moral necessity consists of a subjection to 
extrinsic causation, winch implies the predominance of 
a given motive, and if this motive predominance in- 
volves moral capacity, in the form of unigenous power, 
then moral capacity is implied in moral necessity ; and 
then moral capacity is not moral freedom. Freedom 
and necessity are merely states in which capacity is 
exercised ; and hence they are both distinct from it, 
though each implies a corresponding form of its ex- 
istence. 

Third. If moral necessity consists of a subjection to 
extrinsic causation, it cannot consist of a mere a want 
of disposition," or "a will not." A mere "will not/' 
is only a refusal ; a refusal is an act of choice ; an act 
of choice is an act of moral agency; an act of moral 
agency is not identical with the state in which it is 
performed. 

It may, perhaps, be said, that the exercise of a given 
choice is inconsistent with the exercise of a contrary 
choice at the same time ; and that therefore it involves 
necessity. But the necessity of not also choosing an 
object when we refuse it, or of not also refusing it 
when we choose it, is not the necessity under consid- 
eration — it is not a moral, but a natural necessity. It 
is not produced by any peculiarity in motive influence, 
and it is as really true in respect to those volitions in 
which the agent is free, as in respect to those in which 



MORAL NECESSITY. 65 

he is not. A projectile cannot also descend when it 
ascends ; but this necessity of its nature is entirely dis- 
tinct from its necessity to ascend, or its necessity to 
descend. 

Fourth. Finally, since moral necessity consists of a 
subjection to an extrinsic causation, which is exerted 
through motive influence, it follows that those teachers 
of philosophy are in error, who say that "Freedom con- . 
sists in power to choose according to the motive which 
is placed before the mind." It is impossible to choose, 
as a rational or moral agent, without a motive ; but it 
is not impossible to be necessitated to choose. There- 
fore, power to choose according to some motive, is not 
of itself freedom. 

XX. Moral necessity may apply to the agent, either 
in respect to his agency in the abstract only, or also in 
respect to his agency in the concrete. 

1. Necessity in respect of agency in the abstract, 
is simply a necessity to act, instead of not acting. It 
is an impossibility to forbear the exercise of choice, 
and of other functions of the mind and body. This 
necessity, during our conscious moments, is universally 
and perpetually present. It operates as truly, steadily, 
and effectually,, on every being in the universe of mind, 
as does the law of gravity on every star and planet in 
the universe of matter. The proof lies in the nature 
and relations of being, and in every man's conscious- 
ness of lus own condition. We cannot cease to expe- 
rience want, and we cannot cease to think of various 



66 MORAL NECESSITY. 

objects around us, which are adapted to relieve our 
necessities, and to afford us pleasure. 

Concerning these necessities, and these objects, the 
law of God prescribes our duty; and this law we must 
necessarily either obey or disobey — we must either obey 
or disobey, in the will and otherwise. But thus to ful- 
fill or transgress God's law, is moral action. Therefore, 
we are moral actors or agents, of absolute necessity. 

Necessity, in respect to agency in the concrete, is a 
necessity to act in a given manner. It is a necessity 
to choose a particular object or objects, and of pursu- 
ing a particular course of conduct, instead of some 
other object, or course of action ; or it is a necessity in 
full, so that the agent has no available alternative. It 
includes necessity in the abstract, and therefore differs 
from it only in extent ; yet this difference creates a 
distinction which is of great importance — a distinction 
which lies at the very foundation of freedom and ac- 
countability. 

XXI. Moral necessity, in the concrete of moral 
agency, may he either factitious or radical. 

1. Factitious necessity is that which is a direct re- 
sult of the agent's own action. 

The exercise of given volitions, at least under particu- 
lar circumstances, is adaptedto enhance given influences; 
and hence it may produce a temporary dominion of 
those influences, and by this means a temporary sub- 
jection to extrinsic causation. In choosing, the agent 
relinquishes, in favor of a given influence, whatever of 
reserve he had till then maintained ; and if the result 



MORAL NECESSITY. 67 

be pleasant, that influence will be augmented : if it be 
not pleasant, that influence may be destroyed, and an- 
other be augmented to a state of predominance. In 
either case, such a modification of influences may ensue 
as shall prove the means of his being irresistibly con- 
trolled. 

The exercise of a given volition may so change his 
relations, that the sources of a given influence shall be 
multiplied, and brought nearer, while the sources of 
opposing influences are rendered fewer, and more re- 
mote. Finally, the -exercise of volition in a given di- 
rection, may result in a particular habit ; and that 
habit may become irresistible. "Know ye not, that to 
whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants 
ye are to whom ye obey ; whether of sin unto death, or of 
obedience unto righteousness?" — Rom. 6: 16. The 
word servants, (<5ou/o») signifies slaves. " Can the Ethi- 
opian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? Then 
may ye also do good, who are accustomed to do evil." 
— Jer. 13: 23. 

The dominion of a given kind of influence, as result- 
ing from a given volition, may even be permanent. 
"If we sin willfully, after that we have received the 
knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sac- 
rifice for sins ; but a certain fearful looking for of judg- 
ment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the ad- 
versaries. — Heb. 10: 26, 27. "Whosoever speaketh 
against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, 
neither in this world, neither in the world to come." — 
Mat. 12 : 32. 



68 MORAL NECESSITY. 

2. Kadical moral necessity, in the concrete of moral 
agency, is a necessity which is wholly the effect of an 
extrinsic cause. We have an instance of it in the case 
of the Syrians who flecl from Samaria, under a sudden 
and irresistible impulse of fear: "For the Lord had 
made the host of the Syrians to hear a noise of chari- 
ots, and a noise of horses, even the noise of a great 
host ; and they said one to another, Lo, the king of 
Israel hath hired against us the kings of the Hittites, 
and the kings of the Egyptians, to come upon us. 
Wherefore, they arose and fled in the twilight, and 
left their tents, and their horses, and their asses, even 
the camp as it was, and fled for their life." — 2 Kings, 
7: 6,7. 

Their own conduct, it is true, was made the occa- 
sion of the moral necessity under which they fled ; but 
the necessity was nevertheless radical, because their 
hostile operations against Samaria, had in themselves 
no tendency to produce it. Again we read, "But 
Sihon, king of Heshbon, would not let us pass by him; 
for the Lord thy G-ocl hardened his spirit, and made 
his heart obstinate, that he might deliver hirn into thy 
hand, as appeareth this day." — Deut. 2 : 30. 

These are very plain instances of an extrinsic cause 
operating on finite moral agents, and producing their 
actions as effects ; and the relation of cause and effect, 
is always, to the subject of the operation, a necessary 
relation at the time of the operation. The agent af- 
fected is then truly a subject. 



MOKAL NECESSITY. 69 

XXII. Radical moral necessity, in the concrete of 
moral agency, may he conceived of, as being either ad- 
ventitious or absolute. 

1. As adventitious, it is casual or occasional. It 
does not cover the agent's whole life ; but it is divinely 
created, at an appropriate time or times, as required 
by particular circumstances. It is such as has been 
already instanced in the case of the terrified Syrians, 
and in that of Sihon, the obstinate king of Heshbon. It 
may also be instanced in the case of the ten kings, 
who give their power to the apocalyptic beast. " For 
God hath put in their hearts to fulfill his will, and to 
agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until 
the words of God shall be fulfilled."— Eev. 17 : 17. 
That is to say, " God has given it into their hearts to 
execute his sentence/' — Campbell. 

When God pleases that it shall exist, it unites 
with that necessity which we have denominated facti- 
tious ; which it renders proof against approaching 
events, as in the case of Pharaoh. In the world to 
come, it confirms the wicked in their hostility, and the 
righteous in their allegiance. 

2. As absolute, it is conceived of as applying to 
every moral agent, during every period of his existence, 
and in every act of his agency. This absolute radical 
moral necessity in the concrete of moral agency, is 
what we usually mean by the simple phrase, " moral 
necessity ;" because it is the only moral necessity in 
dispute. The question is, does it exist ? The necessi- 



70 MORAL NECESSITY. 

tarian answers in the affirmative : we answer in the 
negative. 

XXIII. Absolute radical moral necessity in the con- 
crete of moral agency, cannot 'be proved to exist. 

If its existence were a truth, it might be proved, 
either by Scripture, reason, or consciousness ; but it 
cannot be made out by 'either. 

1. It cannot be proved by the Inspired Scriptures. 
Kadical moral necessity in the concrete of moral 
agency, may exist. As we have shown, it is affirmed 
in the Holy Bible ; but it is always spoken of in the 
Scriptures as adventitious, and never as absolute. 
The instances of its existence which are specified, are 
recorded as uncommon events ; and then occasions are 
described as having in them something peculiar. For 
instance, we are not informed that the Lord always 
hardened Pharaoh's heart, or that he always made Si- 
hon's heart obstinate, or that he always sent " strong 
delusions" upon some minds, or that he does the like 
to all sinners ; but we are told that hardness, obstina- 
cy, and delusion, were sent upon particular persons, 
on particular occasions, and with exclusive relevancy 
in the reasons. They are recorded as instances of a 
necessity, which does not cover the agent's entire life ; 
and therefore as instances of a necessity which is not 
absolute. 

2. As absolute, it cannot be proved by reason. 
" The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens, 
and his kingdom ruleth over all ;" so that the neces- 
sity in question cannot exist, unless God subject man- 









MOKAL NECESSITY. 71 

kind, dining every moment of their probation, to the 
circumstances which produce it, and so make himself 
its primary and proper cause. But God is infinite in 
wisdom, goodness, and justice ; -and therefore he can- 
not be the cause of such a necessity. 

The supremacy of the Divine government, and the 
wisdom, goodness, and justice of God, are all ascer- 
tained facts ; and hence they all come under the cog- 
nizance of reason. What, then, is the voice of reason ? 
It proclaims clearly, that the necessity in question 
does not exist, because it would be a necessity for all 
the crimes and miseries of the present state, and for 
all the blasphemies and eternal agonies of the future ; 
and that it would be wholly gratuitous to those who 
are thus doomed. Gratuitous to Adam was the boon 
of his existence, and gratuitous to his posterity was 
the boon of their existence in him ; and if Aclani was 
under this absolute necessity, his fall was gratuitous ; 
and whether he was or not, the fall of his posterity 
was to them gratuitous, because of a gratuitous con- 
nection with him. In his fall, Adam forfeited his ex- 
istence ; and by a gratuitous connection with him, his 
posterity suffered a gratuitous forfeiture of theirs. 
By a gratuitous provision, the forfeited personal ex- 
istence of Adam's posterity, was gratuitously imposed 
upon them ; and hence if this absolute moral necessi- 
ty accompanies it as an inseparable adjunct, that also 
is gratuitous. Reason asserts that such an exercise of 
sovereignty would be an exercise of enormous tyranny : 
that it woidd be cruel and unjust in the extreme. In 



72 MOEAL NECESSITY. 

such a case, God might be just to others, but not to 
those whom his Almighty hand chained down to sin, 
and misery, and death. 

Keason further affirms, that if God were not just to 
all, but exceedingly cruel to some, he could not be 
" good to all ;" and that in such a case, his justice 
and goodness could not be infinite ; and hence, that 
he could not be infinitely wise : not wise enough to be 
universally good and just. Thus the necessity in 
question, if it existed, would preclude the Divine In- 
finitude ; and hence it would, in reality, preclude the 
Divine existence itself. 

Perhaps we shall be told, that this necessity, though 
it involves so much that is terrible, is upon the whole 
wisest and best ; but such a statement wholly fails to 
relieve the subject. It simply affirms that it is wisest 
and best upon the whole, that to a large portion of 
mankind God should be utterly and eternally unjust ; 
and to say this, is to affirm that infinite wisdom and 
goodness are inconsistent with infinite justice. It is 
to affirm that the multitude of sinners is a sacrifice, 
not to justice, but in opposition to justice ; a sacrifice 
to that wisdom and goodness which God exercises, not 
towards them, but towards a few favorites, called 
" the elect." Such a sentiment is not according to 
the deductions of reason, unless it be from false 
premises. 

3. The necessity in question is not proved by con- 
sciousness. Consciousness is found not to contradict 
Scripture and reason, but to endorse and verify them. 



MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 73 

There are seasons in men's lives, when their internal 
experience is not of a state of hardness, obstinacy, 
and judicial delusion ; but of a state of tenderness, 
inquiry, and salutary convictions. In this internal 
experience, they enjoy a consciousness, that they may 
" break off their sins by righteousness ;" and that 
they may " return unto the Lord, and he will have 
mercy upon them, and to our Grod, for he will abun- 
dantly pardon." 

XXIV. Moral necessity is a proper necessity. The 
necessitarian affirms that it is not. His language is 
such as the following : 

" It must be observed, that in what has been ex- 
plained as signified by the name of moral necessity, 
the word necessity is not used according to the original 
design and meaning of the word ; for, as was observed 
before, such terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, 
etc., in common speech, and in their most proper 
sense, are always relative ; having reference to some 
supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor that is 
insufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will 
and endeavor, is supposable in the case of moral ne- 
cessity ; which is a certainty of the inclination and 
will itself, which does not admit of the supposition of 
a will to oppose and resist it." Again he says : " It 
must be observed concerning moral inability in each 
kind of it, [i. e., general and particular] that the word 
inability, is used in a sense very diverse from its origi- 
nal import. The word signifies only a natural inabil- 
ity, in the proper use of it ; and is applied to such 
4 



74 MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 

cases only, wherein a present will or inclination to the 
thing with respect to which a person is said to be un- 
able, is supposable. 

" It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform 
those external actions which are dependent on the act 
of the will, and which would be easily performed if 
the act of the will were present. And if it be im- 
properly said, that he cannot perform those external 
voluntary actions which dejDend on the will, it is in 
some respects more improperly said, that he is unable 
to exert the acts of the will themselves ; because it is 
more evidently false with respect to these, that he 
cannot, if he will ; for to say so is a downright contra- 
diction : it is to say, he cannot will, if he does will." — - 
Edwards on the Will, Part I. Sec. IY. 

By "voluntary actions/' nothing appears to be 
meant distinct from "actions which depend on the 
will." 

That moral necessity is not termed necessity im- 
properly, but properly, appears from the following con- 
siderations : 

1. The criterion by which it has been pronounced 
to be not properly necessity, is a false criterion. The 
criterion is, that proper necessity always instances 
" contrary will or endeavor." By this rule, the indi- 
vidual who dies in a struggle for his life, dies necessa- 
rily ; whereas he whose head is cloven by an unseen 
hand, so that he perishes in a moment, without put- 
ting forth any opposition of will or endeavor, dies not 
properly of necessity, but freely. But common sense 



MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 75 

tells us, that the latter victim is as truly necessitated 
in his death as is the former; and hence that Ed- 
wards' criterion is utterly false. 2 

When an extraneous cause rules the agent by over- 
coming his opposition, he is admitted to be in a state 
of necessity : why, then, is not his condition one of 
necessity, when an extraneous cause rules him with so 
much greater force, as to preclude or destroy the very 
power of opposition? If there is in either case any 
difference of condition in favor of freedom, it is when 
the slave possesses yet some power of resistance ; and 
not when that power is wholly precluded or destroyed. 

Opposition is a counter-act of the inner man, in the 
exercise of volition or choice; and it simply proves 
that what binds and enslaves the body, does not al- 
ways enslave the spirit or soul. It proves that the 
soul is either free, or under a contrary necessity. 
Hence, to say that "contrary endeavor" is essential to 
a given necessity, is to say that either freedom, or a 
contrary necessity is essential to it ; and to affirm this, 
is to affirm that if a given necessity should become 
absolute, so as to preclude all contrary necessity and 
all freedom, then that absolute necessity would not 
properly be necessity at all, but freedom. It is the 
same as to say, disease is a state which implies either 
a measure of contrary disease, or a measure of health ; 
and that when a given disease becomes universal, so as 
to preclude all contrary disease, and all health, then 
that given disease is not properly disease, but health. 
Or, to confine the illustration to "contrary endeavor," 



76 MOEAL NECESSITY KEAL. 

instead of extending it to legitimate implications, the 
absurdity in question is the same as to say. disease 
is that state of the system in which medicine is taken ; 
and that therefore, in all cases in which medicine is 
not taken, or in which no contrary endeavor is made, 
the patient is not properly sick, but well. 

Edwards artfully says : " Necessity is always rela- 
tive ;" which is very true, and throws the reader off 
his guard. He then adds, " having reference to oppo- 
sition or endeavor that is insufficient ;" which is very 
untrue. It is relative in that being not a substance 
but a state, it cannot exist apart from its subject, 
like life 01 death, which has no separate or positive 
existence of its own, but which has a relative existence, 
because it relates to some being or beings. Or, neces- 
sity is relative because it is simply the agent's rela- 
tion of subjection to extrinsic causation. To say, 
therefore, that it is relative as "having reference to 
some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor 
that is insufficient" is wholly gratuitous and in- 
correct. 

Mankind in general believe, that absolute moral 
necessity in moral agency, is utterly inconsistent with 
proper freedom in that agency ; and hence when they 
call it necessity, they do not employ the term figura- 
tively, or as Edwards has it, " nonsensically." 

They mean what they say. Also, they speak of 
moral necessity as a real necessity, under no mistake 
or inadvertence as to contrary endeavor. They know 
perfectly well, that in all cases of moral necessity, the 



MORAL NECESSITY KEAL. 77 

soul is constrained in the exercise of willing ; and that 
therefore no contrary endeavor is possible. It is there- 
fore the deliberate voice of mankind, or of natural 
consciousness in mankind, that contrary will or en- 
deavor is not essential to necessity ; and the argument 
which assumes it to be essential, is merely a sophism : 
a fallacia accidentis. 

But why is Edwards so anxious to make out, that 
moral necessity is not properly necessity ? It is an 
important part of his system ; -being inseparable from 
the idea, that moral freedom is not properly freedom. 

These two ideas contain the very essence of fatal- 
ism ; and they have done more, perhaps, than any 
others, to give currency to the necessitarian's creed. 
When one is persuaded that moral necessity is not 
properly necessity, he is easily persuaded that man- 
kind are universally and absolutely subject to it ; and 
though this conclusion requires him to discard the 
doctrine of moral freedom, he does it the more readily 
from considering, that if moral necessity be not prop- 
erly necessity, moral freedom is not properly freedom, 
and therefore is not of any consequence. 

When moral freedom, which is the essential and 
all-important freedom, has been thrown overboard, the 
mind is supplied, by way of compensation, with the 
idea of a natural freedom ; which idea simply is, that 
the agent is morally necessitated without being also 
necessitated after a physical manner. The meaning 
is, that the agent is only necessitated by one method, 
and not by two. 



78 MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 

It is as if a coroner's jury should say, The man has 
only been murdered by having a dagger thrust to his 
heart, and not also by having his head cloven ; and 
because he had not also his brains dashed out, there- 
fore he was, properly speaking, not murdered at all. 

2. A part of Edwards' argument is merely an irrel- 
evant truism. He says of the necessitated agent, " If 
it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those 
external voluntary actions which depend on the will, 
it is in some respects more improperly said, that he is 
unable to exert the acts of the will themselves ; be- 
cause it is more evidently false, with respect to these, 
that he cannot if he will ; for to say so, is a downright 
contradiction. It is to say, he cannot will, if he does 
will." 

The imposition to be proved is, he is able to exert 
given acts of the will, under a moral inability to exert 
them. 

The proof is, he can will them, if he ivill ; " for to 
say, he cannot will, if he does will, is a downright con- 
tradiction." 

This is strong reasoning : such as is worthy of its 
author, and of his cause ; for all must admit, what I 
believe none have ever denied, that an agent can will, 
if he does will. It would indeed be very conclusive 
reasoning, if it only had some bearing on the question 
in debate, or if the question were essentially othei 
than it is ; but, unfortunately for the argument, the 
question is not whether the agent can will when he 
does will, but whether he can will under a relevant 



MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 79 

moral inability to will, and when of course lie does not 
will. To say, lie can if he does, is equivalent to say- 
ing, he can if he can ; which is all very true, and it 
would be very absurd to deny it, but it is also very 
irrelevant, and very simple. Thus Edwards has at- 
tempted to show, that moral agents can exercise given 
volitions under a moral inability to exercise them, and 
has failed ; elsewhere he has undertaken to prove the 
contrary, and apparently with success. His language 
is as follows : " Moral necessity may be as absolute as 
natural necessity ; that is, the effect may be as per- 
fectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural 
necessary effect is with its natural cause. I suppose 
none will deny, but that in some cases, a previous bias 
and inclination, or the motive presented, may be so 
powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly 
and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives 
or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that 
there is some difficulty in going against them. And 
if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still 
greater. And therefore, if more were still added to 
their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the 
difficulty so great, that it would be wholly impossible 
to surmount it ; for this plain reason, because, what- 
ever power men may be supposed to have to surmount 
difficulties, yet that power is not infinite ; and so goes 
not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount 
ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty de- 
grees of strength, because the degrees of strength are 
beyond the degrees of difficulty, yet, if the difficulty 



80 MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 

be increased to thirty, or a hundred, or a thousand 
degrees, and his strength not also increased, his 
strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the 
difficulty."— On the Will, Part I. Sec. IY. 

This insufficiency of strength, is precisely what ob- 
tains in all cases of moral necessity j and hence that 
necessity is a real or proper necessity. To suppose 
otherwise, is to suppose that a difficulty in a given 
instance, may be wholly ^surmountable, and yet 
wholly surmountable, at the same time ; which is an 
absurdity. This very absurdity, however, belongs to 
Edwards' reasoning as a whole ; and it strongly reminds 
me of Dow's poetry. The crazy man's lines are, if I 
remember correctly, as follows : 

"You can, and you can't; 
You shall, and you shan't; 
You will, and you won't ; 
You '11 be damned if you do, 
And you '11 be damned if you don't." 

3. The idea that moral necessity is termed necessity 
improperly, implies that moral freedom is termed 
freedom improperly ; and hence, that moral freedom 
has, properly speaking, no existence. This is no doubt 
the necessitarian's honest belief. He holds to no 
freedom, which does not permit him to attribute every 
moral action to some cause beyond the actor ; and 
hence he believes in no freedom which takes the actor 
out of the position of a subject in any respect. He 
could very well discard the troublesome word, freedom, 
from his vocabulary ; but he finds it necessary to con- 



MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 81 

descend, somewhat, to the weakness of those who be- 
lieve in freedom as a reality. His only resource, there- 
fore, is to admit freedom in the name, and to exclude 
it in the sense. Thus freedom is taken by the beard, 
as if to be embraced ; but is immediately stabbed un- 
der the fifth rib, and buried in the dark grave of a 
false philosophy. 

4. Moral necessity is real, in that the means and 
cause of its existence are real. Edwards himself 



" Moral causes may be causes in as proper a sense, 
as any causes whatsoever ; may have as real an 
influence, and may as truly be the ground and reason 
of an event's coming to pass." 

Then why are not the appropriate effects as real or 
proper as any other ? To suppose that they are not, 
is to suppose that the nature and reality of causes has 
nothing to do with the nature and reality of their ef- 
fects ; and hence, that the nature of the effect, and 
that of the cause, may be contrary. If a given event 
is an effect, so is the relation or connection between it 
and the cause ; and this connection is that of absolute 
subjection, which constitutes necessity. Now if the 
cause exists in a " proper sense," no matter what that 
cause may be, and if necessity exists as the effect only 
in an " improper sense," it follows that the effect of a 
proper cause of necessity, is, in a proper sense, free- 
dom ; for that is properly a state of liberty, which is 
not properly a state of necessity. Thus the necessita- 
rian's theory is reduced to a contradiction: 
4* 



82 MORAL NECESSITY REAL. 

The cause of an effect really controls its subject ; 
but the necessitarian will not call it proper necessity, 
when the subject puts forth no contrary endeavor. 
Now it happens so, that the cause of moral control is 
also the cause why the subject puts forth no contrary 
endeavor ; and hence the freedom which it involves 
is precisely like that of drift-wood on the bosom of the 
swollen stream : a freedom which is most purely and 
properly necessity. 

5. Necessity consists of subjection to extrinsic caus- 
ation ; and whenever it obtains, it exists by occasion 
of the laws of our being. This is true of both natural 
and moral necessity. But in no case has the agent 
power to transcend the laws of his being ; and hence 
in no case has he power to transcend or contravene an 
existing necessity. The removal of the difficulty by 
himself, as it would involve a suspension of the laws 
of his being, would constitute a miracle. Therefore, 
in so far as moral agents do not possess the power 
to work miracles in their moral agency, in so far the 
moral necessity which they may experience, is neces- 
sity in the proper sense of the term. 

We may remark, that the reason why they are 
not exculpated from blame who are morally ne- 
cessitated in given instances of sin, as drunkards, 
liars, and murderers may be necessitated, is not be- 
cause the necessity is unreal ; but because it is founded 
on their own abuse of freedom. Its existence is by 
no means arbitrary. In other words, the agent who 
is necessitated to perform particular moral actions, 



MORAL NECESSITY REAL. £3 

was primarily not necessitated to become thus necessi- 
tated ; or he was previously free to avoid it. The 
drunkard, the liar, or the murderer, who originates or 
occasions his peculiar moral necessity to commit a 
particular sin, does it, either primarily or remotely, 
against the remonstrances of his conscience, and of 
heavenly influences : does it in abuse and perversion 
of moral liberty. Consequently he is blameworthy as 
a sinner, for the very necessity under which he acts ; 
and if he is blameworthy for that, he is blameworthy 
for whatever of evil it involves. 

The necessity which mankind believe to be incom- 
patible with freedom and accountability, is in its ex- 
istence absolute and arbitrary : a necessity which, in 
respect to particular moral actions, they rightly believe 
does not take place. 

Having treated of the facts implied in unigenous 
power, we come now to speak of those which are con- 
nected with diversified power. 



CHAPTER VI 



PRINCIPLES. 

XXV. Diversified power implies the existence and 
influence of diverse motives. 

Power to perform a given act, as a moral act ; is pow- 
er to perform it as a rational act ; and power to perform 
it as a rational act, implies the existence of a reason 
for it ; and a reason is a motive. Therefore, power to 
perform a given moral act, implies the existence of a 
motive for that act. But a motive in favor of a given 
act, is not a motive in favor of any other act ; and 
specially not in favor of a contrary or rival act. There- 
fore, power to perform the contrary moral act, requires 
the existence of a contrary motive. Hence it is evident, 
that power to perform either one of two opposite moral 
acts, requires the existence of two opposite or diverse 
motives. In other words, power to choose either right 
or wrong, implies the existence, real or fancied, of at 
least two contrary objects, each of which exerts an in- 
fluence on the mind. Each of \\\p diverse objects may 



DIVERSE MOTIVES. 85 

be two-fold — proximate and remote. The proximate 
object is a motive indirectly, or because it influences 
the agent by its real or apparent connection with the 
remote object ; but the remote object is a motive di- 
rectly, or because it influences the agent of itself. The 
remote object, therefore, is the motive in favor of the 
proximate object ; but the motive in favor of the re- 
mote object is the remote object itself. The remote ob- 
ject may be happiness, and the proximate may be that 
which involves the happiness ; or the proximate object 
may be the possession of that which produces happiness. 
Motives may be diverse in three respects. 

1. They may differ in their relation to the divine 
law. As objects, the one may be prohibited, and the 
other not ; and this circumstance produces a contra- 
riety of moral quality. In other respects they may be 
generally the same. 

2. They may be contrary in their relation to each 
other. As objects, either one may be attainable, but 
not both, or, not more than one ; or either one may be 
lawful, but not more than one. The enjoyment of the 
one, may preclude the enjoyment of the other. 

3. They may be diverse in their nature. The one 
may be physical, or sensual, and the other spiritual. 

The allurements of sin, though specifically very nu- 
merous, are all summed up in the ideas of honor, wealth, 
and carnal pleasure ; or they consist of the "weak and 
beggarly elements of this world/' Said Paul, " Denias 
hath forsaken me, having loved this present world." — 
2 Tim. 4: 10. 



86 DIVERSE MOTIVES. 

The motives in favor of righteousness are also many, 
but our Lord sums them up in the following language : 
"He that believeth and is baptized;, shall be saved, but 
he that believeth not, shall be damned/' — Mark 16 : 
16. Or, as given in the Kevelation, through St. John, 
thus : "And I saw a new heaven, and a new earth : 
for the first heaven and the first earth were passed 
away, and there was no more sea. And I John saw 
the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God 
out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her hus- 
band. And I heard a great voice out of heaven, say- 
ing, Behold the tabernacle of God is with men, and he 
will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and 
God himself shall be with them, and be their God. 
And God shall wijDe away all tears from their eyes ; 
and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor 
crying, neither shall there be any more pain ; for the 
former things are passed away. And he that sat upon 
the throne, said, Behold, I make all things new. And 
he said unto me, Write ; for these words are true and 
faithful. And he said unto me, It is done : I am Al- 
pha and Omega, the beginning and the end. I will 
give unto him that is athirst, of the fountain of the 
water of life freely. He that overcometh shall inherit 
all things, and I will be his God, and he shall be my 
son. But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abom- 
inable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcer- 
ers, and idolaters, and all liars, shall have their part in 
the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone ; which 
is the second death/' — Bev, 21 : 1-8. 



DIVERSE MOTIVES. 87 

XXVI. Motives in favor of moral right, and others 
in favor of moral wrong, may consentaneously affect a 
sinful agent. 

1. This principle is proved by two facts in the irre- 
ligious man's experience. The fact of his being a sin- 
ner, implies the existence of incentives to evil ; and the 
fact of his resolving at times to amend, as is often the 
case, implies the existence of benign and holy influen- 
ces. Every instance of a sinner's awakening, is an 
instance of his being acted upon by good motives ; for 
it is a collision between opposite incentives, which occa- 
sions the internal conflict, and that obdurate distress 
which is distinct from godly sorrow, but which may 
eventuate in such sorrow. 

2. That sinners may be subject to both good and 
evil influences, is scriptural. Felix and Agrippa re- 
mained probably unconverted, and therefore under the 
influence of evil ; yet, under the preaching of Paul, the 
one trembled, and the other said, " Almost thou persua- 
dest me to be a Christian." Paul says, " Evil men 
and seducers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and 
being deceived ; " and yet it is written of Christ, "That 
was the true light, which light eth. every man that Com- 
eth into the world."— John 1 : 9. Paul speaks of sin- 
ners in the snare of the devil, as they " who are taken 
captive by him at liis will ; " yet Christ says of the 
Comforter, " When he is come, he will reprove the 
world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment." — 
John 12 : 8. 

Again, Christ said of the Jews, "Ye are of your 



88 DIVERSE MOTIVES. 

father the devil ; and the lusts of your father ye will 
do ; which means that they were under the influence 
of the devil. Yet Stephen said, " Ye stiff-necked, and 
uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the 
Holy Grhost : as your fathers did, so do ye. — Acts 7 : 
51. If they resisted, they must have been affected by 
the Divine Spirit; and if so, they must have been 
wrought upon by a good influence. The same things 
are taught in the parable of the sower. The - seeds 
which "fell upon stony places, where they had not 
much earth," and those which "fell among thorns," 
were not without some effect, or influence ; but it was 
overcome by the greater influence of the stones and 
thorns. There must, therefore, have been a conflict, 
and, of course, a consentaneous operation of the di- 
verse influences. 

XXVII. Motives in favor of moral right, and 
others in favor of evil, may consentaneously affect an 
innocent or holy being. 

1. As proof, we may instance the temptation of our 
first parents in the garden. The tempter found them in- 
nocent, and under the influence of divine truth ; and he 
waited not for Grod to withdraw that influence, but ap- 
proached them at once with the counter influence of 
falsehood. As God was faithful to his goodly creature, 
he could not withdraw his sacred influence previous to 
that creature's transgression ; and that holy being, thus 
situated, could not sin without an evil influence. There- 
fore, the influences of good and evil must have met, on 
the mind and heart of our first parents, before that 



DIVERSE MOTIVES. 89 

mind and heart were sullied with the guilt of a single 
offence. The prelinxinaries of the fall, especially in 
the case of Eve, consisted of a gradual process of in- 
ternal conflict and trial. 

2. Paul had a similar experience. He says ; "I find 
then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present 
with me. For I delight in the law of God, after the 
inward man. But I see another law in my members, 
warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me 
into captivity to the law of sin which is in my mem- 
bers/' — Kom. 7 : 21-23. This language cannot mean 
either more or less, than that the apostle experienced 
the operation of diverse influences. 

3. The Lord Jesus experienced substantially the 
same quality and contrariety of incentives, but with- 
out any evil result. " For we have not a high priest, 
who cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirm- 
ities, but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet 
without sin." — Heb. 4 : 15. If Christ was thus temp- 
ted, he was made to experience the influence of evil 
incentives ; and yet he was never destitute of an in- 
fluence from holy considerations. The two must there- 
fore have operated on his mind consentaneously. 

We cannot infer an agent's sinfulness, from his temp- 
tations. If there is any exception, it is in cases of 
self-originated temptation, which is itself a crime ; 
and even then, as in all other cases, sin is only com- 
mitted by yielding to temptation which existed, previ- 
ous to the sin, and which might have been resisted or 
avoided. If unavoidable temptation be ever so power- 



90 DIVERSE MOTIVES. 

ful, or ever so protracted, the agent affected sins not, 
if he but constantly resists it. No one was ever so 
severely tried, or so powerfully tempted, as the great 
" Captain of our salvation •". yet through the whole 
process he remained spotless and pure : " a lamb with- 
out blemish." — 1 Peter 1 : 19. 

XXVIII. Both good and evil motives existed, or, 
both good and evil influences were experienced, previ- 
ously to the existence of sin. 

Concerning the prior existence of holy influences, 
there can be no difference of opinion. It only remains 
therefore to show, that influences in favor of moral 
evil, were antecedent to the first sin. Sin has now an 
existence ; but there was a period when it had not an 
existence. Previous to the existence of sin, every moral 
agent in the universe was perfectly holy ; consequently, 
till sin was committed, he was perfectly holy who com- 
mitted it. 

But sin is a moral act ; a moral act is a rational act ; 
a rational act is one for which the actor has a previous 
reason ; and a previous reason is a j)revious motive ; 
and a motive is an object which exerts an influence. 
Therefore, a motive influence in favor of moral evil, 
must have existed, and have operated on some mind 
or minds, previously to the existence of the first sin in 
the universe, and consequently while motive influence 
in favor of holiness yet obtained and prevailed. 

But how may this phenomenon be explained 1 We 
answer, in the following manner : Through Divine 
goodness, all intelligent beings were made with a view 



DIVERSE MOTIVES. 91 

to the enjoyment of happiness ; and happiness depends 
on the means of happiness. These means can only 
answer their end by being good, useful, fair, beautiful, 
lovely ; and by these properties, they necessarily awa- 
ken, under favorable circumstances, certain emotions 
which they are adapted to gratify. Hence, to place 
an intelligent social being in the midst of these objects, 
so that he must necessarily behold and contemplate 
them, is to make him feel that it would afford him 
pleasure to enjoy them ; and this is to render him sub- 
ject to their influence as motives. If now a law be 
introduced, prohibiting the enjoyment of some of these 
objects, and permitting or commanding the enjoyment 
of some, then, by reason of their inviting influence, 
some of these objects are motives to transgression, and 
some are motives to obedience. Thus we arrive at the 
existence of good and evil motives, independently of 
sin, and antecedently to it. 

The moral agents who existed before any creature 
had sinned, were intelligent and social ; they were in 
the midst of the most inviting means of pleasure ; 
and they were under law which, allowed and command- 
ed to each a portion, and which denied to each a 
portion of those means. Hence, to each, the influence 
of those means was divided into an influence in favor 
of moral right, and an influence in favor of moral wrong. 
These diverse influences might affect them consentane- 
ously, because the prohibited and the enjoined objects 
by which they are produced, might, to some extent, be 
presented to their minds at the same time. 



92 



DIVERSE MOTIVES. 



Perhaps we shall be reminded of this Scripture : 
" God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth 
he any man/' — James 1 : 13. But the passage is only 
in appearance, and not truly, relevant. That God em- 
ploys the means of happiness for the purpose of leading 
his creatures astray, is all that James really denies. 
That forbidden objects may have an influence, and 
that God gave them their properties, he cannot mean 
to deny. The passage implies that sin is not the nec- 
essary or intended result of what God has made or 
done ; but that moral agents, by cherishing wicked 
desires, may themselves be the cause of their entan- 
glement and ruin. Hence he further writes, " Every 
man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own 
lust, and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it 
bringeth forth sin ; and sin, when it is finished, bring- 
eth forth death." — James 1 : 14, 15. 



CHAPTER VII. 



(B\\ Iptiire (fpilibmm. 



PRINCIPLES. 

XXIX. Diversified 'power implies an equilibrium 
of diverse motives. 

Diversified power is power to clioose in favor of 
either one of two or more different or distinct motives. 

Power to choose as a moral agen$ in favor of either 
one of two contrary motives, is power to choose in fa- 
vor of either as a rational agent. Power to choose in 
favor of either as a rational agent, is power to choose 
in favor of either without a violation of reason. Pow- 
er to choose in favor of either without a violation of 
reason, is power to choose in favor of either with 
equal reason. Power to choose in favor of either 
of the diverse motives with equal reason, implies that 
in their influence the diverse motives are equal. 

Therefore, diversified power of choice implies an 
equihbrium of diverse motives. 

Diverse motives are essential to diversified power, 
as possessing the following properties : motivity, 
equality, distinction. By their motivity they are the 



94 MOTIVE EQU1L1BBIUM. 

reason why action takes place instead of no action. 
A rational mind ; as such, cannot choose without some 
reason or incentive to move it, any more than matter 
can overcome its own inertia ; for the laws of spirit 
and the laws of matter, though different, are equally 
laws of nature, and therefore equally imperious. 

By their "equality they are precluded from being the 
cause why action occurs as it does, instead of other- 
wise. 

Motivity involves the necessity of volition ; and 
equality of diverse motivity so modifies this necessity, 
that either one of two or more volitions are possible. 

The distinction of diverse motives is implied in 
their equality, and hence in the result of their 
equality. 

It may be well to remark, that an equilibrium of 
diverse motives in respect to their influence, is not an 
equilibrium of something else^ and hence, that it is not 
an equilibrium of the will. It is not anything which can 
be expressed by a phrase so unmeaning. It is not 
anything which is different from what it is named ; 
and hence also, it is not identical with indifference. 
All objections and arguments which assume it to be 
other than it is, however they may be endorsed by great 
names, are unworthy of a reply ; because it is easily 
perceived, that they are, of themselves, null and void. 
Yet objections may be advanced, though equally in- 
valid, which, from their plausibility, demand some no- 
tice ; and such are the following : 

First, it may be objected, that diverse motives in 






MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 95 

equilibrium must neutralize, and in effect destroy each 
other ; and hence, that their equality must produce a 
moral inability. This objection is a contradiction in 
terms. 

It is to say, that when the motives operate on the 
agent equally, they do not operate on him at all. The 
property of impelling to action, is an essential element 
in their nature ; for it is identical with their motivity. 
It is that, without which they would not be motives. 

In the property of action or motivity, motives do 
not positively operate on each other at all ; but merely 
on the agent. If diverse motives oppose each other, 
it is only by competition. Action, therefore, is that 
in which they completely agree ; and for that reason 
they can no more neutralize each other in this respect, 
than an alkali can neutralize an alkali. 

Diverse motives in a state of equality, cannot neu- 
tralize each other in their essential properties, because 
they cannot by their equality neutralize or destroy the 
functions of the human system. 

Man was intended to be a moral agent ; and in just 
such a world as we inhabit. He was designed, there- 
fore, to be capable of volition under all the influences, 
and relations of influences, to which he may be sub- 
jected ; and the Divine purpose is no doubt accom- 
plished. If an orange or an apple be divided into two 
equal parts, and then presented to some hungry child 
to choose one of the parts, the two pieces cannot by their 
equality destroy the child's appetite, or its keen relish 
for fruit ; and therefore, as every such experiment 



96 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 

proves, cannot destroy the child's relevant power of 
choice, or volition. But further, when diverse motives 
are unequal, the stronger influence does not neutralize 
the weaker. If it did, there would not be any weaker 
influence ; for to neutralize it in its action would be 
to destroy it. But this the superior motive does not 
of itself effect. The miser may love a dram, but love 
his gold still more, and so refuse to spend ; and all 
because each object has its influence, but the influence 
of the one, is less than that of the other. Therefore, 
as a given influence does not neutralize another which 
is less, so it does not neutralize another which is its 
equal. To suppose otherwise, is absurd. 

Secoxd, it may, perhaps, be objected, that motive 
equilibrium, if it occurs at all, must be too brief in 
duration for practical purposes : too brief to be avail- 
able in moral agency. This objection overlooks the 
ability of God ; or rather it charges him with a radi- 
cal incompetency. 

If motive equilibrium in respect of moral good and 
evil occurs at all, it takes place through Divine agen- 
cy ; and what God originates, he can preserve in being 
as long as the purposes of his moral government re- 
quire, and therefore as long as may be needful to its 
avanibility in moral agency. He has the wisdom to 
understand what is to be done, and the skill to accom- 
plish what his wisdom suggests. If, then, motive 
equilibrium does not exist sufficiently long to be avail- 
able in moral agency, it is because God does not will 
that it should ; and if he does not, it is because he 



MOTIVE EQUILIBKIUM. 97 

does not will that moral agents shall enjoy diversified 
power ; which is contrary to what has been proved. 

Thikd. It is also objected, that good and evil motives 
are so different, that they cannot be compared, to as- 
certain that they are equal. We answer, if they can- 
not be compared to ascertain that they are ever equal, 
they cannot be compared to ascertain that they are 
ever unequal. In this respect, then, the necessitarian 
system has no advantage. 

Moreover, the objection assumes several things 
which are false. It assumes that the good and evil 
motives in a given case, must be essentially different 
in their nature, as well as in their moral quality, 
which is not the case. Of two desirable objects which 
are placed before the mind, the one may be prohibited, 
and the other not, and hence the one may be a motive 
in favor of evil, and the other not ; and yet the two 
objects may be essentially alike. 

It assumes also, that if any comparison takes j)lace, 
it must be a comparison of objects ; whereas the 
equilibrium respects only influences, and good and evil 
influences may be of the same species, and therefore 
essentially the same in their nature. Both may 
appeal to the same faculties, and in the same way. 

The objection, finally, is false, in assuming that the 
proof of the equilibrium of diverse motives or influ- 
ences, is made out by comparing those motives or 
influences. The proof depends on no such thing ; 
but is derived by induction from divinely revealed 
facts. 



98 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 

XXX. An equilibrium of diverse motives, in re- 
spect of their influence, admits of distinct proof . 

1. It is proved by the conditions of the first crea- 
tion. 

" Space we know perfectly to be absolutely infinite. 
Space in itself is in all parts alike. So must it appear 
to the mind of G-od. Now when God determined to 
create the Universe, he must have resolved to locate 
its centre in some one point of space in distinction 
from all others. At that moment, there was present 
to the Divine intelligence an infinite number of points, 
all and each absolutely equally eligible. Neither point 
could have been selected because it was better than 
any other, for all were equal. So they must have ap- 
peared to (rod." — Median. 

What is true of space, is also true of duration or 
eternity. The first created object must have had its 
starting point in duration, as well as its location in 
space ; and for the commencement, all points of dura- 
tion were in themselves alike, and alike to the immu- 
table Jehovah, who could feel no new or pressing want. 
Yet of all equal moments for the commencement, one 
was selected. 

Therefore it is certain, that the Divine mind has 
acted under an equality of diverse motives ; or with- 
out any previous ^equality in their influences. 

2. Motive equilibrium is proved by the first sin. 
The first sin in the universe was committed, either 
from an evil motive, or a holy motive, or no motive. 

First. It was not committed without anv motive* 



MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 99 

Every moral act must be a rational act ; every rational 
act must be performed in view of some reason ; and a 
reason is a motive. The first sin, therefore, was com- 
mitted in view of some motive. 

Second. It was not committed in view of a holy 
motive. Holy motives, no doubt, existed, and operated 
on the agent's mind ; but as holy, they must have op- 
erated in opposition to moral evil. Whatever reaches 
the mind as an incentive to moral evil, for that reason 
is not a holy, but an evil motive to the agent affected ; 
and the first sin must have been committed from a 
corresponding incentive, and therefore from an incen- 
tive to moral evil. 

Third. Therefore, the first sin was committed from 
an evil motive. Again, in its influence on the agent's 
mind, as the occasion of the first sin, this evil motive 
was either less, or greater than the opposite holy mo- 
tive, or else the two were just equal. 

First. It was not in its influence less than the holy 
motive. Previous to the first sin, all finite beings were 
not only holy, but completely rational ; and such, from 
the immutability of God, they must continue in their 
nature and action, until the laws of their being should 
be disturbed as a result of sin. Consequently, the 
first sin could not be an irrational act ; for it could not 
be a result of its own existence. 

But to suppose that the first sin was committed in 
view of an evil motive, which had less influence than 
the opposite holy motive, is to suppose that the first 
sin was an irrational act ; and hence it is to suppose 



100 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 

what is not true. Therefore, the evil motive in view 
of which the first sin was committed, was not, in its 
influence, less than the contrary holy motive. 

Second. The evil motive was not, in its influence, 
greater than the holy motive. The reason is this : 
antecedently to the first sin, it was impossible that evil 
influences should predominate. If an evil influence 
had predominatad previous to the first sin, its predomi- 
nance must have been caused ; for every effect must 
have its cause. If this predominance of evil influence 
had been caused to take place, it must have been 
caused either by the Creator, or by the agent who 
sinned, or by some other finite being. But it was not 
caused by either. 

God could not cause it by anything which he created 
or did, because he could not become the author of a 
creature's alienation and enmity. To suppose he could, 
and then eternally punish that creature, is to suppose 
him capable of the most horrible contradictions in his 
nature and in his conduct. If he had caused a holy 
being to experience a predominance of evil influence, 
he would have destroyed that creature's righteousness. 
But " The righteous Lord loveth righteousness." — Ps. 
11:7. And he cannot destroy that which he exclu- 
sively loves. "God cannot be tempted with evil, nei- 
ther tempteth he any man." — James 1 : 13. Therefore 
no predominance of evil influence, as the occasion of 
the first sin in the universe, could be caused by 
the Creator. Neither could any such thing be caused 



MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 101 

by some finite being or beings, distinct from the agent 
who first sinned. 

If any other finite agent than he had caused it ; that 
agent must have sinned in doing so ; and then there 
would have been a first sin, previous to the first. 
This contradiction could not take place. For the 
same reason, the first sinner himself could not cause 
it ; for he could not, any more than others, commit a 
sin that should be previous to the first sin. Therefore, 
antecedently to the first sin, or as the occasion of the 
first sin, no predominance of evil influence did or 
could take place. 

Third. Having shown that the evil influence which 
occasioned the first sin, was, as the occasion, neither 
less nor greater than the opposing holy influence, it 
follows that the diverse influences were equal. 

It may, perhaps, be objected, that motive equilibrium 
can only occur, if at all, in respect to trifles ; but if it 
respect only so small a thing as the eating or touching 
of a little forbidden fruit, it would not respect a trifle. 

The first sin in the universe, like that in the gar- 
den, may have been very insignificant in its form, and 
in its immediate object ; but in its nature, it was 
great as eternal death. The same littleness and great- 
ness conjoined, may possibly attach to our own con- 
duct. However, motive equilibrium depends not on 
the form of the actions, nor on the magnitude of the 
objects to which it refers; but on their relation in 
point of influence. 

It may also be objected, that motive equilibrium 



102 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 

must immediately produce indifference; and that 
therefore it could not occur before the first sin, except 
as an irresistible means of it, because indifference is 
sin. If this objection were valid, we should gain 
nothing, at least in respect to the first sin, by estab- 
lishing the doctrine of motive equihbrium; but the 
objection assumes what is not true. The immediate 
and necessary result is not a sinful indifference. 

A holy being, for example, must either remain holy, 
or he must become a sinner ; and he must remain 
holy, or he must become a sinner as the result of an 
evil volition, will, or choice. Under an equibbrium 
of diverse motives, he must either remain holy, or he 
must become a sinner by one of two choices: by 
choosing in favor of the evil motive, or by choosing in- 
difference. But neither of these choices is a necessary 
result. We cannot say that he must necessarily choose 
in favor of the evil motive, because we might as well say 
that he must necessarily choose in favor of the holy 
motive. If the equilibrium proves either, it proves both. 
But it cannot prove both. Therefore it proves neither. 

Nor can we say that the agent must necessarily 
choose indifference. First, he does not necessarily 
choose absolute indifference. When the diverse mo- 
tives are equal, they are still incentives to the choice 
of objects distinct from absolute indifference ; and 
there is then no motive to choose an absolute indiffer- 
ence. Consequently, there must be felt a general in- 
terest, as when the divided orange is before the hungry 
child. 



MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 103 

Second, the agent does not necessarily choose a spe- 
cific indifference. The diverse motives are to be con- 
sidered under two aspects : the positive and the rela- 
tive. Each motive is positive in favor of its own ob- 
ject, and hence there obtains a certain amount of 
influence in favor of choosing either one of the diverse 
objects ; but by reason of the agent's inability to 
choose two contrary objects at the same time, each is 
also, by the relation of competition, a motive against 
the choice of the other's object, and hence there ob- 
tains indirectly or relatively, an equal amount of 
influence against the choice of any distinct object. If 
this latter influence must be considered an influence 
in favor of a specific indifference, it is in favor of it 
only as such indifference is put over against a distinct 
object of choice ; and hence that indifference must 
itself be regarded as an object of choice. It must 
present itself as an object of choice, before it can ob- 
tain as sinful. Consequently, the case involves merely 
an equihbrium of diverse motives between the choice 
of a specific indifference, and the choice of something else. 

Now will any one say, that this specific indifference 
must be chosen because of the equilibrium between it 
and a positive object? We have just the same ground 
to say, that a positive object must be chosen. The 
equilibrium in the case, proves the one quite as much 
as the other. But it cannot prove both. Therefore 
it proves neither. Consequently, a sinful indifference 
is not a necessary result of motive equilibrium. 

3. The doctrine of motive equilibrium is proved by 



104 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 

taking a united view of God's promises, and the sins 
of God's people. It is written, " Sin shall not have 
dominion over you." — Horn. 6 : 14. And again, " God 
is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above 
that you are able ; but will with the temptation also 
make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear 
it."— 1 Cor. 10 : 13. 

In these passages it is promised, that evil influences 
shall not be too mighty to resist : that they shall be 
so modified and limited, and that the righteous shall 
be so strengthened and guided, that transgression may 
be avoided. 

Yet transgression, on the part of God's people, is 
not always avoided. Their sins, alas, are many and va- 
rious. Hence, they must sometimes experience an 
equality of contrary influences. The fact that a 
righteous man does an evil act, proves that the relevant 
holy influence does not at the time predominate ; and 
the fact that God's promise is true, proves that as the 
occasion of that act, the relevant evil influence does 
not predominate. But when neither predominates, 
they must be in a state of equipoise. 

4. Motive equilibrium is proved by the fact, that 
the Divine scheme of salvation is adapted to the fallen 
condition of mankind. If Christ fulfilled his mission, 
he is "the Savior of all men."— 1 Tim. 4: 10 ; Heb. 
2 : 9. If Christ is " the Savior of all men," he exe- 
cutes a scheme of salvation which is adapted to the 
fallen condition, primarily, of "all men;" for to be 
really their " Savior," cannot admit of less. 



MOTIVE EQUILIBKIUM. 105 

If Christ executes such a scheme, he removes from 
every accountable human agent, whatever would be to 
him morally an insuperable hindrance to salvation ; 
for the adaptation of an all-comprehending scheme to 
save, cannot admit of less. The difficulty being a 
moral one, the result of the provision made to meet 
it, must also be moral. If Christ removes from every 
accountable human agent, whatever would be to him 
morally an insuperable hindrance to salvation, then 
for every such agent he interrupts the predominance 
of evil influences ; for an uninterrupted superiority of 
such influences, would be morally an insuperable 
hindrance to salvation. If Christ interrupts for every 
accountable human agent, the predominance of evil 
influences, he causes every such agent to experience, 
at times at least, either a predominance of holy influ- 
ences, or else an equilibrium of the good and evil. 

But Christ does not cause every accountable human 
agent to experience a predominance of holy influences. 
If he did, every such agent, for a season at least, would 
love righteousness and pursue it, and that too of ne- 
cessity ; which multitudes of accountable human 
agents never do. Therefore, if Christ fulfilled his 
mission, he causes every accountable member of the 
human family to experience, at times at least, an 
equilibrium of good and evil influences. This conclu- 
sion is confirmed by the following passage : "He that 
spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us 
all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all 
tilings/' — Eom. 8: 32. It is true, the apostle here 



106 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 

reasons respecting the elect ; but he reasons from an 
act of mercy to the whole human family. His argu- 
ment is, that the gift of the Son is connected with the 
bestownient of such other blessings as are requisite to 
salvation. If the condition of the righteous, as such, 
is met with every requisite, so is that of the wicked ; 
and for the same grand reason : the death of Christ. 

5. The doctrine of motive equilibrium agrees with 
the experience of men. 

First. It agrees with the internal conflict of the 
awakened sinner ; a conflict in which he realizes that 
he is on a poise between life and death. The influence 
of the Divine Spirit, as comprised in motive influence, 
and as thus producing true awakening, does itself pro- 
duce a consciousness of this fact. The fact, therefore, 
at times exists. At such times, the following language 
is peculiarly appropriate. "Seek ye the Lord while 
he may be found : call ye upon him while he is near." 
— Isa. 55 : 6. 

Second. It agrees with the experience of indecision. 
This experience obtains more or less with every person, 
at times, and in relation to particular objects of choice, 
or modes of action ; and it is indicated in such lan- 
guage as the following : I have not determined : I 
have not decided : I have not yet made up my mind : 
I have not come to a conclusion. "What I shall 
choose I wot not ; for I am in a strait betwixt two." — 
Phil. 1 : 22, 23. 

If Paul had not experienced a parity of diverse in- 
fluences, he never could have penned the passage just 



MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 107 

cited ; for under a predominance of motive influence, 
indecision is impossible. The superior motive is in- 
stantly decisive. Therefore to experience indecision is 
to experience the proof of motive equilibrium. 

Third. It agrees with the fact that sin is not a 
mere blunder, arising from a .mistaken sense of "the 
greatest apparent good." That the pleasures of sin 
are not superior to the awards of righteousness, or 
that they are not the "greatest good," the transgressor 
is sometimes made both to know and to feel ; which 
could not be true, if he always acted from a predomi- 
nance of some evil motive, and if that motive con- 
sisted of "the greatest apparent good." 

Every moral agent comprehends enough of truth for 
his own guidance ; and the influence thus exerted on 
his mind, is, at times at least, as strong as that by 
which it is opposed. 

Fourth. The doctrine of motive equilibrium agrees 
with the fact that the lost are wholly "without ex- 
cuse." 

That their blameworthiness is complete, is no doubt 
keenly felt ; and that it will at last be fully and pub- 
licly acknowledged, is plainly declared in the following 
Scriptures: "As I live, saith the Lord, every knee 
shall bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to 
God." — Kom. 14 : 11. " Now we know that what things 
soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under 
the law ; that every mouth may be stopped, and all 
the world may become guilty before God." — Kom. 3 :' 
19. Every sinner will confess the justice of his doom ; 



108 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 

but his mouth will be "stopped" against all excuse, or 
palliation of his guilt. Each will perceive, that in his 
measure his blameworthiness is complete. This could 
not be the case, on the supposition that the motives 
from which the lost acted were less than the holy mo- 
tives, for then they would necessarily not have acted 
from them at all ; and it could not be the case, if the 
motives from which they acted were always greater than 
the opposite holy motives, for then the evil motives 
would always have been irresistible, and so would have 
precluded accountability. Therefore the motives from 
which the lost will be found to have acted, were at 
times neither greater nor less than the opposite holy 
motives. If they had always been a little greater, 
they would in just so far have constituted an excuse ; 
and by that law of rational action which requires the 
strongest motive to be obeyed, the excuse would have 
been complete. God's moral laws do not abrogate his 
natural laws ; but the moral are conformed to the nat- 
ural, so that they do not necessarily contravene each 
other. This idea was inculcated by our Lord when he 
said, " The Sabbath was made for man, and not man 
for the Sabbath."— Mark 2 : 27. 

Fifth. The doctrine of motive equilibrium agrees 
with the fact, that all essential goodness and mercy are 
extended to the whole human family. " The Lord is 
good to all ; and his tender mercies are over all his 
works."— Ps. Ill : 5, 9. 

But there can be no essential mercy to sinners, if 
the predominance of evil motives be not interrupted. 



MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 109 

The plan of salvation is null and void to them ; and 
that by a law of their being, derived immediately from 
then Maker, which requires obedience to the strongest 
motive. Every passage of Scripture, therefore, which 
declares that God is merciful to the whole human race, 
is a proof that no man is under an uninterrupted pre- 
dominance of what to him are evil motives. Yet some ' 
men sin on, and never repent. Therefore, with them 
the holy motives never predominate. Consequently, 
with them the diverse motives are in equipoise, when- 
ever the evil motives do not predominate. 

6. Motive equilibrium is proved by the legitimate 
office of holy influence, in respect to sinners. 

In bringing good motives, or holy influences, to bear 
on the mind of sinners, God has doubtless some end in 
view ; and that end is invariably accomplished, for the 
divine Being cannot be disappointed. That end must 
be one of four which may be supposed. That is to 
say, it is either their worldly happiness, their regenera- 
tion, the immediate condition of their regeneration, or 
the possibility, on their part, of right volition. No 
other supposition is possible ; unless it be, that by it 
God intends to sinners only evil, and no good at all : 
a supposition which no rational mind will entertain for 
a moment. 

First. The office of good motives, in respect to the 
finally impenitent, is not primarily to improve their 
temporal condition. The essential motives to holiness 
are fruits of the death of Christ ; and the primary 
object of what his death procures, must be of more 



110 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 

importance than anything purely temporal : of more 
importance than merely to make men happier sinners. 
The sinner would be deceived in their import, if the 
case were otherwise ; and then St. Paul could not have 
said, " Our exhortation was not of deceit, nor of un- 
cleanness, nor in guile." — 1 Thess. 2 : 3. 

Second. The office of holy motives is not to do the 
work of regeneration. In regeneration, the soul is in 
a sense created anew, not mediately, but immediately, 
by the renovating energies of the Holy Ghost. If the 
work were accomplished by mere motive influence, we 
might find it devoid of mystery ; but now there is 
something in it which is enexplicable. " The wind 
bloweth where it listeth, and thou nearest the sound 
thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and 
whither it goeth : so is every one that is born of the 
Spirit." — John 3 : 8. David, after his "great trans- 
gression," was not satisfied with the exclusive opera- 
tion of holy motives ; but when he felt then influence 
he prayed, " Create in me a clean heart, God, and 
renew a right spirit within me." — Ps. 51 : 10. 

Third. The office of motive influence to holiness, is 
not to create of itself the proximate or immediate con- 
dition of regeneration. If it were, regeneration would 
in all cases ensue, and so all men would find the "strait 
gate," and the " narrow way ;" whereas, they are found, 
alas, by only a " few." 

Fourth. Therefore, the office of holy motives must 
be, to secure to the sinner the power of right volition. 
No other supposition remains to be made. This power 



MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. Ill 

may respect the exercise of choice between life and 
death, or between moral objects which are subordinate 
to life and death. 

Hence it is written, " Choose life, that thou and thy 
seed may live." A heart-felt choice of life, both in the 
abstract and in the concrete, is the grand condition of 
regeneration ; and good motives, by their influence, 
impart the moral power to make this choice. This 
office they perform at some time or other, or at different 
times, for every accountable human agent ; but they 
accomplish no more by their own immediate energy or 
influences. But to impart the moral power of right 
volition, absolutely, without necessitating such volition, 
is simply to counterpoise the influence of evil motives ; 
and the mere counterpoise of evil motives, is simply 
motive equilibrium. 

An objector may perhaps remark, that we represent 
a divine work as being dependent on a human work : 
on a volition or choice. We answer, the Scriptures do 
the same ; but that human work is first represented by 
us, as being itself dependent on a previous divine work. 
In this also we are scriptural ; for it is written, "Work 
out your own salvation with fear and trembling ; for it 
is God who worketh in you, both to will and to do of 
his good pleasure." — Phil. 2 : 12, 13. " For the grace 
of God that bringeth salvation, hath appeared to all 
men, teaching us that denying ungodliness and worldly 
lusts, we should live soberly, righteously and godly, in 
this present evil world." — Titus 2 : 11, 12. The pri- 
mary gifts of God are the spontaneous and universal 



112 MOTIVE EQUILIBRIUM. 

blossoms of salvation. They bud and expand in every 
heart. But the ultimate fruit, which ripens into eter- 
nal life, is neither universal nor arbitrary ; for it results 
only to those who wisely cherish the incipient mercies. 
We may here remark, that an equilibrium of diverse 
motives involves not necessarily a joerversion of the un- 
derstanding, or it does not require that the agent should 
view right and wrong as being to him equally good. 
The inebriate, for example, after advancing to a certain 
position in the great stream of unholy influence, may 
be carried away irresistibly ; yet in every stage of his 
mad career, he understands that his course is not to 
him the " greatest good." But if the judgment may 
be correct, when evil motives are greater in their influ- 
ence than good motives, it may certainly be correct, 
when evil motives are not so strong, or when the diverse 
motives are just equal. Motives oj)erate on the soul, 
not only in respect to the understanding, but also in 
respect to the sensitivity or affections, and they are 
weak or strong, mainly as they operate in the latter 
respect. Now it must be apparent, that when the di- 
verse motives are equal, the judgment cannot be dis- 
turbed or enslaved by an obliquity of the feelings ; and 
hence, that an equality of motives only favors a correct 
judgment. 



CHAPTER VIII. 






(tojtimt from <ffi3rtriit5it tfraium. 

PRINCIPLES. 

XXXI. An equilibrium of diverse motives involves 
exemption in a given respect from extrinsic causation. 

It is by means of motives operating on a mind of 
adequate faculties, that extrinsic causes may produce 
moral effects ; for whatever has no motive influence on 
the mind, cannot be the means of originating and con- 
trolling its action. The motives which serve as means 
to cause moral actions in the concrete, are such as in 
their influence predominate over their opposites ; and 
it is because they predominate, that they are such 
means. For example, when the motive in favor of a 
given act is greater than that which is adverse, the 
agent is caused to perform that act ; but when the 
adverse motive is the greater of the two, he is caused 
not to perform it. The motive, therefore, which is not 
greater in its influence than its opposite, is not a means 
of causing action in the concrete. Therefore, when 
neither of the diverse influences is greater than the 
other, the agent is not extrinsically caused, either to 
perform or to omit the relevant act. By a law of his 



114 EXEMPTION FROM EXTRINSIC CAUSATION. 

being, or in the nature of tilings, he is extrinsically 
caused to do the one or the other ; but he is not thus 
caused to do the one instead of the other. 

This exemption in the concrete of Iris action, from 
extrinsic causation, is always enjoyed in three relations 
of time. 

1. It is enjoyed in the time of the action. A given 
volition, or other action, cannot transpire by occasion 
of diverse motives in eqiulibriuin, and yet be caused 
by a sudden predominance of one of those motives. 
To suppose it could, is to assume that in identically 
the same respect, it might have two separate causes ; 
the one internal, and the other external, or that 
an action may be performed in a state of exemp- 
tion from extrinsic causation in a given respect, 
and yet in the same respect result from subjection to 
such causation, which is an absurdity. Therefore, when 
a volition or other action takes place from a motive 
which, as the occasion, is just equal with its opposite, 
it takes place under a consentaneous exemption from 
extrinsic causation. 

In all such cases we may say, that the action is per- 
formed under the motive equihbrium ; meaning, not 
that the equality in every instance continues after the 
action has commenced, but that no possible predomi- 
nance can then be the occasion of the action. The 
action itself may instantly destroy the equality ; but 
it cannot result from the motive predominance which 
it originates. It is still subordinate to the equilibri- 



EXEMPTION FROM EXTRINSIC CAUSATION. 115 

urn ; or performed from a motive, which, as its occa- 
sion, was equal to the 023posite motive. 

2. Exemption from extrinsic causation is also enjoyed 
before the action. The motive must exist hefore the 
action which it occasions ; and it must exist before the 
action, in the strength in which* it occasions it. For 
the degree of influence is in part the occasion. When, 
therefore, a motive occasions an action in a degree of 
strength which is just equal to that of an opposite 
motive, the equality is previous to that action ; and 
this equality involves a consentaneous exemption from 
extrinsic causation. Therefore, in the order of things, 
the exemption is previous to the action. 

3. Exemption from extrinsic causation is likewise 
enjoyed after the action. If it is enjoyed before and 
in a given act, it must also, in relation to that act, be 
enjoyed after it ; because no subsequent causation can 
change the agent's relation to that act. In other words, 
a given action, which, at the time of its being perform- 
ed, is not the effect of an extrinsic cause, cannot after- 
wards become an effect of such cause ; and hence the 
agent's relation to it, remains forever a relation of ex- 
emption from foreign causation. 



X 



CHAPTER IX, 



0ol $xttlnm* 



PRINCIPLES. 

XXXII. Exemption from extrinsic moral causa- 
tio?i, is moral freedom. 

In other words, exemption from extrinsic causation 
in the choice of moral good and evil, is moral freedom. 
We cannot properly define it by any other term than 
this, or its synonym, liberty. While the African is 
subject to extrinsic causation of service, he is in a 
state of bondage, however the cause may operate to 
produce the effect ; but when he is rendered exempt 
from such causation of service, he is made a free man. 
He who is subject to extrinsic causation in the pecu- 
niary support of government, is thus far necessitated, 
at least proximately ; whereas he who is exempt, is in 
that respect free. In the sense of exempt, the word 
free was employed by our Lord. He said to Peter, 
"What thinkest thou, Simon? of whom do the kings 
of the earth take custom or tribute ? of their own 
children, or of strangers ? Peter said unto him ; Of 



MORAL FREEDOM. 117 

strangers. Jesus saith unto him, Then are the chil^ 
dren free."— Mat. 17 : 25, 26. 

In the following passages, also, the word free is em- 
ployed in the sense of exempt. "Being then made 
free from sin, ye became the servants of righteous- 
ness." — Eom. 6 : 18. " When ye were the servants 
of sin, ye were free from righteousness." — Horn. 6 : 
20. " The woman which hath an husband, is bound by 
the law to her husband, so long as he liveth ; but if 
the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of 
her husband." And again, " if her husband be dead, 
she is free from that law." 

The subject may be further illustrated by the fol- 
lowing reference. A certain individual, having inad- 
vertently suffered his boat to be drawn into the rapids 
above Niagara Falls, was forcibly carried over the 
cataract, and destroyed. When fiercely driven along 
in the terrible current, what was his condition, but 
one of subjection to extrinsic causation. And what 
was this state of subjection, but a state of necessity. 
If before the fatal plunge this subjection had been re- 
moved, so as to afford him a complete exemption in 
this respect, from the mighty energy by which he was 
swept along, or so as to enable him to row his boat 
either up the stream or down, would he not in this 
exemption have found his freedom? Most certainly. 
In like manner does the moral agent, as such, find his 
moral freedom in a given exemption from * extrinsic 
causation. Before him is "the lake which burneth 
with fire and brimstone, which is the second death," 






118 MORAL FREEDOM. 

and the current of unholy influence sets strongly 
towards it ; but in great mercy God has sent hirn a 
countervailing wind of holy influence, so that he may 
either make his way to destruction, or " return unto 
the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him, and to 
our God, for he will abundantly pardon/' — Isa. 55 : 7. 
" Where the Spirit of the Lord is [to counter-balance 
evil influence] there is liberty." — 2 Cor. 3 : 17. 

Moral freedom, as exemption from extrinsic causa- 
tion, in respect to a given act, is scriptural in all its 
relations of time in respect to that act. 

1. It is scriptural as enjoyed in the action. " Ye 
did run well ; who did hinder you, that ye should not 
obey the truth ? " — Gal. 5:7. " And they came ev- 
ery one whose heart stirred him up, and every one 
whom his spirit made willing, and they brought the 
Lord's offering to the work of the tabernacle of the 
congregation, and for all his service, and for the holy 
garments." " And they brought yet unto him free 
offerings every morning." — Ex. 35 : 21. — 36 : 3. 
" What could have been done more to my vineyard, 
that I have not done in it ? Wherefore, when I looked 
that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild 
grapes." — Isa. 5 : 4. 

All this were but solemn mockery, if they concern- 
ing whom it was spoken, were not free in their sins ; 
for in that case, nothing had been done for them to 
purpose, and evil fruit was all that could consistently 
be looked for ; which is contrary to the sober sense of 
the text. 



MORAL FREEDOM. 119 

2. Moral freedom, as exemption from extrinsic cau- 
sation, is scriptural as enjoyed before the action. 

" The Spirit and the Bride say, come. And let him 
that heareth say, come. And let him that is athirst, 
come. And whosoever will, let him take the water of 
life freely."— Rev. 22 : 17. " For God sent not his 
Son into the world to condemn the world ; but that 
the world through him might be sated." — John 3 : 17. 

3. Freedom, as exemption from extrinsic causation, 
is scriptural as enjoyed after the action. 

That is to say, the Bible recognizes the perpetuity 
of the relation which the agent sustains to those past 
actions, which were performed in a state of exemption 
from extrinsic causation. " How often would I have 
gathered thy children together, even as a hen gather- 
eth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not. 
Behold, your house is left unto you desolate." — Mat. 
23 : 37, 38. 

" And when he was come near, he beheld the city 
and wept over it, saying, If thou haclst known, even 
thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong 
unto thy peace, but now they are hid from thine 
eyes." — Luke 19 : 41, 42. Thus the Messiah pro- 
claimed the condition of the Jews hopeless, and justi- 
fied the Divine judgment which was soon to overtake 
them, on the ground of their relation to past acts of 
rejecting salvation ; and that a relation of exemption 
from extrinsic causation, or a relation of freedom. 
The idea of their relation in this respect, as one of 



120 MORAL FREEDOM. 

freedom, is implied in the expression, "How often 
would I — and ye would not." 

That men's relation to their past actions, as char- 
acterized by their condition at the time of those ac- 
tions, does not change, is a principle which lies at the 
foundation of a future judgment, and which is recog- 
nized as such in the following Scripture : " The men 
of Nineveh shall rise in Judgment with this generation, 
and shall condemn it ; because they repented at the 
preaching of Jonas, and behold, a greater than Jonas 
is here. The Queen of the South shall rise up in the 
judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it ; 
for she came from the uttermost parts of the earth to 
hear the wisdom of Solomon, and behold, a greater 
than Solomon is here." — Mat. 12 : 41, 42. 

Perhaps it. may be proper to remark, what must be 
apparent from the nature of tilings, that moral free- 
dom is a property of the agent, and not properly of 
his agency. Agency is in no respect exempt from sub- 
jection to a cause extrinsic of itself; for it is not an 
actor, but an effect, and every effect must have its 
distinct cause. However, it is admissible to say, "free 
agency," if by that phrase be simply meant action, 
either positive or negative, in which the agent is free. 

We may further remark, if moral freedom consists 
in exemption from extrinsic causation, in a given re- 
spect, it consists not in diversified power, or in the 
power of contrary choice. Diversified power is a con- 
comitant of freedom in the first stage of its existence, 
but not freedom itself. The supposition that this 



MORAL FREEDOM. - 121 

peculiar power is moral liberty itself, is the rock on 
which many an advocate of freedom has been wrecked. 
If freedom consisted of diversified power, necessity, as 
being the opposite of freedom, would consist either of 
unigenous power of action, or of the absence of power 
to act Necessity does not consist of the latter, be- 
cause it respects the agent in regard to action or agen- 
cy, for which he is accountable ; and for which, there- 
fore, either proximately or remotely, he possesses 
power. 

Neither does necessity consist of unigenous power 
of action ; because if it did, both it and freedom 
would consist of power, and so would be in their na- 
ture the same. Therefore, diversified power is not 
identical with freedom, though intimately connected 
with it. That this conclusion is just, further appears 
in that freedom in respect to a given action must be 
enjoyed in the time of the action ; for otherwise the 
action would not be performed freely. But in the 
time of the action, the relevant diversified power can- 
not exist. An agent may take or not take, choose or 
not choose, an object ; (and this power is diversified 
power ;) but when he takes it, he cannot also not take 
it : when he chooses it, he cannot also not choose it. 
It is as truly impossible, as that a projectile should 
both ascend and descend at the same time. In the 
time of the act, therefore, no relevant diversified pow- 
er obtains ; and consequently that power is not free- 
dom. It is merely a concomitant of freedom before 

the act. 

6 



122 MORAL FREEDOM. 

We remark^ finally, that the doctrine of moral free- 
dom precludes the necessitarian doctrine of special 
and irresistible grace. The latter doctrine is, that the 
agent cannot choose the grace of regeneration, till his 
soul has been irresistibly regenerated ; or, that he can- 
not truly choose the saving change, until it has actually 
taken place : that all previous efforts are displeasing 
to God, and only serve to sink the awakened soul still 
deeper in the mire of sin and guilt. 

If the doctrine of man's moral freedom is true, or 
if the doctrine of diversified power is true, or if the 
doctrine of motive equilibrium is true, then this doc- 
trine of the necessitarian is not true. Those doctrines 
are all inconsistent with it, and they are supported by 
many arguments. Each is sustained by a number of 
arguments peculiar to itself ; but as each implies the 
others, they are all supported by the proof of each. 
This makes "assurance doubly sure." The doctrine 
of irresistible grace, belongs to the exploded system 
of fatalism ; and hence it is itself exploded. 

XXXIII. Moral freedom may be distinguished into 
generic and specific. 

1. Generic freedom is that which is exercised in gen- 
eric agency. Such agency consists of a primary ' or 
parent action : an action in which a course of subor- 
dinate conduct is involved. Such is the exercise of 
faith, the choice of holiness, or the resisting of God's 
Spirit. Freedom in respect to these generic acts, may 
be named generic freedom. At some time or other, 
if not frequently, every accountable agent enjoys it. 



MORAL FREEDOM. 123 

Hence it is written, " I call heaven and earth to record 
this day against you, that I have set before you life 
and death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose 
life, that both thou and thy seed may live." — Deut. 
30 : 19. " Choose you this day whom ye will serve, 
— as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord." — 
Joshua 24 : 15. 

2. Specific freedom is that which is exercised in 
particular and subordinate moral acts. 

If the generic action be a rejection of G-od's grace, 
the subordinate ones may be those of fraud, intemper- 
ance, or murder ; and if the generic action be that of 
choosing " the good part," the subordinate ones may 
be those of prayer, benevolence, love, martyrdom. 
These subordinate actions may be termed specific, by 
way of contra-distinction : and in them, the agent's 
freedom is not always limited to his generic freedom. 
That is to say, he may be free in the specific, and not 
free in the generic ; or he may be free in the generic, 
and not in the specific. 

The murderer, at the time of his bloody deed, had 
perhaps no control of himself, and the martyr per- 
haps •could not deny his Lord ; but both may have 
been remotely or generically free, and therefore both 
acted as accountable beings. 

Again, a sinner, being unawakened, may be morally 
unable to choose holiness, or to submit his soul to 
God, and so be generically in a state of proximate ne- 
cessity ; while at the same time he may be perfectly 
free to choose either subordinate evil, or subordinate 



124 MORAL FREEDOM. 

good. He may be free to choose attendance either on 
scenes of vice and dissipation, where, it may be, his 
heart will be fatally hardened, or on the means of 
grace as enjoyed at public worship, where he may be 
thoroughly awakened, and be enabled to submit him- 
self to the renovating and saving power of God's 
grace. Thus, while he is generically in a state of 
proximate necessity, he may be specifically in a state 
of proximate freedom. 

XXXIV. Moral freedom may be distinguished 
into essential and non-essential. 

1. Essential freedom is freedom in respect to essen- 
tial moral agency. It is freedom in respect to volition 
or choice. It is essential, because it is an indispensa- 
ble prerequisite to accountability. 

2. Non-essential freedom is that which respects the 
execution of volition. It relates, perhaps, most fre- 
quently to outward actions. As it is obvious that the 
power of willing may exist without the power of doing 
what is willed, so is it also plain, that freedom to will 
an act, may be enjoyed without any freedom to per- 
form that act. The latter may be termed non-essen- 
tial, because it is not requisite to accountability. • 



CHAPTER X. 



PRINCIPLES. 

XXXY. Moral freedom, as exemption from ex- 
trinsic causation, involves intrinsic causation. 

1. This exemption, be it remembered, respects ac- 
tion in the concrete, and not in the abstract. That is 
to say, the agent is extrinsically caused to act instead 
of not acting ; but when proximately free, he is not 
extrinsically caused to act as he does instead of acting 
otherwise. His acting as he does instead of acting 
otherwise, is, however, an effect which must have its 
cause ; and as that cause is not extrinsic, it must be 
intrinsic : as it is not distinct from the agent, it must 
be identical with him. 

Intrinsic causation is exercised in acting. We may 
not say, it is exercised by means of acting, because 
that would imply the relation of antecedent and sub- 
sequent, which is a relation that does not obtain, 
either in the order of time, or in the order of nature ; 
but we may affirm, that the power of causation is an 
attribute of the power of action, and consequently 



126 INTRINSIC CAUSATION. 

that causation is an attribute of action. Apart from 
the power of action, the power of causation cannot 
exist ; and under an exemption from extrinsic causation, 
as occasioned by motive equilibrium, the power of ac- 
tion cannot exist apart from the power of causation. 
The free agent, therefore, does not act in order to 
cause, nor cause in order to act ; but he acts in caus- 
ing, and causes in acting. 

Being caused to act, but not caused to act in a giv- 
en manner, at the same time that he cannot act with- 
out acting in a particular manner, it follows that in 
the particular manner of his acting, or in his action 
as definite and specific, the free agent exercises the 
power of causation unavoidably. At this point, some 
minds may possibly reason somewhat as follows : " The 
same cause, the same casual power, force, or influence, 
without variation in any respect : , cannot produce dif- 
ferent effects at different times. Therefore the doc- 
trine of diversified power is not true ; and consequent- 
ly the idea of freedom, as exemption from extrinsic 
causation, is also not true." 

But the question is not whether under the same 
circumstances a given cause, as such, must invariably 
produce the same effect, but whether before the act 
of causation, and previous to his becoming a given 
cause, the agent may have " power over his own will,"* 
to cause either one of two different volitions : either a 
good or an evil volition ; and hence whether he may 

* St. Paul. 



INTRINSIC CAUSATION. 127 

morally be either one of two different causes : a cause 
of good, or a cause of evil. We think it has been 
made abundantly plain, that he may. 

2. That finite agents may exercise the power of 
causation, is demonstrated in the existence of moral 
eviL 

Moral evil exists, and it must have had a begin- 
ning ; and to have had a beginning, it must have been 
produced by some moral agent as cause. That cause 
must either be the Supreme Being, or some finite be- 
ing. It cannot be the Supreme Being, because he 
could not violate his own law, nor cause his innocent 
creatures to violate it. He is denominated in Scrip- 
ture, " The Holy One ;" and it is written, " God can- 
not be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any 
man/' — James 1: 13. Moral evil, therefore, must 
have been originated, primarily, by some finite being 
as cause. 

3. The creature's causation of moral evil is proved 
also by the necessity of future punishment. 

Future punishment is necessary, or it is not. If it 
were not necessary, it would not be inflicted. " God 
is love ;" and he has sworn, " As I live, saith the 
Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the 
wicked."— Ezek. 33 : 11. 

Again he says, " Judge, I pray you, betwixt me and 
my vineyard. What could have been done more to 
my vineyard, that I have not done in it ? Wherefore, 
when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought 
it forth wild grapes V — Isa. 5 : 3, 4. 






128 INTRINSIC CAUSATION. 



In this passage we are challenged to name anything 
which could have been done, that was not done ; and 
thus we are taught that all was done, that was mor- 
ally possible. 

If G-od had not done all that he might do to pre- 
vent sin and future punishment, he would not be so 
good as he might be ; and then he would not be infi- 
nite in all the perfections of his nature. But in all 
his perfections Grocl is infinite. Future punishment is 
therefore inflicted of necessity. The proper cause of 
this necessity is either in the creature or in the Creator. 
It is not in the Creator ; because he is not the malev- 
olent or incompetent being which he would be if it 
were. It is a necessity, therefore, which has its cause 
in the creature ; and that through the causation of 
moral evil. 

4. The doctrine of causation by finite agents is scrip- 
tural. When Moses gave the children of Israel an 
opportunity to make a free-will offering, " They came 
every one whose heart stirred him up, and every one 
whom his spirit made willing, and they brought the 
Lord's offering — " "And the children of Israel 
brought a willing offering unto the Lord, every man 
and woman whose heart made them willing to bring for 
all manner of work, which the Lord had commanded 
to be made by the hands of Moses." — Ex. 35 : 21, 29. 

Again it is written, " He that standeth steadfast in 
his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his 
own will, and hath so decreed in his heart that he will 
keep his virgin, doeth well/'— 1 Cor. 7 : 37. 






INTRINSIC CAUSATION. 129 

This passage presents to us a case of moral free- 
dom, in the phrase, "no necessity;" and it presents 
that freedom as being an exemption from extrinsic 
causation, in the phrase, "hath power over his own 
will ;" and thus it implies intrinsic causation, in the 
phrases, "hath decreed in his heart/' and "doeth 
well." 

The following passages are of similar import : 

" The spirits of the prophets are subject to the 
prophets." — 1 Cor. 14 : 32. " Israel, thou hast de- 
stroyed thyself." — Hosea 13 : 9. "Lo, this only have 
I found, that God hath made man upright ; but they 
have sought out many inventions." — Eccl. 7 : 29. 

If any passages appear to inculcate a different doc- 
trine, it is either because they are misunderstood, or 
mistranslated. Such is the following : "By grace are 
ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, it 
is the gift of God."— Eph. 2 : 8. 

This Scripture denies that the power to exercise 
faith is of the agent, and also that the connection be- 
tween faith and salvation is of the agent ; but it does 
not deny that the exercise of faith is of the agent. 
Its main doctrine is, that faith is not of itself an 
equivalent for salvation ; and to this effect St. Paul 
explains himself, when he says of salvation, " It is of 
faith, that it might be by grace." — Eom. 4:16. 

The language of Jude, in the fourth verse, is also 
liable to be misunderstood. He says : " There are 
certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old 
ordained to this condemnation." The obscurity, in 



130 INTRINSIC CAUSATION. 

this instance, arises from mistranslation. The phrase, 
before ordained, is translated from the word progeg- 
rammenoi, (tfpo-^pa^evoi) which comes from (<rrpo & 
ypowpw) pro and grapho ; and which merely signifies pre- 
written. 

The passage means that these ungodly men were 
subjects of prophecy : that they were before of old 
described as coming to this condemnation. Campbell 
renders the passage thus : " Certain men have come 
in privily, who long ago were before written to this 
very condemnation/' 

Another obscure passage is the following. "The 
Lord hath made all things for himself ; yea, even the 
wicked for the day of evil." — Prov. 16 : 4. The per- 
sons spoken of are "wicked." Either they were made 
wicked by themselves, or by God. If not by God, then 
to make the wicked for the day of evil, can only mean 
that he renders them who have made themselves wick- 
ed, and remain incorrigibly so, the instruments of glo- 
rifying his justice, "in the day of evil ;" that is, in the 
day of punishment. The Hebrew phrase, rendered 
literally, is, "the Lord doth work all things for him- 
self;" which applies as well to acts of government, as 
to acts of creation. Thus then we are taught by the 
passage, not that God created the wicked to punish 
them, but [that he] so governs, controls, and subjects 
all things to himself, and so orders them for the accom- 
plishment of his purpose, that the wicked shall not es- 
cape his just displeasure ; since upon such men the 
day of evil will ultimately come. It is therefore added 



ACCOUNTABILITY. 131 

in the next verse, "Though hand join in hand, he shall 
not he unpunished." — Watson's Institutes. 

Necessitarians strongly insist on receiving an answer 
to a question like the following. "What is the cause, 
ground, or reason, wiry the free agent acts or chooses 
as he does, and not otherwise V This question con- 
founds two things which are different : the cause and 
the occasion. We will therefore divide it into two, 
viz : 

1. What is the cause ? 2. What is the occasion ? 

Ans. 1. The cause is intrinsic. It is the agent : the 
soul. 2. The occasion is extrinsic. It is the motive 
adopted : the object chosen. 

The cause and occasion fully account for the effect, 
whether the effect be viewed positively or relatively ; 
and though the cause and the occasion are united in 
producing the effect, they are nevertheless distinct in 
themselves, and in their office. Necessitarians attrib- 
ute to the occasion, what belongs to the agent as cause ; 
and thus they degrade the agent to a machine, though 
it may be to a grand and beautiful machine. 

XXXYI. Intrinsic causation involves accountability. 

1. This principle is one that reason teaches. If a 
whirlwind should lift a moral agent from the ground, 
and irresistibly dash him upon a child, so as to produce 
the child's death, that agent would not be held amen- 
able for the event ; but should the tornado lift him, 
and bear him on, under such circumstances that he 
might equally well descend either on the child, or in some 
other spot, and should he then fall on the child, so as 



132 



accotts TAI5ILITY. 



to produce its death, lie would by all men be consid- 
ered a murderer. Why do we acquit him in the one 
case, and convict him in the other? Simply because 
in the one case he merely and unavoidably occasions 
the child's death, and in the other he causes it. There- 
fore, causation involves accountability. 

The same thing is true of freedom in moral agency; 
because such freedom implies intrinsic causation. With- 
out freedom, virtue and vice, praise and blame are wholly 
impossible. To this view the necessitarian objects ; and 
by the aid of a false philosophy, he is enabled to make 
the absurd statement, "that God himself has the high- 
est possible freedom, according to the true and proper 
meaning of the term ; and that he is in the highest 
possible respect, an agent, and active in the exercise 
of his infinite holiness, though he acts therein in the 
highest degree, necessarily ; and his actions of this kind 
are in the highest, most absolutely perfect manner, vir- 
tuous and praiseworthy ; and are so, for that very rea- 
son, because they are most perfectly necessary." — Ed- 
wards. 

We answer, if God's actions are perfectly praisewor- 
thy, because they are performed from a perfect neces- 
sity, that necessity must be fundamentally different 
from the assumed absolute necessity of mankind ; for 
men are not praised on such grounds. 

The author fails, therefore, to prove that human ac- 
countability is consistent with man's subjection to an 
absolute moral necessity. The necessity under which 
God acts, exists and originates exclusively in himself : 



ACCOUNTABILITY. 133 

whereas the absolute moral necessity of the creature, 
if it exist, must be derived extrinsically. Here is a 
fundamental difference. 

If a person were placed on trial before a human tri- 
bunal, for a deed done when he had not control of him- 
self, it would be important to ascertain whether the 
necessity under which he acted, were self-originated, 
as by the indulgence of some vice, or whether it were 
imposed on him by some other person. If the neces- 
sity were found to be self-originated, and if the deed were 
really evil, he would be really blameworthy ; and the 
more so, in proportion as that necessity prevailed. If 
the deed were found to be a righteous one, and the 
self-originated necessity its righteous occasion, the per- 
son would be really praiseworthy ; and the more so, as 
the benign necessity prevailed. 

But, on the other hand, if it were found that the 
necessity under which he acted was imposed by some 
other person, the blame and indignation, or the praise 
and esteem, as the case might be, would be wholly trans- 
ferred to that other person. If, therefore, we would 
reason correctly from the necessity under which God 
acts, to that under which the finite agent may be as- 
sumed to act, we must in our reasoning make the two 
cases equal ; and the moment we do that, the necessi- 
tarian's argument is exploded. 

If we make the two cases equal, by supposing that 
the necessity under which God acts is derived, extrin- 
sic of himself, we remove the virtue of his action, and 
with it, the praise of his action, to another and a higher 



134 ACCOUNTABILITY. 

agent as its proper cause, which is fatal to the neces- 
sitarian's argument. If, on the other hand, we make 
the two cases equal, by supposing that the finite agent 
originates to himself a necessity to act in a given rnan- 
ner ; we imply intrinsic causation, and hence exemp- 
tion from extrinsic causation, which is freedom : the 
very thing against which the objection is brought. Thus 
is the necessitarian environed with difficulties. He 
does not make the two cases equal — his argument is 
irrelevant and void. If he would render them equal in his 
reasoning, he must either reason against human ac- 
countability, and Divine praiseworthiness, or against 
his own favorite doctrine of moral necessity. 

Others may prefer to answer the necessitarian as fol- 
lows : "Grod, as the cause unconditional and absolute, 
is a, free and not a necessary cause. This is absolutely 
evident from the fact that the effects of the divine 
agency are in time, and not in eternity. A cause that 
acts of necessity, must act, and act to the full extent 
of its i)o wer, as soon as it does exist. If we suppose a 
necessary cause to exist from eternity, the effects of its 
action must also be eternal. To suppose the opposite, 
would be to suppose that a cause did exist from eter- 
nity, which must act as soon as it exists, and yet, that 
through the eternity of the past it did not act at all. 
The commencement of its action in time, therefore, 
would not only be unaccountable, but inconceivable. If 
the human race, the world of mankind around us, had 
their origin in a necessary, and not a free cause, their 
existence would be from eternity, and not have com- 



ACCOUNTABILITY. 135 

inenced in time. It did commence in time. God, then, 
the unconditional and absolute cause of their existence, 
is a free, and not a necessary cause. This conclusion 
follows of necessity. 

Further, to suppose God to be a cause unconditioned 
and absolute, and yet that he is a necessary, and not a 
free agent, is a palpable contradiction. What is a 
necessary cause ? It is a cause which can act, only as 
it is acted upon by something out of itself, a some- 
thing which necessitates its action. A necessary cause, 
therefore, in its action, must be conditioned, and not 
unconditioned and absolute. If God, then, is not free, 
he is not the unconditional cause of all conditional ex- 
istences. Besides, the supposition that the uncondi- 
tioned and absolute is under the law of necessity, im- 
plies that the necessitating power acted antecedently 
to the unconditioned. This is equivalent to denying 
that God is the first, as well as the unconditioned and 
absolute cause." — Median's Intel. Phil, pp. 309, 310. 

We may here remark, that as moral capacity is dis- 
tinct from both moral freedom and moral necessity, 
so is it likewise distinct from accountability. We do 
not say that they are separate, but that they are dis- 
tinct ; and hence, that the phrases "moral agent/' and 
"accountable agent," are not strictly synonymous. 

XXXVII. The modus operandi of the soul in cau- 
sation is beyond the sphere of philosophy, or of legiti- 
mate inquiry. 

"Philosophy, it should be borne in mind, has to do 
with facts as they are, with the nature of the powers 



136 



ACCOUNTABILITY. 



revealed in those facts, and with the laws in conformi- 
ty to which those powers act. With the mode of the 
action further than this, it has nothing to do. In the 
fall of heavy bodies to the earth, for example, we learn 
that attraction is a property of all material substances. 
We then set ourselves to determine the law which con- 
trols the action of this property. Here we are within 
the legitimate domain of philosophy. But suppose we 
attempt to explain the mode in which the attractive 
power acts. "Such knowledge is too wonderful for us. 
It is high, we cannot attain unto it." Philosophy, well 
satisfied with her own legitimate and wide domain, re- 
signs such things to the Eternal One, who created all 
the powers of the universe, and, consequently, under- 
stands the mode of their action. All that philosophy 
can say, in regard to the mode of the action of any 
power, is that such is its nature." — Malian. 



PART SECOND. 

PRINCIPLES OF HARMONY, 



CHAPTER I, 



Jxttfram hr& J^nkitfltohirjjt 



PRINCIPLES. 

I. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine fore- 
knowledge. 

" Known unto God are all his works from [ouwvwv] 
eternity ;" and in these works are comprehended ex- 
act and specific references to all the moral actions of all 
his rational creatures. Therefore, known unto God 
are all the works of all his rational creatures, from 
eternity. 

1. Man's moral freedom is consistent with this Di- 
vine prescience, notwithstanding the connection of 
events. By some this principle is denied ; and fore- 
knowledge is adduced to prove the doctrine of an ab- 
solute moral necessity. The main argument employed 
is as follows : 

"Those things which are indissolubly connected 



138 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

with other things that are necessary, are themselves 
necessary." But all our future volitions and actions 
are inseparably connected with the Divine foreknowl- 
edge of them ; and that knowledge is now necessary. 
" It is now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than 
that this foreknowledge should be, or should have 
been." Therefore all our future volitions and actions 
" are necessary events." — Edwards. 

This argument has been regarded by necessitarians, 
as almost or quite a demonstration ; but it is in real- 
ity a mere sophism : an ignoratio elencM. To ren- 
der this apparent, it is important to observe that there 
are two kinds of necessity conceivable, winch have no 
essential connection : a moral necessity of the actor, 
which consists of his subjection to extrinsic moral 
causation, and a natural necessity of the volition or 
act, which consists of its subjection to the law of its 
own identity. 

The latter consists in the fact that an event cannot 
both be and not be at the same time, or that it cannot 
be as it is and at the same time be other than it is ; 
and hence, that it cannot both be true that an event 
will come to pass, and that it will not come to pass. 
This necessity is specifically natural, as truly as that 
a projectile cannot at the same time both ascend and 
descend. It is therefore very different from the moral 
necessity of the agent ; and it exists where moral ne- 
cessity does not. When it is true that an agent will 
exercise a given volition freely, or in which he will be 
morally free, it still is true that he will exercise it ; 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 139 

and when it is true that he will exercise it, it cannot 
also be true that he, though free, will not exercise it. 
Therefore the natural necessity of identity, appertains 
to volitions in which the agent is morally tree ; and 
of course it is perfectly consistent with moral freedom. 
It is simply a necessity in nature, that two things 
shall not co-exist, or shall not both be true, whose co- 
existence would constitute an absurdity. This neces- 
sity is implied in Divine foreknowledge, because that 
knowledge is in itself consistent ; but no moral neces- 
sity of the agent is thereby implied, because the voli- 
tion's necessity of identity, affects only the volition 
itseE 

The things connected with others that exist, are 
present things with present, 'past things with present, 
and future things with present things ; and the syllo- 
gism employed by Edwards, applies equally to each of 
these cases of connection, because the major premise 
contains a universal proposition. Therefore, what the 
argument proves in the one case of connection, it 
proves also in the other ; and hence we will test it in 
each respect. 

First, present things connected with present things. 
Those present things which are indissolubly connected 
with present things that are now by their actual ex- 
istence necessary, are themselves also by their actual 
existence necessary. 

For example, I have present knowledge ; and my 
present knowledge, " having made sure of existence/' 
cannot now but be. "It is now utterly impossible 



140 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

but that it should be." But with this knowledge is 
indissolubly connected, the fact that it rains ; for I do 
actually see it rain. Therefore it cannot but be that 
it rains. What is now certainly true in this respect, 
cannot be false. But to infer from this fact, that God 
is morally necessitated to send this rain, is the height 
of absurdity. It is to draw an inference, which has 
evidently no connection with the event ; as much so, 
as to infer famine or war from the appearance of a 
comet. Consequently, the major premise of Edwards' 
syllogism is true only when it is understood of the ne- 
cessity of identity, and false when it is understood of 
moral necessity ; and as it was brought to prove moral 
necessity, the whole argument is of course a failure. 

Second, past things connected with jxresent things. 
Those past things which are indissolubly connected 
with other things that are now by their actual existence 
necessary, are themselves also by their actual ex- 
istence necessary. 

Past things may have ceased to be ; but they have 
still a connection with the present knowledge of them. 
This knowledge is now necessary. "It is now impos- 
sible that it should be otherwise than true" that it 
exists. Therefore those past events which are indisso- 
lubly connected with it, are themselves necessary. 
Not that they must now exist, or that they must here- 
after exist, but they must have existed. It cannot be 
otherwise. But why ? Will any one say, because the 
authors of those past events were morally necessitated 
to produce them ? I think not. Such an idea would 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 141 

imply, that if past events could possibly have been 
produced without moral necessity, there would have 
been no "indissoluble connection" between the ex- 
istence of those events, and the present knowledge of 
them ; which is false. The connection is just as real, 
and therefore as truly indissoluble, on the ground that 
past events were produced in the exercise of moral 
freedom, as on the ground that they were brought to 
pass of moral necessity ; for the connection depends 
simply on the reality of their existence. 

Thus the necessity of connection resolves itself 
again into the necessity of identity ; and hence the 
major premise of the argument under consideration, 
as understood of moral necessity, is again proved to be 
false. 

Third, future things connected with present things. 
Those future things which are indissolubly connected 
with other things that are now by their actual 
existence necessary, are themselves also, by their future 
existence, necessary. It has become known as a fact, 
and so the fact is now connected with present knowl- 
edge, that our future volitions will exist ; and it can- 
not now become known that those volitions will not 
exist. There is therefore an " indissoluble connection" 
between our future volitions and God's foreknowledge 
of them ; and in the argument which we are consid- 
ering, this is the essential point. The question con- 
cerning it is this : Is the moral necessity of the agent 
requisite to the indissoluble connection ? 

We answer in the negative : the necessitarian in 



142 FKEEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

the affirmative. The burden of proof, therefore, rests 
with him ; and what he has to advance, is thus ex- 
pressed : "If that, whose existence is indissolubly con- 
nected with something whose existence is now neces- 
sary, is itself not necessary, then it may possibly not 
exist, notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of 
its existence. Whether the absurdity be not glaring, 
let the reader judge." — Edwards. This is said rather 
triumphantly ; but it is said irrelevantly, and there- 
fore fallaciously. 

If the indissoluble connection proves moral necessity 
in this case, it does so as an exception to the general 
rule ; for in the other cases it does not prove it. The 
connection in the other cases, is equally indissoluble. 
This is granted by the necessitarian himself. He 
says, "I freely allow, that foreknowledge does not prove 
a thing to be necessary, any more than after-knowl- 
edge ; but then after-knowledge, which is certain and 
infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but 
that the proposition known should be true. Certain 
after-knowledge proves that it is now, in the time of 
the knowledge, by some means or other, become im- 
possible but that the proposition which predicates 
past existence of the event, should be true. And so 
does certain /breknowledge prove that now, in the 
time of the knowledge, it is, by some means or other, 
become impossible but that the proposition which 
predicates future existence of the event, should be 
true." — Ediuards. Here it is admitted, that the ne 
cessity proved is in each case the same ; and we have 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 143 

shown ; that the indissoluble connection, both in the 
case of present things with present knowledge, and in 
that of past things with present knowledge, does not 
prove moral necessity at all : that it proves merely the 
natural necessity of identity. 

Therefore, according to Edwards' own admission, 
freely and fully stated, it must follow, that the indis- 
soluble connection between fwture events and the Di- 
vine foreknowledge of them, likewise does not prove 
moral necessity at all ; but only the natural necessity 
of identity. 

Again, the nature of the necessity which attaches to 
foreknowledge, is tacitly admitted to be the nature of the 
necessity which attaches to the foreknown event ; for 
it is only claimed that the two cases of necessity are 
equal. But the necessity which appertains to fore- 
knowledge, is simply the necessity of an event as pres- 
ent ; and that is only the necessity of identity. 

Finally, the " indissoluble connection" between our 
future volitions and the Divine foreknowledge of them, 
is the connection between the occasion and the result ; 
and such a connection cannot prove the moral necessi- 
ty of the agent. Either the knowledge results from 
the volitions, or the volitions result from the knowl- 
edge. The latter cannot be true. The necessitarian 
himself does not contend for it ; but he admits, that 
the future event is the occasion, and that the fore- 
knowledge of it is the result. He says of the event, 
" Its future existence has already had actual influence 
and efficiency, and has produced an effect^ viz : pre- 



144 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

science. The effect exists already ; and as the cause 
supposes, the effect is connected with the cause, and 
depends entirely upon it. Therefore it is as if the 
future event which is the cause, had existed already. 
The effect is firm as possible ; it having already the 
possession of existence, and has made sure of it. But 
the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its 
cause, ground, and reasons. The building cannot be 
firmer than the foundation." 

Thus it is admitted, that the " indissoluble connec- 
tion" between our future volitions, for instance, and 
the Divine foreknowledge of them, is the connection 
between the occasion and the result : between what 
are improperly called cause and effect. It follows, 
therefore, that the necessity of foreknoiuledge, is the 
necessity of an existing result ; and its necessity as 
an existing result, is its necessity of identity in a sub- 
ordinate relation. It is the necessity of existing in a 
state of dependence on, and of conformity to, our fu- 
ture volitions, and other events. Its necessity consists 
in that it cannot, in these respects, lose its identity. 
It cannot be other than knowledge ; and it cannot but 
exist in conformity to the free events on which it de- 
pends. 

I repeat, therefore, it is the necessity of identity, 
as that necessity appertains to a result. What, tlfen, 
is the necessity which it involves relative to the voli- 
tions on which it depends ? It is evidently a necessi- 
ty that they * as existing, do not also not exist ; and 
that they, as the occasion of the knowledge^ be not 



FKEEDOM AND FOKEKNOWLEDGE. 145 

also not the occasion. It is therefore their necessity 
of identity, as the occasion of the result. Conse- 
quently, it is not moral necessity. To infer moral ne- 
cessity, is as if we should say, " Coming events cast 
their shadows before ;" and hence the shadows con- 
strain the authors of the events to produce those 
events. " Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let 
the reader judge." 

To prove that our future volitions are foreknown, is 
only to prove it true concerning them, that they will 
come to pass ; and merely to prove that they will come 
to pass, is not to prove fww they will come to pass. 
It is true, when we have proved that an event will be, 
we cannot also prove that it will not be ; or we can- 
not prove that a proposition is true, and also that it is 
false, in the same sense. From the very nature of 
things, every event must be identical with itself. 
But this fact is as truly essential to the agent's moral 
freedom, as it is to necessity. The agent may freely 
desire that his volitions and actions shall be as they 
are, and not otherwise ; and hence if they were to 
change, or to become otherwise than identical with 
themselves, the agent who primarily executes them, 
ultimately would not be free in respect to them. That 
to which they might change, would be to him in the 
highest degree arbitrary ; and it might be to him in the 
highest degree unwelcome. This would certainly be 
the case if they changed from good to bad, or from 
bad to worse. 

Therefore, since the necessity which is produced by 



146 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

Divine foreknowledge, is essential to the agent's moral 
freedom, it certainly cannot be inconsistent with such 
freedom. This natural necessity of identity, or " axi- 
omatical necessity" in the act, is so different from the 
moral necessity of the actor, that the author who 
proves the one, under pretence of proving the other, 
must stand convicted of glaring sophistry. 

This will perhaps more fully appear, if we consider 
that the necessity proved may even be predicated of 
moral freedom itself. 

Moral freedom, it has been proved, is accorded to 
all who attain to an understanding of moral good and 
evil ; and hence it must be foreknown, as an event 
which is to exist in the future, in connection with fu- 
ture and foreknown volitions. Therefore, the same 
argument from God's prescience which proves any 
given necessity of foreknown volitions, proves also the 
same necessity of foreknown moral freedom. The 
same premises must always involve the same conclu- 
sion. 

The syllogism may be stated as follows : " Those 
things which are indissolubly connected with other 
things that are necessary, are themselves necessary." 
But all future moral freedom is inseparably connected 
with the Divine foreknowledge of it ; and that knowl- 
edge is now necessary. " It is now utterly impossible 
to be otherwise, than that this foreknowledge should 
be, or should have been." Therefore all future moral 
freedom is now necessary. 

Does this necessity of the agent's moral freedom, 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 147 

preclude his moral freedom? Does it preclude the 
moral freedom of any being ? Certainly not ; for the 
Divine foreknowledge cannot both prove and disprove 
the same thing at the same time. Therefore the ne- 
cessity which it proves is not moral necessity : is not 
the necessity in dispute. 

2. Man's moral freedom is consistent with God's 
prescience, notwithstanding any absence of separate 
evidence concerning the events foreknown. 

In opposition to this view, the necessitarian holds 
the following language : "It is impossible for a thing 
to be certainly known to any intellect without evi- 
dence. To suppose otherwise, implies a contradiction ; 
because, for a thing to be certainly known to any un- 
derstanding, is for it to be evident to that understand- 
ing ; and for a thing to be evident to any understand- 
ing, is the same thing as for that understanding to see 
evidence of it. But if there be any future event 
whose existence is contingent, without all necessity, 
the future existence of the event is absolutely without 
evidence, and absolutely unknowable." — Edicards. 

That future events, or volitions in which moral 
agents are free, are "without all necessity," is not 
claimed by any one ; and if Edwards has only proved 
that foreknown events are not without all necessity, 
he has proved nothing to the purpose. 

He should have proved, that the foreknowledge of 
an act implies such evidence of it, as involves moral 
necessity to the actor. This he has not done. To 
have accomplished such a feat in logic, he must have 



148 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

proved that the Infinite Jehovah knows nothing of the 
future, except as his knowledge of future events is de- 
duced from his knowledge of present causes ; for pres- 
ent causes are the only distinct evidence which can 
possibly conduct the mind to future effects. But the 
eternity of Divine foreknowledge renders it impossible 
to prove any such thing ; for it precludes all depen- 
dence on induction. To foreknow an event from evi- 
dence, is to foreknow it as an effect, by foreknowing 
its primary and proper cause ; and to foreknow the 
ultimate effect by foreknowing the primary cause, 
when the series extends for instance over eternity, is 
to foreknow the event by an infinite series of foregoing 
deductions. But the foreknowledge which is thus ac- 
quired, cannot be eternal ; and hence the Divine 
foreknowledge is not thus enjoyed, for that is eter- 
nal. 

But if Divine foreknowledge does not exist by de- 
duction from evidence, the absence of evidence con- 
cerning those future volitions in which men will be 
free, does not prove that those volitions are " unknow- 
able ;" and hence it does not j>rove, that the foreknowl- 
edge of men's volitions involves moral necessity. 

If those acts in which moral agents will be necessi- 
tated, are foreknown independently of any distinct 
evidence concerning them, because the Divine fore- 
knowledge of them is eternal ; and if those acts in 
which moral agents will be free, are foreknown inde- 
pendently of any distinct evidence concerning them, 
because, no present evidence of them exists, then are 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 149 

they not all foreknown on the same principle, and in 
a way unknown to finite beings ? If so, the Divine 
prescience affords the necessitarian no support. 

" That all things are known to God/' is freely ad- 
mitted ; but that they can be known, only by reason 
of their resulting from the necessitating influence of 
known causes, which are themselves necessitated, is 
more than any finite mind should presume to affirm. 
It were indeed to make our shallow, limited, and feeble 
intellects, the measure of all possible modes of knowl- 
edge. It were to make God Like one of ourselves. 
Yet this position the necessitarian has been compelled 
to assume. After all his pretended demonstrations 
from the foreknowledge of God, his argument can 
reach the point in dispute, only by means of this tre- 
mendous flight of presumption. 

Let the necessitarian show, that God cannot foresee 
future events, unless he " have determined to bring 
them to pass," or unless they are brought to pass by a 
chain of producing causes, ultimately connected with 
his own will, and he will prove something to the pur- 
pose ; but let him not talk so boastfully about demon- 
strations, while there is this exceedingly weak link in 
the chain of his argument. If God were so like one 
of ourselves, that he could not foresee future volitions, 
unless they are brought to pass by the operation of 
known causes ; then, I admit, that his foreknowledge 
would infer the moral necessity for which Edwards 
contends, provided he really possesses that knowledge ; 
but if he were so imperfect a being, I should be com- 



150 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

pelled to believe, that there are some things which he 
could not foreknow. 

This assumption comes with a peculiarly ill grace 
from the necessitarian. He should be the last man to 
contend, that God cannot foresee future events unless 
they are involved in known producing causes ; just as 
all that we know of the future is ascertained by reason- 
ing from known causes to effects. For he contends 
that with God, " there is no time ;" but that to His 
view all things are seen as if they were present. 

This knowledge is without succession, and there is 
no before nor after with him : all things are intimate- 
ly present to his mind from all eternity. Such is the 
doctrine of both the Edwards ; and Dr. Dick be- 
lieves, that " God sees all things at a glance." Now, 
present things are not known to exist because they are 
implied by known causes, but because they are present 
and seen. And hence, if God sees all things as pres- 
ent, there is not the shadow of a foundation whereon 
to rest the proof of " moral necessity" from his fore- 
knowledge. It is all taken away by their own doc- 
trine, and their argument is left without the least sup- 
port from it. 

Indeed, there is no need of lugging the foreknowl- 
edge of God into the present controversy, except it be 
to deceive the mind. For all future events will cer- 
tainly and infallibly come to pass, whether they are 
foreknown or not ; and foreknowledge cannot make 
the matter any more certain than it is without it. 
We may say that God foreknows all things, and we 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 151 

may mix this up with all possible propositions ; but 
this will never help the conclusion, that " all future 
things will certainly and infallibly come to pass." If 
God should cease to foreknow all future volitions, or if 
he had never foreknown them, they would neverthe- 
less just as certainly and infahibly come to pass, as if 
he had foreknown them from all eternity. The bare 
naked fact that they are future, infers all that is im- 
plied in God's foreknowledge of them ; and it is just 
as much a contradiction in terms, to say that what is 
future will not come to pass, as it is to say, that what 
God foreknows will never take place. Hence, by 
bringing in the prescience of Deity, we do not really 
strengthen or add to the conclusion in favor of neces- 
sity. It only furnishes a very convenient and plausible 
method of begging the question, or of seeming to 
prove something by hiding our sophisms in the blaze 
of the Divine attributes. 

I reason from what I know, to what I do not know : 
from my knowledge of the actual world as it is, up to 
God's foreknowledge respecting it. To illustrate this 
point : I know that I act : and hence I conclude, that 
God foreknew that I would act. And again, I know 
that my act is not necessitated : that it does not ne- 
cessarily proceed from the action or influence of [ex- 
trinsic] causes ; and hence I conclude, that God 
foreknew that I would thus act freely, in precisely this 
manner, and not otherwise. 

The necessitarian pursues the opposite course. He 
reasons from what he does not know, that is, from the 



152 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

particulars of the Divine foreknowledge, about which 
he absolutely knows nothing a priori, down to the facts 
of the actual world. Thus, quitting the light which 
shines so brightly within us and around us, he seeks for 
light in tne midst of impenetrable darkness. He endea- 
vors to determine the phenomena of the world, not by 
looking at them and seeing what they are, but by de- 
ducing conclusions from God's infinite foreknowledge 
respecting them ! 

" In doing this, a grand illusion is practiced, by his 
merely supposing that the volitions themselves are 
foreknown, without taking into the supposition the 
whole of the case, and recollecting that God not only 
foresees all our actions, but also all about them. For 
if this were done, if it were remembered that He not 
only foresees that our volitions will come to pass, but 
also how they will come to pass ; the necessitarian 
would see, that nothing could be proved in this way 
except what is first tacitly assumed. The grand illu- 
sion v\ T ould vanish, and it would be clearly seen, that 
if the argument from foreknowledge proves anything, 
it just as well proves the necessity of freedom as any- 
thing else." — Bledsoe. 

3. Moral freedom and Divine foreknowledge may be 
regarded as in harmony, on the principle that the "All 
wise God" possesses a faculty of knowledge which we do 
not. We have no faculty to foresee the future, except 
by induction ; and our power of induction is so limited 
in respect to future events, that, properly speaking, it 
does not constitute at all, a faculty to foresee. Have 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 153 

we any right to attribute this principle of imperfection 
to the Supreme Being : " have we any reason for impo- 
sing upon the Deity the limitation of our own feeble- 
ness ? I think not. Unendowed, as we are, with any 
faculty of foreseeing the future, it may be difficult for 
us to conceive of such a faculty in God ; but yet can 
we not from analogy form such an idea ? We have 
now two faculties of perception : of the past by memo- 
ry, and of the present by observation. Can we not 
imagine a third to exist in God : the faculty of perceiv- 
ing the future, as we perceive the past. "What would 
be the consequence ? This : that God, instead of con- 
jecturing, by induction, the acts of human beings from 
the laws of the causes operating upon them, would see 
them simply as the results of the free determinations 
of the will. Such perception of future acts no more 
implies the necessity of those actions, than the percep- 
tions of similar acts in the past. To see that effects 
arise from certain causes, is not to force causes to pro- 
duce them ; neither is it to compel these effects to 
follow. It matters not whether such a perception refers 
to the past, present, or future : it is merely a percep- 
tion ; and therefore far from producing the effect per- 
ceived. I do not pretend that this vision of what is to 
be, is an operation of which our minds easily conceive. 
It is difficult to form an image of what we have never 
experienced ; but I do assert, that the power of seeing 
what no longer exists, is full as remarkable as that of 
seeing what has as yet no being, and that the reason of 
our readily conceiving of the former, is only the fact 



154 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

that we are endowed with, such a power : to my reason, 
the mystery is the same." — Jouffroy. 

4. Moral freedom is consistent with foreknowledge, 
because effects cannot constrain their causes to produce 
them ; and because results cannot constrain the occa- 
sion to produce them. 

Moral agents, in the exercise of freedom, are causes ; 
and their volitions and actions are effects, of which 
foreknowledge is the result. Edwards, however, pre- 
sents us with an argument against freedom, in which 
foreknowledge is regarded, not as a result merely, but 
as an effect of finite causation. His argument or illus- 
tration, because of its plausibility and apparent strength, 
demands our notice. He says : 

" To illustrate this matter, let us suppose the ap- 
pearances and images of things in a glass; for instance, 
a reflecting telescope, to be the real effects of heavenly 
bodies (at a distance and out of sight) which they re- 
semble : if it be so, as these images in the telescope 
have had a past actual existence, and it is become ut- 
terly impossible now that it should be otherwise than 
that they have existed ; so they, being the true effects 
of the heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves the 
existing of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infalli- 
ble, finn, and necessary, as the existing of these effects ; 
the one being connected with, and wholly depending 
on, the other. Now let us suppose future existences 
some way or other to have influence back, to produce 
effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect images 
of themselves in a glass, a thousand years before they 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 155 

exist, yea, in all preceding ages ; but yet that these 
images are real effects of these future existences, per- 
fectly dependent on, and connected with, their cause ; 
these effects and images having already had actual ex- 
istence, rendering that matter of their existing perfect- 
ly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be 
otherwise : this proves in. like manner, as in the other 
instance, that the existence of the things which are 
their causes is also equally sure, firm, and necessary ; 
and that it is alike impossible but that they should be, 
as if they had been already, as their effects have. And 
if instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antece- 
dent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine 
mind, which have existed there from all eternity, which 
are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected 
with their cause, the case is not altered." — Edwards 
on Will, p. 183. 

This illustration represents the volitions of moral 
agents as causing their results backward or beforehand, 
in the form of ideas in the Divine mind ; which ideas 
constitute foreknowledge. But volitions are mere oc- 
casions, and not causes. As occasions, however, they 
may be said in some sense to produce such results ; but 
these volitions produce these results beforehand, sim- 
ply on the ground that moral agents produce these 
volitions. So that if the Divine foreknowledge depends 
on the foreknown volitions, it depends to the same 
extent on the agents who produce or cause those voli- 
tions. And what does all this prove ? Merely that 
foreknowledge naturally must have its subject, and 



156 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

that, its subject naturally must have its cause. And 
what then 1 Why then we have three things given to 
find a fourth : the agent, the act, and the knowledge 
of the act, to find whether the agent is morally free, or 
morally constrained in the act. Or we have the cause, 
the effect, and the result, to find whether the cause be 
a cause, or a medium only. Edwards concludes that 
the agent is not morally free, but morally constrained ; 
or that the cause is not the cause. His essential rea- 
son, including all other reasons, is, that the effects 
are "perfectly dependent on, and connected with, 
their cause." That is to say, the foreknowledge is per- 
fectly dependent on the act, and the act is perfectly 
dependent on the actor. This, however, is so far from 
sustaining Edwards' conclusion, that it is the very 
reason why the agent may be a cause, or why he mny 
be free in his volitions. The circumstance that the 
results are produced backward or beforehand, can make 
no difference. If, on account of this circumstance, the 
effects either cause or occasion their own cause to pro- 
duce them, (which will hardly be claimed except by 
implication) it still is true, that the effects are wholly 
" dependent on, and connected with, their cause;" or 
that they must be produced by their cause. It follows, 
therefore, that whatever constraint they involve, must 
primarily have its origin in their cause. That is to say, 
by means of his own effects or volitions, the cause or 
agent simply constrains himself ; and hence the case 
is merely one of intrinsic causation." But intrinsic 
causation involves a corresponding exemption from ex- 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 157 

trinsic causation ; and exemption from extrinsic cau- 
sation is freedom. Thus, Edwards' reasoning from 
events, as producing their results in a given respect 
backward not only fails to sustain his theory, but 
when fully developed, it destroys his system. 

5. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine fore- 
knowledge, although foreknowledge implies that our 
future volitions and actions are certain. 

We are told, " If the event be not necessary, then it 
is possible it may never be ; and if it be possible it may 
never be, God knows it may possibly never be ; and 
that is to know that the proposition which affirms its 
existence, may possibly not be true ; and that is to 
know that the truth of it is uncertain ; which surely 
is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth." 
" To say, in such a case, that God may have ways of 
knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive 
of, is ridiculous ; as much so, as to say that God may 
know contradictions to be true, for aught we know, or 
that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the 
same time know it not to be certain." — Edwards, 
p. 176. 

This statement assumes, that as foreknowledge im- 
plies the certainty of an act, so the certainty of the 
act implies the moral necessity of the actor ; and on 
the other hand, that the moral freedom of the actor, 
implies uncertainty of the act. These conclusions, 
which are but counterparts cf each other, we deny ; 
and for the following reasons : 

First. — Whatever will be, is certain. It is so in the 



158 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

very nature of things, whether it be foreknown or not. 
But the future existence of moral freedom will be. It 
will be, because, as has been proved, such freedom is 
at some time or other accorded to every accountable 
agent. Therefore, the future existence of moral free- 
dom is certain. But if the future existence of moral 
freedom is certain, the results of that freedom are also 
certain ; for it is as much a truism in the one case as 
in the other, that " What will be, will be" And if 
the particular results of moral freedom are certain, it 
must be certain what the free agent will do, and what 
he will not do : what power of volition and action he 
will possess which he will exercise, and what power 
of volition and action he will possess which he will not 
exercise. 

But if the volitions and actions which result from 
the existence of moral freedom may be certain, it fol- 
lows that the certainty of the act, is not inconsistent 
with the moral freedom of the actor ; and consequently, 
that the foreknowledge of the act is also not inconsist- 
ent with the moral freedom of the actor. The fore- 
knowledge of the act, cannot prove more than is proved 
by the certainty of the act ; and the agent's moral 
freedom, it is evident, cannot disprove that certainty. 
Moral freedom and foreknowledge, as viewed together, 
do not imply, therefore, that our future volitions are 
both certain and uncertain, but simply that we will 
hereafter, as now, possess power to act which we will 
not exercise ; and that the extent of this power is spe- 
cific and certain. The future possession of unexercised 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 159 

power, is an event, as truly as any other ; and all 
events are in their nature certain, and from eternity 
foreknown. Edwards' statement ought therefore to 
be corrected, so as to ^ead as follows : "If the event 
be not necessary, i. e. if the agent be not constrained 
to produce it, then it is possible to the agent for it 
never to be. If it is possible for it never to be, God 
knows it is possible for it never to be ; and that is to 
know that the agent will possess power which he will 
not exercise : it is to know that the proposition which 
affirms the existence of the event or act, does not de- 
pend on the moral necessity of the actor for its truth- 
fulness ; and that is to know that its truthfulness is 
by some other means certain ; which surely is not in- 
consistent with his knowing it as a certain truth/' 

The relation which the agent sustains to his action, 
may be either one of two : it may be that of cause, or 
that of medium ; and the difference between these two 
relations, determines and explains the difference be- 
tween acting with mere certainty, and acting with 
certainty and necessity combined. The mere medium, 
or constrained agent, performs the act with certainty, 
and of necessity ; but the proper cause, or uncon- 
strained agent, performs the act with certainty only, 
and not of necessity. Now it has been proved, that 
mankind exercise moral freedom, in at least some of 
their actions ; and that moral freedom, as exemption 
from extrinsic causation, involves intrinsic causation, 
in every instance of its exercise. Yet these very ac- 
tions are foreknown and certain. Therefore, the mere 



160 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

certainty of the act, does not involve the moral neces- 
sity of the actor. To say it does, is the same as to say, 
that to act as cause, is only to act as medium ; and to 
say this, is to utter a contradiction in terms ; for he 
who is constrained in a given respect, is not a cause 
in that respect. 

That moral agents as free, will hereafter possess 
power which they will not exercise, and that this pow- 
er is specific and certain, may easily he conceived ; but 
how it may be foreknown, is apparent only to the 
mind of Deity. Therefore, the method of the Divine 
prescience, we cannot reasonably be required to devel- 
ope ; and yet to explain that method is the only diffi- 
culty in the case : a difficulty, however, which does not 
concern us. 

Necessitarians reason as if they understood the 
method ; and in this they depart from their usual 
modesty. " There is no class of men who dwell with 
more frequency and apparent reverence upon the truth, 
that i secret things belong to God/ and those and 
those only, 'that are revealed, to us ;' that 'none by 
searching can find out God ;' that ' as the heavens are 
high above the earth, so are his ways above our ways, 
and his thoughts above our thoughts ;' and that it is 
the height of presumption in us, to j)retend to under- 
stand God's mode of knowing and acting. None are 
more ready to talk of mysteries in religion than they. 
Yet, strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, 
that their whole argument, drawn from the Divine 
foreknowledge, against the doctrine of Liberty, and in 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 161 

favor of Necessity, is based entirely upon the assump- 
tion that they have found out and fully understand 
the mode of the Divine prescience of human conduct ; 
that they have so measured and determined the ' ways 
and thoughts' of God, that they know that he cannot 
foresee any but [morally] necessary events ; that 
among many events, all in themselves equally possi- 
ble, and none of them necessary in distinction from 
others, he cannot foreknow which in fact will arise. 
We may properly ask the Necessitarian whence he 
obtained this knowledge, so vast and deep ; whence he 
has thus ' found out the Almighty to perfection V 
To me the pretension to such knowledge appears more 
like presumption, than that deep self-distrust and hu- 
miliation which becomes the finite in the presence of 
the Infinite. This knowledge has not been obtained 
from revelation. God has never told us that He can 
foresee none but [morally] necessary events ; [and] if 
we admit ourselves ignorant of the mode of God's fore- 
knowledge of future events (and who will dare deny 
the existence of such ignorance in his own case ?) the 
entire argument of the necessitarian, based upon that 
foreknowledge, in favor of his doctrine, falls to the 
ground at once." — Median. 

Second. God has done what he had power not to do, 
though the event was certain and foreknown. 

Edwards' view of the subject involves the idea of an 
absolute fatality : a fatality which enchains not only 
man, but God himself. " Known unto God are all his 
works from eternity," and as known, they are certain. 



162 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

If therefore an act can be certain only on the ground 
that the actor cannot avoid it, the conclusion is inevi- 
table, that God's actions are to Him unavoidable ; or 
that he is subject to the control of fate, as well as all 
his creatures. But this conclusion is inconsistent with 
the doctrine of Divine omnipotence. For example, 
God chose a particular moment in which to commence 
the work of creation, and a definite point of space in 
which to locate the primary centre of the universe ; 
and these acts of choice, as distinct from all others of 
the kind, were eternally certain and foreknown. If 
these acts of volition, as thus distinct, were to the actor 
unavoidable because they were certain and foreknown, 
the Divine Being must have labored under an inability 
or lack of power to choose any other moment or point ; 
and that lack of power must have been either moral or 
natural. It could not be moral, because some other 
moment, and some other point of space, might have 
been chosen with equal propriety, and by the same 
laws of rational action. Previous to the first act of 
creation, all moments of duration, and all points of 
space, were positively and relatively equal ; and hence 
the same influence, motive, or reason, which operated 
in favor of a given selection, operated equally in favor 
of a different selection. No moral inability, therefore, 
could exist. Consequently, if God was unable to com- 
mence the work of creation in some other moment, or 
to fix its primary centre in some other point of space 
than he did, he must have labored under a lack of 
natural power ; and it must have been a lack of natu- 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 163 

ral power to do that which in itself involved no con- 
tradiction. But such a lack of power is wholly 
inconsistent with omnipotence. It is a natural defect : 
a radical weakness, characteristic of a finite being. 
But in God, no such weakness or defect exists. He 
is truly and absolutely Almighty. He might there- 
fore have commenced the work of creation in some 
other moment of duration, and might have located the 
centre of the universe in some other point of space ; 
and consequently, he had power to omit what was eter- 
nally certain and foreknown, and power to do what it 
was eternally certain he would not do. If, therefore, 
we admit that God is omnipotent, we must also admit, 
that the certainty of an act is consistent with the pos- 
sibility or power that it may not be ; or that the act 
may be certain, and hence foreknown, and yet be not 
performed of necessity. 

Third. The doctrine of man's essential moral free- 
dom, and that of the certainty of future events, inclu- 
ding man's moral volitions and actions, are both incul- 
cated in the sacred Scriptures. Either directly or in- 
directly, they are presented in almost every part of the 
Bible. They must, therefore, be in harmony : for the 
word of God does not contradict itself, either directly 
or indirectly. 

The ideas which men entertain of these great truths, 
do not in all instances agree ; but this disturbs not 
the harmony of the truths themselves. In despite of 
human creeds, they are in themselves harmonious and 
true ; and it had been well, if they who pronounce 



164 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

the subject inscrutable, bad propounded tbeir conflict- 
ing views with more modesty, and less dogmatism. 
No man bas a right to affirm concerning that, of which 
he is confessedly ignorant. 

6. Moral freedom is consistent with foreknowledge, 
notwithstanding the necessity of connection and agree- 
ment between that knowledge and the finite agent's 
volitions and actions. The connection and agreement 
are fully secured by one necessity ; and hence they re- 
quire not two necessities. That is to say, if they are 
in a given manner necessitated to exist, they do not 
need to be otherwise necessitated, because a single ne- 
cessity is as truly effectual as a double necessity. 

But the connection and agreement are fully secured 
by a natural necessity ; and that a necessity which af- 
fects not the finite agent whose actions are foreknown, 
but the Infinite Agent who foreknows them. The 
knowledge itself is in its very nature necessitated to 
connect and agree with the thing known ; and this 
necessity cannot be waived or obviated by the Supreme 
Being. 

Consequently, as possessing foreknowledge, God is 
naturally necessitated, or necessitated in the nature 
of things, to know things precisely as they will be. 
It is impossible for him to know them otherwise. 
Therefore, the agreement between the foreknowledge 
of Grod and the action of a finite agent, does not re- 
quire that agent to act from moral necessity. 

If the action cannot differ from the Divine fore- 
knowledge of it, it is because the knowledge cannot 



FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 165 

differ from the action. Let the agent act with the 
greatest freedom possible, the Divine prescience can- 
not fail to be knowledge ; and therefore cannot fail to 
agree with the facts in the case. The case of the 
agent is like that of a man at work in the sunshine. 
His motions, it may be contended, cannot be different 
from the motions of his shadow : though he change 
them ever so often, or ever so much, the result or 
agreement is constantly the same. But why ? Is it 
because the agent lacks freedom ? Certainly not. It 
is simply because the motions of the shadow cannot 
be different from the motions of the man. 

Again, if the evolutions of an army cannot differ 
from the view which is taken of them by a well-formed 
eye, it is simply because the view of them by a perfect 
eye, cannot differ from them. So is God's prescience. 
It is his view of the immense, varied, and complicated 
scenes of eternity. These scenes are in a sense pres- 
ent with him ; for He is "the high and lofty One that 
inhabiteth eternity ;" and they are in a sense imaged in 
the Divine mind, as natural objects are imaged in the 
human eye. 

If, therefore, they cannot differ from his view of 
them, it is simply because his secret and all-compre- 
hending view of them cannot differ from them. 

In concluding these remarks, we ask, has there ever 
been any moral agent who has really had moral power 
to do otherwise than he did ; or have all moral agents 
been destitute of that power ? 

If the latter be true, the doctrine of universal moral 



166 FREEDOM AND FOREKNOWLEDGE. 

fatality must also be true ; and then God must be the 
primary and proper cause of whatever comes to pass 
in the moral world. But if the former be true, 
moral actions have occurred which were not performed 
of moral necessity ; and then, since those actions 
must have been foreknown, it follows that foreknowl- 
edge does not imply moral necessity. 



CHAPTER II 



fmimtt &nfa §iblial fnhsiioiifltt 



PRINCIPLES. 

II. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine pre" 
destination. 

That is to say, it exists whenever it obtains, in har- 
mony with God's eternal purpose, preordination, or 
decree, as that decree respects what God does, forbears 
to do, and prevents ; and also as it respects what 
finite moral agents do, forbear, and prevent. Predes- 
tination is simply a predetermination of the Divine 
providence, or of that positive and negative action 
which consists in producing, waiving, and preventing ; 
and in permitting or suffering his intelligent creatures 
to produce, waive, or prevent things. It is therefore 
to be distinguished into absolute and permissive, con- 
sisting of a predetermination to do what he does, and 
to suffer what he suffers or permits. 

The terms, permit and suffer, it will be observed, 
are not employed in the necessitarian sense. The ne- 
cessitarian believes in " such a providential disposing 
and determining of men's moral actions, as infers a 



168 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 

moral necessity of those actions ;" and hence by the 
terms, " permission" and " permitter," and by the 
phrase, " not a hinderer of sin," he must mean, that 
even in respect of sin, God merely suffers the effect of 
his own causation. That is to say, he suffers the event 
in the sense in which the surgeon suffers the natural 
effect of his knife in removing a tumor ; or in the 
sense in which the murderer merely permits the effect 
of the blow, by which he deprives his victim of life. 
Protesting against such a perversion of the terms un- 
der consideration, we employ them, not to signify that 
God allows the effects of his own causation to trans- 
pire, but to express the fact, that he allows the effects 
of other causation to transpire. Divine predestination 
is eternal, because it is connected with eternal fore- 
knowledge. 

" Known unto God are all his works from aizjvoff, 
eternity :" and hence he could never be uncertain, 
nor undetermined respecting them. 

The existence of such preordination is scriptural. 
The following are a few of many passages which might 
.be cited: "I am God, and there is none like me ; 
declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient 
times the things that are not yet done, saying, My 
counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." — 
Isa. 46: 9, 10. "For .of a truth, against thy holy 
child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and 
Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of 
Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever 
thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 169 

done." — Acts 4 : 27, 23. " — According to the eter- 
nal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our 
Lord." — Eph. 3 : 11. "For whom he did foreknow, 
he also did predestinate to he conformed to the image 
of his Son, that he might be the first born among many 
brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them 
he also called ; and whom he called, them he also jus- 
tified ; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." 
— Kom 8 : 29, 30. 

Divine predestination is a three-fold purpose. It is 
composed of a purpose to accomplish an object, of a 
purpose to execute a relevant plan, and of a purpose 
to exercise the requisite power. The affairs of the 
universe are conducted intelligently, and therefore in 
pursuance of a previous design or determination ; and 
the intelligent determination of the All-wise God, 
must respect the object, the plan, and the power. 

1. Divine predestination is the predetermination of 
an object. There can be no deliberate determination 
on the part of an intelligent being, without a relevant 
motive, for the motive is the essential ground and rea- 
son of the determination ; and there can be no rele- 
vant motive without an object, for the object is that 
which by its influence constitutes the motive. The 
object contemplated in Divine predestination is two- 
fold : primary and secondary, or ultimate and subor- 
dinate. 

First, the ultimate object is the declarative glory 
of God. That must be the grand object, which of all 
conceivable ends is the most worthv ; and such is the 



170 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 

Divine glory. " Before nature, before any part or be- 
ing of the objective universe existed, the God of the 
Bible had existed from eternity in his own self-sufti- 
cience. And the absolute perfection which that self- 
sumcience implies, determines that it shall be, in some 
sense, the chief reason and last end of everything cre- 
ated ; so that he will continue to inhabit his self-sufii- 
cience through the eternity to come." In other words ? 
" the ultimate, chief, and all-comprehending, end is his 
own glory." — J. Harris^ D. D. This sentiment is 
scriptural, as appears from the following passages : 

" Of him, and through him, and to him, are all 
things ; to whom be glory forever."— Rom. 11 : 36. 
" In whom also we have obtained an inheritance ; be- 
ing predestinated according to the purpose of Him who 
worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, 
that we should be to the praise of his glory." &c. — Eph. 
1 : 11.' "As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall 
bow to me, and every tongue shall confess to God." — 
Rom. 14 : 11. " And^ that every tongue should con- 
fess, that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the 
Father."— Phil. 2 : 11. 

Second, a subordinate object is the well-being of 
the universe. " We believe that while he supremely 
regards his own glory, he really regards the well-being 
of the created universe, for its own sake ; and that 
this well-being is regarded by God as an end, in the 
sense of being an object desirable on its own account, 
and that he delights in it as such." — J. H. 

" I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 171 

saith the Lord God ; wherefore, turn yourselves, and 
live ye."— Ezek. 18 : 32. " The Lord is good to all ; 
and his tender mercies are over all his works." — Ps. 
145: 9. "And God saw everything that he had 
made ; and behold, it was very good." — Gen. 1;: 31. 

2. Divine predestination is the predetermination of 
a plan. There can be no wise determination of an ob- 
ject, without a reference to the proper means and 
measures of its attainment ; because the feasibility of 
the object, depends in part on the feasibility of some 
proper method of operation, which wisdom requires to 
be ascertained. On the part of God, the idea of such 
a method or plan, must from eternity have been com- 
plete and perfect ; and the plan itself must have been 
definite and specific. If in given instances a variety 
of means and measures might severally be feasible, the 
Divine mind must have apprehended and preferred the 
best ; and if they were equally good, a definiteness of 
method must notwithstanding have obtained in the 
Divine mind, because God always knew what plan he 
would pursue. " He hath made with me an everlas- 
ting covenant, ordered in all things, and sure ; for this 
is all my salvation, and all my desire." — 2 Sam. 
23 : 5. 

3. Divine predestination is a predetermination to 
exercise the power, which the execution of the plan 
requires. We are divinely assured that God executes 
his plan, and hence by implication, that he exercises 
the requisite power ; for it is written, " The counsel 
of the Lord standeth forever : the thoughts of his 



172 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 

heart to all generations." — Ps. 33 : 11. "He is in 
one 'mind, and who can turn him? and what his sou] 
desireth, even that he doeth." — Job 23 : 13. 

"All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as 
nothing ; and he doeth according to his will in the 
army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the 
earth ; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, 
What doest thou V Dan. 4:35. If Grod exercises 
the power to execute his great eternal plan, it is be- 
cause he determined to exercise it ; because he does 
nothing from accident or fortuity. If Grod determined 
to exercise this power, he must have determined it 
from eternity ; because by reason of his immutability, 
he can have no recent views, and can entertain no 
new designs. As in his nature, so in his purpose, he 
is "the same yesterday, and to-day, and forever." But 
if Grod from eternity purposed to exercise this power, 
he did not purpose it after he had purposed the plan to 
be executed by it, nor before he had purposed the plan ; 
because the predetermination of the plan was also from 
eternity. Therefore, when he determined the one, he 
also determined the other. 

To show that the moral freedom of finite beings is 
consistent with Divine predestination, the threefold 
character of the latter must be kept in view ; and that 
relation must be exhibited, which freedom sustains to 
it in each of the three fundamental distinctions or 
parts. In other words, it is necessary to exhibit the 
harmony which exists between moral freedom, and 
Divine jiredestination as embracing an obiect, a plan, 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 173 

and the exercise of power to execute the plan. There- 
fore — 

1. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predes- 
tination as embracing an object. 

First. It is consistent with predestination as em- 
bracing the grand or ultimate object. 

Whatever is conducive to a given end, is consistent 
with the pre-determination of that end. The severe 
and protracted study of the scholar, is in harmony 
with his pre-determination to be learned ; the arrange- 
ments and labors of the traveller, agree with his de- 
sign to visit distant places ; and the self-denial of the 
saints, is consistent with their purpose to glorify God ; 
because in each case the object is promoted. But moral 
freedom is subservient to the grand object divinely pre- 
destinated. It subserves that object in its existence, 
nature, exercise, occasions, scope, office, and duration. 
The existence of moral freedom is of God as a good 
gift ; for it implies a Divine influence, and is essential 
to moral agency. It . is therefore essential to God's 
declarative glory. In its nature it is exemption from 
extrinsic causation ; and as such it involves mtrinsic 
causation, which is a feature of the Divine likeness, and 
which therefore glorifies God. In other words, it sub- 
serves the end determined. " So God created man in 
his own image, in the image of God created he him." 
Gen. 1 : 27. 

Moral freedom is also in its exercise subservient to 
the Divine glory. Its right exercise is a practical 
recognition of the Divine authority and claims ; and as 



174 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 

such it honors the Supreme Lawgiver. It is in the 
"highest sense obedience ; and " To obey is better than 
sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of ranis." In its 
improper exercise, moral freedom subserves the same 
end indirectly, as an occasion for glorious developments 
of the Divine character and attributes. " Surely the 
wrath of man shall praise thee : the remainder of 
wrath shalt thou restrain." Ps. 76 : 10. We may 
instance persecutions. These have proved to be fires, 
by means of which the refiner has purified his silver ; 
and when they have occasioned the shedding of blood, 
that blood has become " the seed of the church." 

Moral freedom is also conducive to the end deter- 
mined, in the occasions of its existence. By the fall 
of Adam, those holy influences which are requisite to 
moral freedom, were forfeited ; but mankind are per- 
mitted to enjoy them as a merciful result of Christ's 
death, at such times and under such circumstances as 
consist with the declarative glory of God. The same 
thing is true of other requisites of moral freedom, such 
as the enjoyment of life, and of a sane mind. They 
may all be so conferred, so modified, so suspended, and 
so ended, that God shall be glorified. Moral freedom 
is also in its scope subservient to the Divine glory. 
By the word scope, is here meant both direction and 
extent. In those instances in which God pleases that 
freedom shall exist, it is his prerogative so to locate its 
direction, and so to limit its extent, as to contribute 
to such ends as he determines ; for " He hath prepared 
his throne in the heavens, and his kingdom ruleth over 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 175 

all." Ps. 103 : 19. Moral freedom is also in its office 
conducive to the glory of God. Its office is to render 
the creature responsible for his actions, and to justify 
the ways of the Almighty. It lies at the foundation 
of God's glory, in the bestowment of rewards and pun- 
ishments. 

Finally, moral freedom is in its duration subservient 
to the Divine glory. That is to say, the period of its 
existence is not determined by any necessity in its own 
nature, but by the sovereign will of Him for whose glo- 
ry it was imparted. So that there is nothing in the 
case which requires it to be unduly prolonged, or 
which in any way conflicts with the grand object de- 
termined. 

Second. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine 
predestination as embracing a subordinate object or 
objects. That object which is subordinate to the grand 
object, cannot absolutely preclude that which is essen- 
tial to the grand object. To suppose it could, is to 
assume that what is subordinate is not subordinate. 
But moral freedom is essential to the grand object. It 
must at some time or other exist, in order that God 
may be glorified in his judicial acts ; and in order that 
his government in general may do him honor. There- 
fore no subordinate object can absolutely preclude 
moral freedom ; and consequently moral freedom, either 
as proximate or remote, must be consistent with any 
subordinate object which may have been determined. 

2. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predes- 
tination as embracing a Divine plan. 



176 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 

It has been shown that predestination is threefold ; 
embracing an object or objects, and a plan, and the ' 
exercise of power to execute the plan. We now re- 
mark, that it is also threefold in respect to the plan 
alone ; for it respects the plan in its three depart- 
ments of means, relation of means, and modification 
of means. Therefore, to harmonize moral freedom 
with predestination as embracing or respecting a plan, 
it is necessary to harmonize it with the predetermina- 
tion of the means, the relation of the means, and the 
modification of the means, by which the predetermined 
objects are secured. 

First. Moral freedom is consistent with the pre- 
determination of the means. 

Freedom is itself one of the essential means ; and 
its specific exercises are other means, whether those 
exercises are good, as in the conduct of Joseph, or evil, 
as in the conduct of his brethren. The predetermina- 
tion of freedom as a means^ is absolute or efficient ; but 
the predetermination as means, of the immediate spe- 
cific exercises of freedom, is necessarily permissive. 
This distinction is not affected by the fact, that many 
other means are also determined ; because the Divine 
purpose is consistent with itself. But the Divine pur- 
pose, as being in part efficient, and in part permissive, 
is in fact a predetermination that freedom shall not be 
precluded ; and that it shall have all essential scope 
for its exercise. Consequently freedom is perfectly 
consistent with the predetermination of the Divine 
plan, in so far as the plan comprises means. 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 177 

The fact that predestination is "both efficient and 
permissive, explains all such cases of apparently neces- 
sary wickedness, as that of Judas Iscariot in betraying 
the Lord Jesus. The Divine plan comprised the early 
freedom of Judas, his abuse of that freedom in the 
indulgence of covetousness, his judicial abandonment 
to his covetousness, and the consequent betrayal of 
Christ ; but his freedom was determined efficiently, 
and the abuse of it permissively. It was by reason of 
his previous freedom, that it was possible for God to 
be glorified by occasion of his ultimate wickedness ; 
and his freedom was in perfect harmony with his 
wickedness. That is to say, there was nothing in his 
freedom to hinder him from forming an inward habit of 
covetousness ; nor anything in his freedom to hinder 
its being terminated, by his being abandoned to his 
habit ; nor any tiring in his abandonment to his habit 
of covetousness, to prevent his betrayal of Christ for 
thirty pieces of silver. 

But if these things came to pass consistently, they 
were consistently certain before they came to pass ; 
and if they might be consistently certain before they 
existed, they might be consistently predetermined in a 
decree that is partly efficient and partly permissive. 
Perhaps it may be said, if Judas was at any time free, 
he might have entered and pursued till death, the 
way of righteousness ; and then what would have be- 
come of the prophecies, and of the grand scheme of 
redemption? It may be answered, if Judas had im- 
proved his freedom thus, it would have been eternally 



178 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 

certain, and the prophecies would have corresponded 
with the fact ; and the scheme of redemption would 
have been carried forward, either without a betrayal, 
or by the agency of some one else living in our Lord's 
time, who was no better than Judas. . Several no 
doubt might have been found, who would have per- 
formed the office, if only an opportunity had been al- 
lowed them. It is a wrong idea, however, to suppose 
that Christ, in making the atoning sacrifice, was de- 
pendent on wicked men and devils ; for to do that, is 
to assume a position which, in part, imputes to them 
the glory of the atonement. But " What communion 
hath fight with darkness ; and what concord hath 
Christ with Belial V 3 In the agony and bloody sweat 
of the garden, the great sacrifice was begun ; and there 
it might have been finished : there the Son of Man 
might have laid down his life, and have " tasted death 
for every man/' independently of any human agency. 
With this idea his own words agree. " Therefore doth 
my Father love me, because I lay down my life that I 
might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but 
I lay it down of myself : I have power to lay it down, 
and I have power to take it again." John 10 : 17, 18. 
Any necessity which certainty involves, and which 
therefore the prophecies involve, is simply a natural 
necessity of identity, or a natural necessity of agree- 
ment as implied in identity ; and hence it is not the 
necessity in question. It is such a necessity as apper- 
tains to freedom itself as a fact, and therefore cannot 
be inconsistent with freedom. 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 179 

Second. Moral freedom is consistent with the pre- 
determination of the relation of means. 

Among the means of God's predetermined glory, are 
good and evil influences ; or influences in favor of good, 
and influences in favor of evil. 

These influences are in fact the summing up of all 
means ; and it is by their relation as equal, and of 
consequence by the corresponding relation of other 
things, that moral freedom is enjoyed. But this rela- 
tion, at least in our fallen state, could never obtain, if 
it were not Divinely produced ; and it cannot be Di- 
vinely produced without a determination to produce it ; 
and there can be no such determination unless it be 
eternal. " Known unto God are all his works from 
eternity/' and likewise all the reasons respecting them ; 
so that he was never in doubt or undetermined re- 
specting them, and he can never discover any new rea- 
son in relation to them, to change his mind. There- 
fore, since the relation of influences as equal, is the 
result of Divine predestination, and since moral free- 
dom is the result of that relation, it follows that moral 
freedom is the result of the predestination of that re- 
lation, and of the predestination of all necessary sub- 
ordinate relations : and hence that freedom and pre- 
destination in these respects, are in harmony. 

The same reasoning holds good concerning the rela- 
tions which obtain between freedom itself, and neces- 
sity. An agent's moral freedom in a generic sense, is 
consistent with the preordination of his moral necessity 
in a specific sense. He may be free, as was Moses, to 



180 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION, 

choose between the service of God, and " the pleasures 
of sin for a season ;" but in executing his choice, what- 
ever it be, he will, in the providence of God, or ac- 
cording to the Divine purpose, be sometimes necessita- 
ted in particular acts. Moses, for example, could not 
serve God without obeying him ; he could not obey 
God without being leader and judge of Israel ; and he 
could not be leader and judge of Israel, without 
being sometimes pleasantly, and sometimes unpleas- 
antly necessitated to perform particular acts. 

Pharaoh, also, was primarily free to choose, in his 
measure, either to do right, or to do wrong. He 
chose the latter ; and the necessity to do wrong in a 
particular case, which he afterwards experienced, did 
not conflict with this exercise of generic freedom. If 
he was specifically necessitated, he experienced but a 
necessity which he was primarily free to avoid. He 
was but confirmed and fixed in that which he first 
freely chose ; and in this he was but treated as God 
finally treats all other incorrigible sinners. 

Tri^RD. Moral freedom is consistent with the prede- 
termination of the requisite modification of the means. 
All necessary means of God's glory, and of subordinate 
ends, may be adequately changed and yet exist. They 
may have more or fewer attributes, and be more or 
less extensive. Freedom, for instance, as one of the 
means, may be enjoyed respecting internal acts only ? 
or also respecting external acts ; and it may be enjoyed 
concerning a wide range of subjects, as in the case of 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 181 

a cultivated mind, or only concerning a few subjects, 
as in the case of a savage. 

Other means also may be more or less complete in 
their parts, may be more or less eminent in their na- 
ture, and may exist in greater or less number. Such 
modifications, taking place as they do in harmony with 
moral freedom, and being in part produced by the 
Creator, and in part by the creature, may be in part 
efficiently, and in part permissively predetermined, in 
harmony with moral freedom ; because that which 
consistently takes place, it may have been consistently 
predetermined to do or suffer. 

These modifications include the great changes which 
have taken place in the dispensations of God's mercy 
and grace to mankind in general, as those dispensa- 
tions are distinguished into Patriarchal, Mosaic, and 
Christian ; and they include the changes which are 
constantly occurring in the condition and experience 
of individuals. They are in agreement with man's 
moral freedom, because either they do not vitally af- 
fect the agent's liberty, as in the case of an enlarged 
sphere of action, or they result from some specific ex- 
ercise of liberty, as in the formation of ruinous habits, 
or they actually produce moral freedom, by equalizing 
diverse motive influences. 

We may say of the Divine plan, that in subordina- 
tion to the glory of God and the good of the universe, 
it is a scheme to originate moral freedom, and to afford 
that freedom all suitable scope, in so far as justice and 
mercy require, by originating and modifying the ne- 



182 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 

cessary circumstances ; and that therefore moral free- 
dom exists, in so far as justice and mercy require, in 
perfect harmony with the predetermination of the 
Divine plan. 

3. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predes- 
tination, in so far as predestination respects the exer- 
cise of power sufficient to execute the Divine plan. 

It has been shown, that freedom is in harmony with 
the predetermination of both the object and the plan. 
It must therefore be consistent with the execution 
of the one, and the attainment of the other ; for it is 
in reference to them as feasible, that the harmony is 
predicated and proved. But if moral freedom is con- 
sistent with the execution of the plan, it is consistent 
with the exercise of the requisite power 'to execute it ; 
and if so, it is consistent with the predetermination to 
exercise that power ; because in the exercise of it, the 
predetermination is implied. 

The predetermination of Grod, is indeed essential to 
moral freedom. Such freedom cannot exist, except as 
it is comprised in the Divine plan, as one of its pro- 
visions to secure the contemplated object ; and it can- 
not actually exist as one of those provisions, except as 
the Divine plan is in this . respect executed ; and the 
Divine plan cannot be executed in any respect, except 
in pursuance of the Divine purpose or predetermina- 
tion. "Every good gift, and every perfect gift, is 
from above, and cometh down from the Father of 
lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow 
of turning." — James 1 : 17. 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 183 

The harmony under consideration may be illustra- 
ted as follows : A republican government determines 
to obtain satisfaction for injuries received from a sister 
republic. The object is redress ; and the plan is war. 
The latter comprises the plan of campaigns ; and, 
through the agency of generals, the subordinate plans 
of sieges and battles. The exercise of the requisite 
power, is that of a free government over a free and 
in some respects a sovereign people : a people whose 
officers are but their servants. Yet the indispensable 
volunteer soldiery are enrolled, the needful supplies 
are furnished, the enemy's country is invaded, the bat- 
tles are fought, and the object is gained. 

If there is any difference between this case and 
man's moral freedom under the Divine government, it 
is in favor of the latter ; and by so much, as the Di- 
vine administration is a more wise, benign, and appro- 
priate government. 

It may perhaps be objected concerning Pharaoh, 
that God said, " For this cause have I raised thee up, 
for to show in thee my power, and that my name may 
be declared throughout all the earth." — Exodus 9 : 16. 

From this passage it may appear to some, that 
Pharaoh was brought into the world, that he might be 
arbitrarily hardened and afflicted ; that he was ac- 
tually so hardened and afflicted ; and that therefore 
he was not morally a free agent. This, however, is 
not the sense of the passage. " The word translated 
' raised up,' does not signify to bring into existence, but 
to cause to stand, to make to continue. Thus : 1 



184 FEEEDOM AND PEEDESTINATION. 

Kings 15:4, • Nevertheless for David's sake did the 
Lord his God give him a lamp in Jerusalem,- to set up 
his son after him, and to establish Jerusalem/ Heb. 
' To make to stand/ i. e., to preserve. Proverbs 29 : 
4, ' The king by judgment establisheth the land/ 
Hebraism : c Makes to stand / i. e., renders safe. 

So also Ex. 21 : 21, l If he continue a day or two/ 
Heb., c If he stand a day or two / i. e., survive. Paul, 
however, in quoting this passage, Kom. 9 : 17, employs 
the term c raised up / which will occasion no difficulty, 
if it be borne in mincl, that a person may be said to 
be ' raised up/ who is preserved alive when in danger 
of dying, a usage of the word which occurs James 5 : 
15, c And the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and 
the Lord shall raise him up.' It was in this sense of 
being spared from imminent destruction, that Pharaoh 
was raised up." — Bush. 

The passage however may mean, that Pharaoh was 
taken from some comparatively humble station in life, 
and exalted to the throne of Egypt. There had prob- 
ably occurred an intestine revolution, in which the old 
dynasty had passed away, and a new one originated, 
or " raised up" in its stead ; for it is written, " There 
arose up a new king over Egypt, who knew not Jo- 
seph/' — Ex. 1 : 8. That is to say, a strange or for- 
eign king : one at least who was not brought in by 
regular succession ; for the word "new" is elsewhere 
applied to gods and languages, to designate them as 
strange gods, and foreign languages. See Deut. 32 : 
17 ; Judges 5:8; Mark 16 : 17. 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 185 

Besides, Josephus, speaking of the oppressions en- 
dured by the Israelites after the death of Joseph, 
says, " The government having been transferred to an- 
other family." As thus viewed, the case of Pharaoh 
sinrply sustains the following propositions : 

I. God has a decisive agency in raising up men to 
stations of power ; and he exercises this power in 
pagan nations, as well as in others. " Is he the God 
of the Jews only ? Is he not also of the Gentiles ? 
Yes, of the Gentiles also."— Kom. 3 : 29. " There 
fell a voice from heaven, saying, king Nebuchadnez- 
zar, to thee it is spoken : the kingdom is departed from 
thee ; and they shall drive thee from men, and thy 
dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field. They 
shall make thee to eat grass as oxen, and seven times 
shall pass over thee, until thou know that the Most 
High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to 
whomsoever he will." — Dan. 4 : 31, 32. 

II. God frequently raises up wicked men to stations 
of honor and power. It may be so done to them, even 
on account of their wickedness ; for they may be ex- 
alted, that they may be the more signally punished. 

III. God frequently raises up men to important sta- 
tions in life, by suffering fraud and falsehood to pre- 
vail. In the raising up of Pharaoh, he probably suf- 
fered not only these, but violence and bloodshed ; and 
his fate should be a perpetual warning to those who 
seek for worldly success in the employment of un- 
righteous means. Temporary prosperity is no criterion 



186 FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 

of the Divine favor, and therefore not always a just 
occasion for rejoicing. 

IV. When Grod raises up the wicked to stations of 
power and affluence, it is generally to accomplish a 
variety of ends of his own. It may be, 1. To punish 
a wicked and cruel nation. 2. To make his sovereignty 
known. 3. To benefit and save his people, in the 
most effectual and glorious manner. 

V. God sometimes hardens men in their wickedness. 
This hardness may be created in either one or both of 
two ways. 

1. It may obtain as the result of Divine forbearance 
and mercy. " And when Pharaoh saw that the rain, 
and the hail, and the thunders were ceased, he sinned 
yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants. 
And the heart of Pharaoh was hardened, neither 
would he let the children of Israel go, as the Lord 
had spoken by Moses."— Ex. 9 : 34, 35. 

2. It may obtain as a judicial visitation. It is writ- 
ten of some, " God shall send them strong delusion, 
that they should believe a lie : that they all might be 
damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure 
in unrighteousness." — 2 Thess. 2 : 11, 12. 

VI. G-od sometimes hardens rulers in their wicked- 
ness, for the same reason that he raised them up in 
their wickedness ; or he justly withholds from them all 
melting and subduing grace, that the ends of justice 
to them, and of mercy to others, and of glory to Grod, 
may not be defeated. 

It should be borne in mind, that a judicial harden- 



FREEDOM AND PREDESTINATION. 187 

ing, or a hardening in the way of punishment, is never 
arbitrary ; but that it implies guilt in the unhappy 
subject, and therefore previous freedom which has been 
abused. Consequently, it is a hardening which might 
have been avoided : a hardening in which the agent is 
involved by means of his own free volitions and ac- 
tions. 

It is therefore merely that which all must acknowl- 
edge will ultimately befall every incorrigible sinner, 
though every such sinner has his probationary day of 
moral freedom. 



CHAPTER III. 



JtMiflW ani (BUttiaxt, 



PRINCIPLES. 

III. Man's moral freedom is consistent ivith person- 
al and eternal election to salvation. 

It may be well to observe, that election, generically 
considered, is various ; dividing itself into the follow- 
ing departments or branches : 

1. An election of Christ as the Messiah. " Behold 
my servant whom I uphold, mine elect in whom my 
soul delighteth : I have put my Spirit upon him, he 
shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles." — Isa. 42 : 
1. " Behold my servant whom I have chosen." — Mat. 
12 : 18. " A living stone, disallowed indeed of men, 
but chosen of God, and precious." — 1 Peter 2 : 4. 

2. An election of good angels. " I charge thee be- 
fore God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and the elect 
angels."—! Tim. 5 : 21. 

3. An election of the seed of Abraham, or of Israel, 
to the enjoyment of great national blessings, and reli- 
gious privileges. " I will bring forth a seed out of 
Jacob, and out of Judah an inheritor of my moun- 



FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 189 

tains ; and mine elect shall inherit it, and my servants 
shall dwell there/' " They shall not build, and anoth- 
er inhabit : they shall not plant, and another eat ; 
for as the days of a tree, are the days of my people, 
and mine elect shall long enjoy the work of their 
hands."— Isa. 65 : 9, 22. u The Lord thy God hath 
chosen thee to be a special people unto himself, above 
all people that are upon the face of the earth." — Deut. 
7:6. " Israel mine elect." — Isa. 45 : 4. 

4. An election of the G-entiles, or nations in gene- 
ral, to Gospel privileges. " Go ye, therefore, and teach 
all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, 
and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ; teaching 
them to observe all things, whatsoever I have com- 
manded you."— Mat. 28 : 19, 20. " I will declare the 
decree : the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my 
Son, this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me, and 
I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and 
the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." — 
Ps. 2 : 7, 8. "For this cause, I Paul, the prisoner 
of Jesus Christ for you Gentiles, if ye have heard of 
the dispensation of the grace of God, which is given 
me to you-ward. — That the Gentiles should be fellow- 
heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of his 
promise in Christ, by the Gospel. — According to the 
eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our 
Lord."— Eph. 3 : 1, 2, 6, 11. 

5. An election of the Christian Church, or Church- 
es, to be the peculiar people of God, as were the 
Jews of old. "The Church that is at Babylon, 



190 FKEEDOM AND ELECTION. 

elected together with you, saluteth you, and so doth 
Marcus my son/' — 1 Peter 5 : 13. " As he saith also 
in Hosea, I will call them my people, which were not 
my people ; and her beloved, which was not "beloved/' 
— Rom. 9 : 25. " Who gave himself for us, that he 
might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto 
himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works/' — 
Titus 2 : 14. " Ye are a chosen generation, a royal 
priesthood/'— 1 Peter 2 : 9. 

6. An election of individuals to particular duties, 
or offices. " He called unto him his disciples ; and of 
them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles." 
— Luke 6:13. " Ye have not chosen me, but I have 
chosen you, and ordained you, that you should go and 
bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain." — 
John 15 : 16. " Men and brethren, ye know how that 
a good while ago, God made choice among us, that the 
Gentiles by my mouth should hear the word of the 
Gospel, and believe." — Acts 15 : 7. 

7. An election of particular individuals to salvation : 
" Paul, a servant of God, and an apostle of Jesus 
Christ, according to the faith of God's elect." — Titus 
1:1. " God hath not appointed us to wrath ; but 
to obtain salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ." — 1 
Thess. 5:9. " God hath from the beginning chosen 
you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and 
belief of the truth."— 2 Thess. 2 : 13. 

To elect is to choose. Divine election to salvation, 
is God's act of choosing to save ; and it is equivalent 
to a purpose, predestination, or decree. It is charac- 



FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 191 

terized by two distinct and important properties ; be- 
ing personal and eternal. 

1. Election to salvation is personal. " Knowing, 
brethren beloved, your election of God. For our gos- 
pel came not unto you in word only, but also in power, 
and in the Holy Ghost, and in much assurance." — 1 
Thess. 1 : 4, 5. " The foundation of God standeth 
sure, having this seal, the Lord knoweth them that 
are his."— 2 Tim. 2 : 19. "For whom he did fore- 
know, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the 
image of his Son, that he might be the first born 
among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did pre- 
destinate, them he also called ; and whom he called, 
them he also justified ; and whom he justified, them 
he also glorified."— Rom. 8 : 29, 30. " The elder un- 
to the elect lady and her children." — 2 John 1. " The 
children of thy elect sister greet thee." — 2 John 13. 

2. Election to salvation is eternal. " According as 
he hath chosen us in him, before the foundation of the 
world." — Eph. 1:4. " Then shall the king say unto 
them on his right hand, Come ye blessed of my 
Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the 
foundation of the world."— Mat. 25 : 34. " Whom 
he did foreknow, he also did predestinate." — Rom. 8 : 
29. "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God 
the Father."— 1 Peter 1 : 2. 

That moral freedom is consistent with this election 
to salvation, appears from the following consider- 
ations : 

1. Moral freedom is consistent with Divine predes- 



192 FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 

tination, and predestination includes election. " Ac- 
cording as lie hath chosen us in him, "before the foun- 
dation of the world, that we should be holy, and with- 
out blame before him in love ; having predestinated 
us unto the adoption of children/' — Eph. 1 : 4, 5. 

Divine predestination is the predetermination of an 
object, a plan, and the exercise of power sufficient to 
execute that plan ; and hence election, as included or 
involved in predestination, must be in harmony with 
the object, the plan, and the exercise of this power. 
But this predetermined plan comprises man's moral 
freedom, as one of its essential provisions. Therefore 
election must be in harmony with such freedom. It 
must agree with every essential provision of the plan, 
in order to agree with the plan itself. 

The salvation of the elect, is efficiently determined 
as a means of the Divine glory, or as a means of the 
predetermined object ; and that in harmony with 
their moral freedom, because only those " Whom he 
did foreknow" as freely choosing aright, " he did pre- 
destinate to be conformed to the image of his Son," 
and to be " glorified." 

2. Personal and eternal election to salvation is con- 
sistent with man's moral freedom, because it obtains 
in the light of a perfect knowledge, of what will be 
possible and proper in harmony with such freedom. 
In the act of election God did not discard the benefit 
of his knowledge, because he could not dishonor one of 
his attributes, by slighting it in its own appropriate 
sphere ; and hence we read, " Whom he did foreknow, 



FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 193 

he also did predestinate ;" and again, " Elect, accor- 
ding to the foreknowledge of God the Father." 

God foresaw " from eternity" whom he could con- " 
sistently save in harmony with their moral freedom ; 
and he foresaw from eternity, that those whom he con- 
sistently could save in harmony with their moral free- 
dom, he actually would thus save ; and as he foresaw from 
eternity, that he consistently could and would save 
them in harmony with their moral freedom, so he must 
from eternity have chosen, elected, or determined thus 
to save them ; for he is u the same yesterday, to- 
day, and forever." Heb. 13 : 8. His language is, 
"I am the Lord, I change not." This suggests the 
reason why he did not elect a larger number to salva- 
tion : he foresaw that more could not be saved in har- 
mony with their moral freedom. 

The doctrine of moral freedom has been proved 
Therefore free agents attain persooally to salvation ; 
" being justified freely by his grace, through the re- 
demption that is in Jesus Christ." Eom. 3 : 24. If 
free agents attain personally to salvation, their freedom 
is consistent with then salvation. If their freedom is 
consistent with their salvation, it is consistent with 
God's act of saving them ; and then it is consistent 
with God's purpose or choice, at the time, to save 
them. If their moral freedom is consistent with their 
being saved in- pursuance of a Divine choice, exercised 
at the time of their salvation, it is consistent with 
their being saved in pursuance of a Divine choice, ex- 
ercised from eternity ; for the reasons of that choice, 



194 FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 

must in each case be the same. They were all present 
to the Divine mind from eternity ; and God can never 
entertain any new or different view of them. 

3. The moral freedom of the saved, is consistent 
with their election to salvation, because it is consistent 
with their election to the means and method of salva- 
tion. "According as he hath chosen us in him, before 
the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, 
and without blame before him in love ; having predes- 
tinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus 
Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his 
will."— Eph. 1:4,5. 

God elected or chose a redeemer for the world : a 
" Saviour of all men, but especially of those who be- 
lieve ;" and the redeemer whom he elected is Christ 
Jesus. "Wherefore, it is contained in the scripture, 
Behold I lay in Zion a chief corner-stone, elect, pre- 
cious, and he that believeth on him, shall not be con- 
founded." — 1 Peter, 2 : 6. And again, " Behold my 
servant whom I uphold, mine elect in whom my soul 
delighteth." — Isa. 42 : 1. In electing or choosing 
Christ to be the redeemer of mankind, God chose the 
means and method of salvation which he propounds. 
In choosing the means and method propounded by the 
Lord Jesus to the world, God chooses or elects to adop- 
tion and persevering holiness, all who, in the exercise of 
moral freedom, embrace his means and method ; and 
by thus electing them to adoption and persevering ho- 
liness in harmony with their moral freedom, he elects 
them to salvation in harmony with their moral free- 



FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 195 

dom ; and by reason of the Divine foreknowledge, 
their election is both personal and eternal. It is an 
election in Christ ; because, as they would have been 
rejected in the rejection of Christ, so they are elected 
in the election of Christ. Therefore, " Give diligence 
to make your calling and election sure ;" or, to ac- 
quire a vital union or relation to Christ, as the 
branch to the vine, and hence a saving interest in his 
election, as your own. If you have already " gained" 
tHis interest, give diligence to confirm this your calling 
and election ; "for if ye do these things, ye shall 
never fall. For so an entrance shall be ministered un- 
to you abundantly, into the everlasting kingdom of our 
Lord and Savior Jesus Christ/' — 2 Peter 1 : 10, 11. 
The doctrine of this portion of scripture is, not that 
God is in doubt concerning our final end, nor that 
election is not eternal ; but that obedience is indis- 
pensable. It may be illustrated by certain facts con- 
cerning Paul's dangerous voyage and shipwreck, as 
expressed by that apostle. He said, " There shall be 
no loss of any man's life among you, but of the ship. 
For there stood by me this night the Angel of God, 
whose I am, and whom I serve, saying, Fear not Paul, 
thou must be brought before Ca3sar, and lo, God hath 
given thee all them that sail with thee. Wherefore, 
sirs, be of good cheer ; for I believe God, that it shall 
be even as it was told me." Yet " as the shipmen 
were about to flee out of the ship," " Paul said to the 
Centurion and to the soldiers, except these abide in the 
ship, ye cannot be saved." — Acts 27 : 22, 31. 



196 FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 

Eemarks. — 1. All who are elected to salvation, will 
certainly be saved. Not one of them will be lost. To 
suppose otherwise, is as absurd as to suppose that some 
may be lost whom God knows will be saved, and whom 
he has determined to save. We do not say that they 
cannot fatally apostatize, but that they will not. If, 
however, it be insisted that they cannot, it will not 
therefore follow that freedom and moral obligation 
have no existence. As freedom prevents not sinners 
from placing themselves in such a position that they 
cannot be saved, so it prevents not any from attaining 
to such a state, that they cannot practically deny the 
Lord that bought them ; and consequently, that they 
cannot be lost. And if this state should commence 
with regeneration, the case is not essentially altered. 
In their regeneration, the saints are not precluded 
from the exercise of a free choice ; and the choice 
which they then make, is that of eternal life, with all 
its prerequisite grace. They choose, therefore, a final 
preservation from apostasy. On eternal life, through 
Jesus Christ our Lord, their heart is fully set ; and 
therefore, on God's preserving grace. They make at 
the time an entire surrender of themselves to the 
Savior, and throw themselves wholly on his mercy 
and protection ; for they realize that his grace is abso- 
lutely indispensable. If, therefore, all they who are 
elected to salvation, are irresistibly " kept by the power 
of God through faith unto salvation," it is not in con- 
flict with their primary and essential freedom, but in 
harmony with it, as a consistent result of its proper 



FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 197 

exercise. Besides, while they live, they are still in a 
state of trial ; for even if they may not fall away and 
perish, they may be more or less faithful in the im- 
provement of saving grace, and so be more or less use- 
ful and blest, as the result of this part of then pro- 
bation. 

2. All who are elected to salvation, as adults, are 
also elected to the grace or blessing of regeneration. 
It may be less apparent in some than in others, and 
it may imply more in some than in others ; but all 
of mature mind, who are elected to salvation, do ex- 
perience it. " Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye 
must be born again/' — John 3 : 7. 

3. The mere fact, that some are personally and eter- 
nally elected to salvation, and that all these are elect- 
ed to regeneration, does not of itself imply that none 
others are. elected to regeneration ; or, election to sal- 
vation, does not of itself imply that it includes all who 
in time are "born again/' Whether it includes them 
all, or whether it does not, can only be made out from 
the scriptures directly ; and not from anything in its 
nature as a Divine choice. 

4. If the moral freedom of those who are saved, is 
consistent with their personal and eternal election to 
salvation, then the moral freedom of those who are 
not saved, is consistent with that election. Election 
can have no essential or direct effect on any, except on 
its subjects ; and if it precludes not the liberty of its 
subjects, it certainly cannot preclude the liberty of 
others. 



198 FREEDOM AND ELECTION. 

5. To the inquiry, Is election conditional or uncon- 
ditional, the answer must be given in accordance with 
the sense in which the terms, conditional and uncon- 
ditional, are employed by him who puts the question. 
If by conditional be meant, that in election the terms 
of salvation are not set aside, but recognized and re- 
spected, or that faith and obedience are requisite to 
salvation, even in the case of the elect, the answer must 
be that election is conditional ; but if by conditional 
be meant, that the election or choice is not positive 
but provisional, in the Divine mind, then, in opposition 
to such a sense of conditional, the answer must be, 
that election is unconditional. On no subject whatev- 
er, can the All-wise God experience uncertainty or 
doubt ; and hence the eternal choice or predetermina- 
tion of his own action, in the final disposition of his 
creatures, is in no instance encumbered with a proviso 
to himself. 



CHAPTER IY. 



jfrrrttom ani <Btm, Ifixtbxm f rtoripte, Jtal giuum 

PRINCIPLES. 

IY. Moral freedom is consistent with the fact that 
salvation is of grace. 

In no exercise of moral freedom, can any man be 
the procuring cause of eternal life ; for he cannot orig- 
inate the indispensable purchase price. He is him- 
self purchased : "bought with a price :" " redeemed, 
not with corruptible things, as silver and gold, but 
with the precious blood of Christ/' — 1 Peter 1 : 18, 
19. Hence it is written, " When ye shall have done 
all those things which are commanded you, say, We 
are unprofitable servants : we have done that which 
was our duty to do." — Luke 17 : 10. When Christ 
said, " Ye will not come unto me that ye might have 
life/' he spoke as never man spake :" he truthfully as- 
serted his divinity. Sinful man, with all his freedom, 
is unworthy and dependent. He is "wretched, and 
miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked /' and the 
" gold tried in the fire, the white raiment, the eye- 
salve," and the "milk and honey" which enrich him 



200 FREEDOM AND GRACE. 

when saved, are therefore none the less a favor or 
grace, though accepted in the enjoyment of power to 
reject, 

" Every one that asketh receiveth, and he that seek- 
eth findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be 
opened ;" but it is not by asking, nor by anything else, 
that the agent can possibly render an equivalent for 
the blessings received. It is therefore entirely of grace 
that they are enjoyed, though they are not forced up- 
on his acceptance ; and the idea that they must be 
forced upon him, in order that they may be enjoyed 
through favor or grace, is strange indeed. It is an 
idea which no one can reasonably entertain. That 
salvation is of grace, appears not only in that it is 
itself " the gift of God," but also in that the power to 
accept and receive it is the gift of God. Mankind were 
famishing, and therefore " the bread of life" was placed 
before them ; but they were unable of themselves to 
profit by the rich provision. They were like men ex- 
hausted, benumbed, prostrated, and overwhelmed in 
an arctic snow-storm : they were not only destitute, 
but helpless. They needed, therefore, to have some- 
thing done for them independently of their own efforts ; 
and that, something more than a mere extrinsic pro- 
vision. As the chilled and perishing traveller needs to 
be conveyed into a warmer atmosphere, and to receive 
those attentions which are requisite to restore him to 
consciousness and capacity, in order that he may par- 
take of food and live, so fallen men needed first to be 
introduced into an atmosphere of mercy, and to receive 



FREEDOM AND GRACE. 201 

those benefits which should remove their moral inabili- 
ty, that they might freely partake of " the living bread 
which came down from heaven/' "and not die." This 
kind office is actually performed for them ; "for when 
we were yet without strength, in due time Christ died 
for the ungodly/' and " Grod sent not his Son into the 
world to condemn the world, but that the world 
through him might be saved/' Mankind therefore 
possess a power to choose the way of life and salvation, 
which is itself an unmerited favor : an unmerited grace. 
If now they exercise this power in accepting what their 
benefactor has, at great pains-taking and expense, pro- 
vided for them, will the praise and honor of their res- 
cue from death be due to themselves, or to their 
Divine Benefactor? To the latter, most certainly. 
He who could answer otherwise, has at least partially 
lost his reason : has in some sense become a monoma- 
niac. In exercising the power of right volition freely, 
the agent does not earn salvation as a reward of merit, 
but merely complies with the condition of a gift ; just 
as the mendicant who reaches forth his hand, does not 
earn the golden coin which is put into it, but only 
performs the condition of a charity or favor. 

V. Man's moral freedom is consistent with the fact 
that regeneration is a Divine ivorh. 

Freedom is not a power to regenerate. It is merely 
exemption from extrinsic causation, in choosing or re- 
fusing the grace or favor of regeneration, as an office- 
work of God's Holy Spirit, through Jesus Christ our 
Lord. That man is essentially free, and that the new 



202 . FREEDOM AND GRACE. 

birth, is notwithstanding a Divine work, are both im- 
plied in the following scriptures. " Ye will not come 
to me that ye might have life." — John 5 : 40. " How 
often would I have gathered thy children together, 
even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, 
and ye would not,"— Mat, 23 : 37. "I have called, 
and ye refused : I have stretched out my hand, and no 
man regarded." — Prov. 1 : 24. 

The Divine causation obtains in a department in 
which the human causation does not enter ; and kgnce 
it remains with all its glory in harmony with the hu- 
man, and in harmony with that state of the human 
agent in which his causation is possible ; which state 
is that of moral freedom. The harmony appears also 
in the fact, that the human causation is wholly sub- 
servient to the Divine ; or in the fact, that the human, 
as exercised in right volition, is a condition of the Di- 
vine. God himself has made it such ; and he himself 
creates that freedom which renders it possible. But 
God creates not anything which precludes regeneration 
as a Divine work. Therefore, moral freedom as an 
endowment of man, and man's regeneration as a work 
of God, are events which transpire in harmony. 

By way of objection, we are referred to the following 
passages : " Ye have not chosen me, but I have cho- 
sen you and ordained you, that you should go and 
bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain." 
John 15 : 16. " It is not of him that willeth, nor of 
him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." 
Rom. 9 : 16. Neither of these passages is relevant to 



FREEDOM AND GRACE. 203 

the subject. The former has reference to the office of 
the Gospel ministry. It simply affirms, that the Apos- 
tles were not first in the choice of office under him, as 
it evidently was not their prerogative ; but that Christ 
selected and ordained them to their work, and provided 
that their "fruit should remain/' in the form of true 
religion, and of visible Churches. 

The latter passage has reference to other mercy than 
that of regeneration. It affirms the exercise of God's 
sovereignty, in his peculiar favors to the Jewish nation, 
and in the subsequent calling of the Gentiles. " Abra- 
ham judged that the blessing ought, and he willed, 
desired that it might be given to Ishmael ; and Isaac 
also willed, designed it for his first born, Esau ; and 
Esau, wishing and hoping that it might be his, readily 
went, run a hunting for venison, that he might have it 
regularly conveyed to him ; but they were all disap- 
pointed: Abraham and Isaac who willed, and Esau 
who ran ; for God had originally intended that the 
blessing of being a great nation and distinguished peo- 
ple, should of his mere good pleasure, be given to 
Isaac and Jacob, and be confirmed in their posterity ; 
and to them it was given. And when, by then apos- 
tasy, they had forfeited this privilege, it was not 
Moses' willing nor any prior obligation God was under, 
but his own sovereign mercy which continued it to 
them."— A. Clarke, D. D. 

The apostle teaches, that this same sovereignty was 
exercised in giving the Gospel to the heathen, or the 
Gentiles ; and in saving those of them who believe, on 



204 VARIATION FROM PREVIOUS CHARACTER. 

the simple terms of faith and love. To sustain him- 
self in this position, he quotes the following language 
of Hosea : "I will call them my people, which were 
not my people ; and her, beloved, which was not be- 
loved. And it shall come to pass, that in the place 
where it was said unto them, Ye are not my people, 
there shall they be called the children of the living 
God." — Rom. 9 : 25, 26. But in teaching us that our 
privileges are sovereign favors, and hence that our sal- 
vation is "not of works," "not of him that willeth, nor 
of him that runneth," he does not teach us that God's 
sovereignty is exercised in causing a portion of us to 
improve these privileges necessarily. 

The apostle, therefore, does not reason against our 
moral freedom. He represents God as a Sovereign in 
all his dispensations ; and man as a limitecl and de- 
pendent free moral agent. He says, "When we were 
yet without strength, in due time Christ died for the 
ungodly :" died to give them strength in the form of 
power to choose either good or evil ; and hence, to give 
them freedom to choose righteousness and salvation. 

VI. The moral quality of a given volition or choice, 
may differ from the previous moral state of the agent, 

1. The volition may be evil, and the previous state 
of the agent holy. This must be true if man be free ; 
and hence we prove it true by proving that man is 
free. If it were not true, no holy being could ever 
sin ; and hence, in respect of choosing between good 
and evil, no holy being could ever be free. 

The first transgressor was originally holy ; for he 



VARIATION FROM PREVIOUS CHARACTER. 205 

was the creation of a holy God. If the first trans- 
gressor was primarily holy, he must have changed 
from a state of holiness to a state of sinfulness ; for 
he did not remain holy. If he changed from a state 
of holiness to a state of sinfulness, he must have 
changed hy sinning ; for to assume the contrary, is to 
suppose that he became a sinner innocently, which is 
a contradiction. If the first transgressor changed 
from a holy to a sinful state by sinning, he must have 
changed his state in the exercise of a sinful voli- 
tion ; for it is in the exercise of choice, that moral 
agency essentially consists. All other agency is sub- 
ordinate to tliis. If the first transgressor changed his 
moral state in the exercise of a sinful volition or choice, 
that volition was evil, and the previous state of the 
agent was holy. 

This instance proves the possibility of such events. 
It proves that an evil volition, instead of proceeding 
from a pre-existing depravity, may itself create de- 
pravity ; or that, instead of arising from a previously 
implanted principle of evil, it may be the means of 
implanting an evil principle. 

2. The volition may be morally good or right, and 
the previous state of the agent be morally evil or sin- 
ful. The same principle in our moral being, or the 
same law of accountable action, which renders it 
ble for a holy being to exercise a wrong volition, ren- 
ders it possible for a sinful agent to exercise a right 
volition ; and that principle is moral freedom. 

Therefore, io sav that a right volition must necessa- 



206 VARIATION FROM PREVIOUS CHARACTER. 

riiy spring from the pre-exist ence of incipient holiness, 
or from a previous change of heart, is incorrect : it is 
to affirm that, in respect of choosing between moral 
good and evil, the unregenerate are not free ; which is 
contrary to what has been proved. 

We shall perhaps be told, that " A good tree can- 
not bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree 
bring forth good fruit." — Mat. 7 : 18. And again, 
" Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard 
his spots ? then may ye also .do good, that are accus- 
tomed to do evil/'— Jer. 13 : 23. 

But these passages are not relevant. If they were, 
they would prove that sin must have entered the uni- 
verse by the creative act of Deity, as exercised either 
in originating a sinful being, as such, or in changing 
the moral nature of a being previously holy ; which 
is, in either case, an act at variance with the Divine 
nature, and therefore impossible. The former of the 
two passages simply assures us, that " by their fruits 
ye shall know them :" that when we behold evil fruits, 
we may know that the tree is then evil ; and that 
when we behold good fruits, we may know that the 
tree is then good. The latter passage simply affirms, 
that men may continue so long in a given course, as 
to render a change impossible ; which implies that 
previously a change was possible. It is true, God has 
said, " Shall there be evil in the city, and the Lord 
hath not done it?" — Amos 3: 6. And again, "I 
form the light and create darkness : I make peace, 



FREEDOM AND MORAL SUASION. 207 

and create evil. I the Lord do all these things." — 
Isaiah 45 : 7. 

But the evils here spoken of are natural and provi- 
dential. They are such as famine, pestilence, and war ; 
and in some instances they may imply a withdrawal 
of holy influences, but they preclude not any freedom 
which is essential to accountability. They are judicial 
visitations, by means of which Grod punishes men for 
the abuse of their freedom. These evils were brought 
upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem ; but not till they 
had deserved them, and not till Christ had wept over 
them, and had offered to gather and save them. 

VII. Freedom is consistent with the agent's suscep- 
tibility of moral suasion. 

It may perhaps bo said, if the doctrine of moral 
freedom be true, "it will follow, that it is not worth 
the while to offer any arguments to persuade men to 
any virtuous volition or voluntary action ; it is in vain 
to set before them the wisdom and amiableness of 
ways of virtue, or the odiousness and folly of ways of 
vice. This notion of liberty and mural agency frus- 
trates all endeavors to draw men to virtue by instruc- 
tion or persuasion, precept or example.''' 

The futility of this objection appears in the feet, that 
persuasion is merely a particular method of conveying 
motive iiifhienee ; and that motive influence always 
affects the agent, though it is not sufficient in every 
case to affect his moral action. If in some instances 
it fails to induce corresponding action, it is not because 
freedom places the agent above persuasion or motive 



208 FREEDOM AND MORAL SUASION. 

influence, but because contrary persuasion or influence 
is to the agent as strong or stronger. It fails by occa- 
sion of existing competition ; or because it is not so 
powerful as it might be, and as in some cases it ought 
to be. It cannot justly be said, that freedom precludes 
the effect of persuasion, since freedom itself is an ef- 
fect of that kind of influence which persuasion exerts. 

When moral suasion is against a given sin, as for 
instance the sin of intemperance, and when it comes 
from some dear and injured friend, it may enable the 
subject of it to resist a temptation which otherwise he 
could not have resisted. It is in the exercise of such 
a power to do good to the erring, and to others, that 
Christians " are workers together with Grod." Even 
temptation may be subservient to moral freedom. It 
may be productive of moral power to sin. In the case 
of Eve's temptation, the persuasion of the devil had 
this effect ; and it was all that he expected to accom- 
plish by his own causation. The rest he could only 
look for as the result of her causation. However, the 
suspension of the moral necessity of obedience, and 
the consequent possibility of transgression, must soon- 
er or later have occurred to Eve, if Satan had not in- 
terposed ; as it did to the first offender, when no sin- 
ful tempter existed. The reason lies in the fact, that 
moral freedom is essential to accountability, or to the 
fitness of reward. 

If the objection of the necessitarian has any weight 
at all, it is against his own system ; for if all moral 
agents are under an absolute moral necessity, and that 



FKEEDOM AND MOItAL SUASION. 209 

from a higher and deeper source than moral suasion, 
" it will follow, that it is not worth the while to offer 
any arguments to persuade men. It is in vain to set 
before them the wisdom and amiableness of ways of 
virtue, or the odiousness and folly of ways of vice." 
It is only in. the scheme of moral freedom, which is the 
system of the Bible, that the proper value is accorded 
to moral suasion ; for in that scheme only, its impor- 
tance is not gratuitous, and its final result is not ar- 
bitrary. 



CHAPTER V, 



<£0rnUti&e«, 



PRINCIPLES. 



VIII. The ideas of freedom and necessity are cor- 
relatives. 

That is to say, they are opposites which mutually 
imply and suggest each other, like right and left, hus- 
band and wife, parent and child ; and as existing facts, 
like life and death, they mutually exclude each other. 
The idea of the one as present, suggests the idea of 
the other as absent. This relation of freedom and ne- 
cessity is universal : it obtains in all cases in which 
either may be affirmed. 

IX. Freedom and necessity are correlated in the 
same quality. 

Freedom may be either natural, moral, or physical, 
according to the references of the distinction ; and that 
which it is in this respect, constitutes what may be 
termed its quality. The same thing is true of neces- 
sity. When freedom is affirmed in a given quality, 
necessity is denied in that quality ; and when necessi- 
ty is affirmed in a given quality, freedom is denied in 
that quality. 



CORRELATIVES. 211 

X. Moral quality is generically natural. 

The freedom or necessity which is moral ; differs from 
that which is natural only in its mode, or in the man- 
ner in which it is produced. In its essential nature 
as a state, it is the same ; for it exists wholly on natu- 
ral principles, or by the natural laws of our being. It 
exists by those inherent laws of our nature, which we 
are naturally as incompetent to transcend, as we are 
incompetent to create a new faculty. For example, 
in all cases of moral necessity, the relevant diverse mo- 
tives are unequal ; and we are naturally compelled to 
obey the strongest, by the force "of reason : natural 
reason, or by the law of rationality in us, as previously 
explained. Hence it is, that moral necessity is really 
a natural necessity. Consequently, to affirm a moral 
necessity, is to affirm a particular kind of natural ne- 
cessity ; and that is to deny natural freedom. There- 
fore, to affirm moral necessity and natural freedom of 
the same agent, at the same time, and in relation to 
the same particular act, is to utter a palpable contra- 
diction ; as truly as to predicate physical life and death 
of the same subject, at the same time. All this is 
done by the necessitarian ; and then he infers by turns 
all the prominent results of an absolute fatality, and 
all the immense obligations of a proper freedom. This 
absurdity is one of his favorite mysteries, and the hu- 
man mind is naturally fond of the wonderful, but it is 
a mystery which finds no place in the great system of 
truth. In a case of moral necessity, there may obtain 
what the necessitarian calls natural freedom ; but it is 



212 CORRELATIVES. 






only the absence of natural necessity in a particular 
form, or as produced by particular means, and there- 
fore it is not of itself freedom. In the case supposed, 
the necessity exists, and it is natural, though it is pro- 
duced by means of motive influence, and though for 
distinction's sake, we call it moral. It is a dictate of 
common sense, that in relation to the same point of 
action, an agent cannot be in two opposite states at 
the same time. 

XI. Liability to evil, and capacity for good, are 
correlatives. They are so, primarily, in the case of 
finite beings. 

1. Liability to sin, and capacity for obedience, are 
correlatives. 

We have no knowledge of any created intelligences, 
who were so constituted by their Maker as to be inca- 
pable of obeying him ; nor have we a knowledge of 
any who were so made as to be incapable of sinning. 
In so far as we can perceive, it appears to be a princi- 
ple in the Divine economy, that primarily liability and 
capacity shall exist in correlation. Mankind are not 
exempt from the operations of this law, either previous 
or subsequent to the fall. Adam sinned, and in him 
sinned all his race ; but he, and in him all his pos- 
terity, did previously obey, and as God did not neces- 
sitate the fall, might still have obeyed. Adam's 
posterity transgress likewise in their personal capacity ; 
and in that capacity also they might obey. It were 
a derogatory reflection on the character of Grod, to sup- 
pose otherwise. It were also a contradiction to his 



CORRELATIVES. 213 

holy word ; for we read, " God sent not his Son into 
the world to condemn the world, but that the world 
through him might be saved/' This declaration is 
true, if true at all, of mankind in general : of the sav- 
age, the barbarous, the civilized, and the enlightened ; 
for only in this comprehensive sense, it agrees with the 
fact that mankind are in a state of probation. The 
idea of a state of trial to those who never have it in 
their power to obey, is a solecism. It is like allowing 
to stones a certain period of time in which to change 
themselves into bread ; or to water, to change itself 
into wine. No such probation could be instituted by 
the All- wise Creator, because it could do him no honor. 
A probation in the true sense, he has however ordain- 
ed ; for "we see Jesus, who was made a little lower 
than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned 
with glory and honor, that he by the grace of God 
should taste death for every man." — Heb. 2:9. "I 
gave her space to repent of her fornication, and she 
repented not. — "Rev. 2: 21. "Then said he unto 
the dresser of his vineyard, Behold, these three years I 
come seeking fruit on this fig-tree, and find none : cut 
it down, why cumbereth it the ground ? And he an- 
swering, said unto him, Lord, let it alone this year also, 
till I shall dig about it, and dung it, and if it bear 
fruit, well, and if not, then after that thou shalt cut 
it down." — Luke 13 : 7, 9. If this parable has its 
fulfillment in the case of sinners, it cannot imply less 
than a liability to sin, and a capacity through Jesus 
Christ to obey. He is the dresser ; and the cultivation 



214 CORRELATIVES, 

which he bestows, is efficient. By it he always produ- 
ces an essential effect ; and as that effect is not obedi- 
ence, (as final impenitence proves,) it must be the 
essential power to obey. 

2. Liability to condemnation, and the privilege of 
justification, are correlatives. 

This fact is involved in the correlation of liability to 
sin, and capacity to obey ; for sin brings condemna- 
tion ; and obedience, either mediately, as in the case 
of sinful men, or immediately, as in the case of holy 
angels, secures justification. On these points the lan- 
guage of the Bible is, " Cursed is every one that con- 
tinueth not in all things which are written in the 
book of the law to do them." — Gal. 3 : 10. And again, 
"Not the hearers of the law are just before God, but 
the doers of the law shall be justified." — Bom. 2:13. 

In the case of human agents, the liability to person- 
al condemnation through sin, and the privilege of 
justification in obedience, are correlated as being both 
inseparably connected with one event. That event is 
the vicarious and mediatorial interposition of Christ. 
It is written, " There is none other name under heaven, 
given among men, whereby we must be saved." — Acts 
4 : 12. And again, " Without shedding of blood is no 
remission." — Heb. 9 : 22. Thus it is clear that the 
privilege of justification is through Christ ; and it is 
equally clear, that the liability to personal condemna- 
tion is through him. The following passages prove it : 
"If I had. not come and spoken to them, they had not 
had sin." "If I had not clone among them the works 



CORRELATIVES. 215 

which none other man did ; they had not had sin/' 
John 15 : 22, 24. 

This liability and capacity constitute a twofold pow- 
er ; and this double power constitutes man a personal 
probationer ; and man is a personal probationer 
through Jesus Christ. 

3. Liability to suffer, and a capacity for enjoyment, 
are correlatives. The faculties of the soul are so many 
channels through which may pour in upon us, either 
streams of happiness or of sorrow ; and the various 
means around us, which are adapted to produce the 
one, are also adapted to produce the other. In the 
natural world, these means comprise cultivation, pos- 
sessions, and endearing relations. Cultivation renders 
us not only the more susceptible of pleasure from the 
refinements of good society, but also of pain from the 
world's barbarity and rudeness. PossessioDs may 
gratify, and in various ways administer to our comfort, 
but they may also originate a multitude of cares, anxie- 
ties, and fears. At best they are held and enjoyed 
with a sense of insecurity ; for not unfrequently "rich- 
es take to themselves wings and flee away/' And the 
endearing relations of life, while they are preserved and 
fulfilled, afford us the very highest of earthly bliss ; 
but when they are broken or violated, they occasion 
the very deepest and most pungent of all sublunary 
sorrows. What is true in this respect in the natural 
world, is true also in the moral. The existence of God, 
angels, heaven, and the plan of salvation, with all 
its rich and gracious provisions, may be so many sour- 



216 CORRELATIVES. 

ces of unspeakable happiness or misery, according as 
we occupy either a right or a wrong position in rela- 
tion to them ; and this is true primarily, in so far as 
we are able to perceive, of all the rational beings whom 
God has created. In this respect, as in others, we may 
exclaim with the wise son of Sirach : " All things are 
double, one against another ; and he hath made noth- 
ing imperfect." — Ecclesiasticus 42 : 24. The correla- 
tion of a liability to suffer, and of a privilege to enjoy, 
as that correlation obtains under the Gospel, is strong- 
ly implied in the following passage : " We are unto 
God a sweet savor of Christ, in them that are saved, 
and in them that perish. To the one we are the savor of 
death unto death ; and to the other, the savor of life 
unto life." — 2 Cor., 2 : 15, 16. How reasonable, 
perfect, and weighty is man's responsibility ! 

XII. Liability to evil and capacity for good are 
primarily correlated in the same state, or in the same 
relations of being. 

The relations of being may be essentially changed, 
and the liability to change is correlated to a liability 
not to change, but in that particular state or relation 
in which originates a given liability to evil, there ob- 
tains also a corresponding capacity or power for good. 
For example, liabilities to evil which take effect in 
Adam, are correlated to corresponding susceptibilities 
of good in him ; and liabilities to evil which take ef- 
fect out of Adam, are primarily correlated to cor- 
responding privileges and aptitudes for good out of 
him. 



CORRELATIVES. 217 

In Adam, as their proxy and representative, man- 
kind were liable to transgress unconsciously and imper- 
sonally ; and by proxy in him, they were also compe- 
tent to obey unconsciously and impersonally. Conse- 
quently they were liable to be punished, or to be 
rewarded, unconsciously and impersonally, in Adam as 
their representative. 

As transgressors in Adam, mankind were liable to 
eternal death in him. Out of Adam, mankind are 
liable to transgress consciously and personally; and 
out of him, they are also competent to obey consciously 
and personally. Consequently, out of him, they are 
liable to be punished, or to be rewarded, consciously 
and personally. These are essential and immutable 
principles in the Divine economy. 

If mankind suffer the personal death or dissolution 
of the body, on account of sin in Adam, it is not as 
the proper correlative of that sin, but as the correla- 
tive of personal life out of Adam ; and hence it is not 
to be regarded as being in itself a punishment, but as 
being incidental to the plan of salvation. 

The liability to evil in the future state, has its com- 
mencement in the present state ; and in this state it 
is correlated to the privilege of salvation. 

XIII. Liability to evil and capacity for good, as 
correlated in the same state, are equal. 

Moral good and evil, as right and wrong, relate pri- 
marily to acts of choice ; and hence they are qualities, 
essentially, of the exercises of one and the same facul- 
ty or power. 

10 



218 CORRELATIVES. 

The power to will is positively one ; but it is rela - 
tively two : a power to will aright, and a power to will 
wrong. This power is exerted fully in all its exercises. 
The agent never chooses with more, nor ever with less, 
than his power to will. He cannot. To choose either 
right or wrong with half, or two-thirds of his faculty 
to will, is what he has not power to do. He may be 
more or less earnest, but when he puts forth the act, 
it is not half an act, nor two-thirds of an act, but a 
complete act of the will ; and therefore a complete 
exercise of the faculty to will. But if both good and 
evil volitions are complete exercises of the power to 
will, the power exerted in each must be equal to that 
which is exerted in the other ; and hence the power 
of good and evil volitions, in so far as it exists, is ex- 
erted in each case with equal facility. 

Moral good and evil, as objects of choice, affect the 
agent only as they are chosen ; and then only as' they 
are at first chosen freely. Or, only as they are chosen 
freely either immediately or mediately. They are 
chosen freely, only as they are chosen in the improve- 
ment or misimprovement of motive equilibrium, or di- 
versified power ; and diversified power, as produced by 
motive equilibrium, is an equal power to choose either 
good or evil. Therefore, correlated liabilities or possi- 
bilities of moral good and evil, are equal. 

We do not say, that an individual must actually 
experience an equal amount of good and evil ; but 
that a preparation in our nature for the one, in so far 
as it extends, is equally a preparation for the other. 



CORRELATIVES. 219 

XIV. Liability to evil is imposed only for the sake 
of the correlated capacity for good. 

" God is love." He " is good to all, and his tender 
mercies are over all his works/' His language is, " I 
have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth ; 
wherefore, turn yourselves and live ye." Hence we 
conclude, that the grand liability to evil is not imposed 
arbitrarily. It is true Christ says, " If I had not come 
and spoken to them, they had not had sin ;" but to 
conclude from this declaration, that he desired the sin- 
fulness of meu, and that he came into the world to 
effect it, is to wrest the Scriptures, and to make Christ 
the " minister of sin." 

In opposition to such a conclusion, it is written, 
" God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the 
world, but that the world through him might be 
saved." — John 3 : 17. This plain affirmation is ac- 
cording to the analogies of nature. If to grain God 
has imparted properties by reason of which it may be 
converted into a bane of human life, and "destroy 
both soul and body in hell," it is not because he would 
tempt mankind to inebriation and death, but because 
in the nature of things, those properties are essential 
to the existence of grain as a blessing ; and if to 
water God has given such properties, that it may either 
sustain life or destroy it, it is not because he would 
destroy, but because those properties are necessary to 
the existence and happiness of mankind. " And God 
saw everything that he had made, and behold it was 
very good." — Gen. 1 : 31. 



220 CORRELATIVES. 

" Contrivance proves design ; and the predominant 
tendency of the contrivance, indicates the disposition 
of the designer. The world abounds with contri- 
vances ; and all the contrivances which we are ac- 
quainted with, are directed to beneficial purposes. 
Evil no doubt exists ; but is never, that we can per- 
ceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived 
to eat, and not to ache. Their aching now and then 
is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable 
from it, or even if you will, let it be called a defect in 
the contrivance ; but it is not the object of it. This 
is a. distinction which well deserves to be attended to. 
In describing implements of husbandry, you would 
hardly say of the sickle, that it is made to cut the 
reaper's fingers, though from the construction of the 
instrument, and the manner of using it, this mischief 
often happens. But if you had occasion to describe 
instruments of torture or execution, this engine, you 
would say, is to extend the sinews ; this to dislocate 
the joints ; this to break the. bones ; this to scorch the 
soles of the feet. Here pain and misery are the very 
objects of the contrivance. Now nothing of this sort 
is to be found in the works of nature. We never dis- 
cover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil 
purpose. No anatomist ever discovered a system of 
organization, calculated to produce pain and disease ; 
or in explaining the parts of the human body, ever 
said, This is to irritate ; this to inflame ; this duct to 
convey the gravel to the kidneys ; this gland to secrete 
the humor which forms the gout. If by chance he 



CORRELATIVES. . 221 

come at a part of which he knows not the use, the 
most that he can say is, that it is useless. No one 
ever suspects that it is put there to incommode, to 
annoy, or to torment/ 7 — Foley. 

The God of the physical universe is the God of the 
moral universe ; and as in the former he does not sub- 
ject his creatures to arbitrary liabilities, because of 
what he is in himself, so he does not in the latter, and 
for the same reason. 

If men may love, it is not that they might love the 
pleasures of sin, but that they might love God and 
righteousness ; and if they possess the faculty to hate, 
it is not that they might hate God and virtue, but 
that they might hate all wicked principles and actions. 
If men are able to sin, it is because they are free ; if 
men are free, it is because they are moral agents ; and 
if they are moral agents, it is because they are made 
capable of heavenly rewards. Therefore, if men are 
capacitated to sin, it is merely an incidental result of 
capacitating them for spiritual and eternal blessings. 

XV. The correlation of liability to evil and capac- 
ity for good, is temporal. 

It is characteristic of the probationaiy state ; and 
that is a temporary state. It soon passes away with 
all that appertains to it : leaving the agent perma- 
nently fixed in a state which is either exclusively 
evil, or exclusively good. The wicked " shall go away 
into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into 
life eternal."— Mat, 25 : 46. After death, the ungodly 
experience only the correlation of sin and misery ; and 



222 COREELATIVES. 

the righteous experience then only the correlation of 
holiness and happiness. To neither remains there any 
liability of a change. This is forcibly expressed by 
our Lord, in the words of Abraham to the rich man 
in hell. " Between us and you there is a great gulf 
fixed, so that they who would pass from hence to you, 
cannot ; neither can they pass to us, that would come 
from thence." — Luke 16 : 26. 

How appropriate to all men is this admonition : 
" Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy 
might ; for there is no work, nor device, nor knowl- 
edge, nor wisdom in the grave, whither thou goest." — 
Eccl. 9 : 10. " Oh that they were wise, that they un- 
derstood this, that they would consider their latter 
end."— Deut. 32 : 29. 

XVI. The loss of an adequate representation in 
Adam, and the enjoyment of an adequate representa- 
tion out of Adam, are correlatives. 

An adequate representation is such as is equal to 
the relations of the being represented ; and hence it 
is such as is equal to the claims of Grod's law. It is 
such a representation as is equitable and just. 

By reason of transgression in Adam, it became ne- 
cessary that mankind should perish in Adam, or that 
they should perish in their own person, or that Christ, 
as their representative, should satisfy the law for that 
original transgression, and render their salvation pos- 
sible. Mankind perished not in Adam ; and by their 
attainment of a personal existence, their representa- 
tion in him has terminated ; so that to perish by proxy 



CORRELATIVES. 223 

in him, is now impossible. Therefore mankind must 
either perish in person for Adam's sin, or they must 
enjoy an adequate representation in Christ ; because 
they cannot themselves make an atonement. 

But mankind cannot perish personally for their sin 
in Adam. In that sin they had no personal agency, 
and no consciousness ; so that justice would have been 
fully met and satisfied, if they had perished as they 
sinned, impersonally and unconsciously in Adam. If 
then for that offence a greater punishment were in- 
flicted, the punishment would be found to exceed the 
demands of justice : would be found to be an unjust 
and tyrannical infliction. Such a punishment, in the 
administration of the Divine government, is impossi- 
ble ; for God cannot be unjust or tyrannical. There- 
fore the only legitimate conclusion is, that all mankind 
enjoy an adequate representation in Christ ; and that 
God thus grants to the whole human family, the priv- 
ilege of being saved. 

This doctrine is sustained by the connection and 
harmony of the Divine attributes ; particularly the 
attributes of justice and benevolence. 

1. When either one of two methods of procedure 
in the Divine government is just, and one of them is 
also benevolent, the Divine Being in every instance 
pursues the latter. If it were not so, he might be 
infinitely just, but he could not be infinitely benevo- 
lent. When Adam had transgressed, either one of two 
methods of procedure was possible, in itself consid- 
ered ; for either of them could be pursued in justice. 



224 CORRELATIVES. 

To destroy mankind in Adam, would have been just ; 
but to spare them on the ground of an atoning sacri- 
fice in their behalf, was both just and benevolent. 
The latter method was pursued, as agreeing most fully 
with the Divine nature ; which is both just and be- 
nevolent, " Justice and judgment are the habitation 
of thy throne : mercy and truth shall go before thy 
face." " Mercy and truth are met together : righ- 
teousness and peace have kissed each other/' 

2. When in the Divine government either one of 
two possible methods of procedure is just, and both 
of them are benevolent, but one of them involves 
greater benevolence than the other, the Divine Being 
pursues that which is most benevolent. If it were 
otherwise, G-od's benevolence would not be absolute ; 
for it would not be so great as it might be. There- 
fore, if it was possible to give every man an adequate 
representation in Christ, and if this was the greater 
benevolence, then every man enjoys primarily such 
representation ; and this greater benevolence was not 
only possible, but naturally involved in its bestowment 
upon Adam, while as yet he was the federal head of 
all mankind. 

This general representation is recognized in such 
passages of Scripture as the following : " As in Adam 
all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." — -1 
Cor. 15 : 22. " We see Jesus, who was made a little 
lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, 
crowned with glory and honor, that he by the grace of 
God should taste death for every man."— Heb. 2 : 9. 



CORRELATIVES. 225 

Besides this general representation, there is also 
necessary to adults, a particular representation ; and 
this is obtained by " repentance toward God, and faith 
toward our Lord Jesus Christ/' — Acts 20 : 21. " For 
there is none other name under heaven, given among 
men, whereby we must be saved ;" and " by grace are 
ye saved through faith." 

3. In the plan of salvation, justice and benevolence 
are both positive and negative ; and in their conjoined 
exercise to the guilty, the negative of the one is essen- 
tial to the positive of the other. For instance, to 
have destroyed mankind in Adam, would have been 
doing them an act of positive justice. To forbear this 
act of positive justice, was an act of negative justice : 
and it was such, because it inflicted on them no injury. 
This forbearance was also an act of positive mercy ; 
and it was such, because it conferred a positive benefit. 
That it should not upon the whole inflict an injury, 
was necessary, that it might upon the whole prove a 
benefit ; and hence negative justice was essential to 
positive mercy. 

But this negative justice and positive mercy depend 
on an adequate representation in Christ. Without 
such representation, the actual existence of mankind 
would be to them an immense injury. In that case, 
Grod by his own act of temporary forbearance, would 
cause Adam's act of sin to bring upon mankind a 
personal and conscious state of eternal misery ; where- 
as, having had no personal agency or will in Adam's 
transgression, and no consciousness of it at the time, 



226 CORRELATIVES. 

they merited, on principles of justice, neither more 
nor less than a painless and oblivious death in Adam. 
Justice had no alternative to this event, but the 
atoning sacrifice of the " Lamb of God/' Therefore, 
since mankind were not destroyed in Adam, it follows 
that they are adequately represented in Christ ; " who 
was crowned with glory and honor, that he by the 
grace of God should taste death for every man/' — 
Heb. 2 i 10. 

The above argument suggests an answer to the fol- 
lowing inquiry. "If it be so, that it is unreasonable, 
unjust , and cruel, for God to require that as the con- 
dition of pardon, which has become impossible by 
original sin, what grace is there in giving assistance 
and ability to perform the condition of pardon ? Or 
why is that called by the name of grace, which is an 
absolute debt that God is bound to bestow, and which 
it would be unjust and cruel in him to withhold ? " — 
Edwards. 

We may answer, the requisite " assistance and abil- 
ity" constitute an essential part of that great whole, 
which had its beginning in saving mankind from de- 
struction in Adam. God's grace to the human family 
is a system of favors. It has distinct stages of pro- 
gress, and essential parts in each of its' stages ; so 
that some of its parts would not be favors, but absolute 
injuries, if it were not for the existence of other parts. 
But those other parts are not the less favors, though 
previous parts of the system render it " unreasonable, 
unjust, and cruel" that they should be withheld ; for 



CORRELATIVES. 227 

this fact simply implies that they have become ex- 
tremely necessary on account of what God has done, 
as well -as on account of what man has done. If some 
vital organ of the human system be removed, the 
whole is ruined, and becomes an offensive mass ; and 
so would the body of God's favors become a horrible 
evil, if some one or more of its essential parts were 
displaced. If, for example, God withheld from sinners 
the grace of freedom to repent, and so left them to 
perish as an unavoidable consequence of Adam's sin, 
his forbearance in not cutting them off in Adam, which 
is now a favor, would then be an evil, terrible and 
unjust. 

In concluding tins part of the subject we may 
remark, that though all mankind have an adequate 
representation in Christ, on the ground that he tasted 
death for every man, yet he died in a special manner 
for those whom he finally saves. God said by the 
mouth of the prophet, " He shall see of the travail of 
his soul, and shall be satisfied : by his knowledge shall 
my righteous servant .justify many, for he shall bear 
their iniquities." — Isa. 53 : 11. " All the ends of the 
world shall remember, and turn unto the Lord ; and 
all the kindreds of the nations shall worship before 
thee/'— Ps. 22 : 27. 

This result was from the beginning a matter of cer- 
tainty ; and this certainty of the result, as opposed to 
the certainty of a failure, imparted a character of 
wisdom and glory to the mediatorial work. If this 
certainty had not existed, and if instead of it had ex- 



_'„8 COliRELATIVEb. 

isted in the Divine mind, a certainty, that of all man- 
kind not one son or daughter would be brought to 
glory, and that the delay of justice, by occasioning 
the personal existence of Adam's posterity, would im- 
mensely aggravate the evils of their final state, would 
then the " Lord of life and glory" have died ? Would 
he have paid so great a price to procure us the con- 
sciousness of eternal pain ? Would he have done so 
much to execute a plan, which he knew would prove 
an utter and disastrous failure ? He would not. His 
wisdom, justice, goodness, would all have conspired to 
oppose and prevent it. Then the conclusion is inev- 
itable that in the great scheme cf salvation, as involv- 
ing the death of Christ, God has a particular reference 
to the salvation of those " whom he did foreknow/' 

This doctrine affords no ground of complaint. If 
Christ "tasted death for every man," and so made 
salvation possible to every man, even they who refuse 
his grace and perish, are bound to say, " He hath done 
all things well." 

XVII. An adequate representation of all mankind 
in Christ, and the ^salvation of all ivho die in their in- 
fancy, are correlatives. 

- The benefit of this representation as enjoyed by all 
mankind, and of course as enjoyed by them in their 
infancy, is expressed by St. Paul in the following lan- 
guage : " As by the offence of one, judgment came 
vipon all men to condemnation, even so by the righ- 
teousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto 
■ Lfiea'tton of life ; for as by one man's disobedience 



CORRELATIVES. 

the many were made sinners, so by the obedience of 
one shall the many be made righteous." — Eom. 5 : 18. 

The blessing here spoken of, is the opposite of " con- 
demnation," and of being " made sinners ;" or it is 
"justification of life," and being "made righteous." 

The persons receiving this blessing are, "all men," 
or " the many." We insert the article the, before the 
word many, because St. Paul inserted it ; or because 
it. stands in the original. 

The proxy or representative through whom this 
blessing is accorded to " all men," is " the last Adam : 
the Lord from heaven." Adam is therefore the figure 
of Christ : " is the figure of him that was to come." — 
Bom. 5: 14.— 1 Cor. 15 : 45. 

But Adam sustained the same relation to "all 
men." Therefore Christ also sustains primarily the 
same relation to "all men." 

If the blessing of righteousness is enjoyed by " all 
men," it is enjoyed by them in their infancy ; for in 
adult age, multitudes are incorrigible sinners. But if 
all men in their infancy enjoy the blessing of justifica- 
tion or righteousness, they who die in their infancy 
must be saved. It is absolutely impossible that they 
should be lost ; for the old occasion of their condem- 
nation is removed, and no new one has transpired. 
No new offence has been committed. 

The views entertained by some, require us to read 
the above passage as follows : " As by the offence of 
one, judgment came upon all believing men to condem- 
nation, oven so by the righteousness of one. the free 



230 CORRELATIVES. 

gift came upon all believing men unto justification of 
life ; for as by one man's disobedience many were 
made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many 
be made righteous." We object to all such narrow 
views, because they require us to insert a word twice, 
the word believing, which St. Paul did not employ ; 
and because they require us to omit a word, the article 
the, which Paul twice inserted. 

If we are to be governed by the context, we shall 
still not find the phrase, " all men," to mean only the 
elect ; for it is employed to indicate the number who 
sinned, and the number who die : " death passed upon 
all men, for that all have sinned." — v. 12. 

The salvation of deceased infants is strongly implied 
in these words of our Savior : " Suffer little children, 
and forbid them not, to come unto me : for of such 
is the kingdom of heaven." — Mat. 19 : 14. " Except 
ye be converted, and become as little children, ye 
shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." — Mat. 
18 : 3. When little children die, they do not change 
for the worse : they still remain like those who com- 
pose the kingdom of heaven ; and when they die, the 
Lord does not change towards them. Then what sen- 
tence may we conclude does he pronounce upon them ? 
Before death " he blessed them :" will he after death 
curse them ? Before death he said, Come to me : will 
he after death say, "Depart from me?" Before 
death "he took them in his arms:" will he after 
death thrust them into the arms of Satan? We 
think not. As " he is the same yesterday, and to-day, 






CORRELATIVES. 231 

and forever/' he will doubtless say to them at the last 
day, " Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the 
kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the 
world." 

" Thus saith the Lord : A voice was heard in Ra- 
man, lamentation, and bitter weeping : Kachel weep- 
ing for her children, refused to be comforted for her 
children, because they were not. Thus saith the 
Lord : Refrain thy voice from weeping, and thine eyes 
from tears ; for thy work shall be rewarded, saith the 
Lord, and they shall come again from the land of the 
enemy. And there is hope in thine end, saith the 
Lord, that thy children shall come again to their own 
border."— Jer. 31 : 15-17. " Then Herod, when he 
saw that he was mocked of the wise men, was exceed- 
ing wroth, and sent forth, and slew all the children 
that were in Bethlehem, and in all the coasts thereof, 
from two years old and under, according to. the time 
which he had diligently inquired of the wise men. 
Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy 
the prophet, saying, In Ramah was there a voice 
heard, lamentation, and weeping, and great mourning, 
Rachel weeping for her children, and would not be 
comforted, because they are not." — Mat. 2 : 16-18. 

The tragedy of Bethlehem fulfilled the prophecy of 
Jeremiah ; and hence the relevant promise of " the 
Lord," as recorded by Jeremiah, is made to the be- 
reaved and sorrowing mothers in Bethlehem, and it 
is made to them for their comfort. The promise to 
them respecting their children is, that " thev shall 



232 CORRELATIVES. 

come again from the land of the enemy ;" and "the 
last enemy that shall he destroyed is death." But 
how is this to comfort them ? Evidently, as a promise 
of infantile salvation ; and on no other ground. 

He says, " There is hope in thine end ;" hut there 
could he no comforting hope in the idea that their 
children were to he raised from the dead, merely to 
experience the second death. The hope which God 
encourages is evidently the hope of their salvation : 
the hope of their eternal life. " It is God that justi- 
fieth : who is he that condemneth V — Rom. 8 : 34. 

It may perhaps he said hy the necessitarian, that as 
children are subjects of disease and death, though 
they have committed no personal transgression, it can- 
not be that their sin in Adam has been canceled ; and 
that, as their painful dissolution proves it just that 
they should suffer for that sin, it proves that they may 
justly be left to perish. The punishment of sin being 
just in the present state, cannot be unjust in the 
future. 

In answer to this argument we would say, that it 
proves too much for its own validity. The same rea- 
soning weuld prove as well, that all Christians are 
lost ; for they, as well as children, experience disease 
and death. It would prove at least that they are not 
saved unless they are pardoned after death. It would 
even prove 'that all inferior animals are sinners, and 
that they are in danger of eternal punishment ; for 
they too are all sufferers, and all mortal. The argument 
is therefore a fallacy ; and we conclude that the lia- 



CORRELATIVES. 233 

bility of children to suffer, does not prove their liabil- 
ity to perish. 

It may perhaps be said, that children are depraved, 
and that they manifest it in pride and anger ; but it 
should be remembered that their passions and actions 
are to them not sinful. Then conduct is not that of 
moral agents, but of beings who possess an animal na- 
ture ; and then depravity is provided for in the death 
of Christ. The plea of Christians is the plea of dying 
infants. It is expressed in the following language : 
" He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him 
up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely 
give us all tilings V — Kom. 8 : 32. 

If they are in need of an inward change, or a spir- 
itual renovation, it will be granted for the sake of him 
who " took them in his arms and blessed them." 

XVIII. An adequate representation of all mankind 
in Christ, and the possibility that Pagans may be 
saved, are correlatives. 

1. An adequate representation in Christ, secures to 
them an interest in all his offices as prophet, priest, 
and king. Christ is a prophet to teach. Where his 
written word is not, men still may read the open vol- 
ume of his creation, and may listen to the teachings 
of their own hearts, and of the Divine Spirit. These 
sources of instruction are all enjoyed through the Me- 
diator ; and from them Pagan minds may learn much 
of Grod and of themselves, and may understand what 
to them is duty. Accordingly it is written, " That 
which may be known of God is manifest in them, for 



234 CORRELATIVES. 

God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible 
things of him from the creation of the world, are 
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are 
made, even his eternal power and godhead, so that 
they are without excuse." — Rom. 1 : 19, 20. 

And again, " Not the hearers of the law are just 
before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified ; 
for when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by 
nature [or do certainly] the tilings contained in the 
law, these having not the law, are a law unto them- 
selves ; which show the work of the law written in 
their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, 
and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else 
excusing one another." — Eom. 2 : 13-15. 

Christ is also their great High Priest. He has of- 
fered in their behalf, the complete and sufficient sacri- 
fice of himself. " Now once in the end of the world, 
hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of 
himself. And as it is appointed unto men once to die, 
but after this the Judgment, so Christ was once offered 
to bear the sins of the (to ^oXXsjv) many ; and unto 
them that look for him shall he appear the second 
time without sin, unto salvation." — Heb. 9 : 26-28. 
" We see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the 
angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory 
and honor, that he by the grace of God should taste 
death for every man." — Heb. 2:9. 

Finally, it may be said of Pagans, that Christ is 
their king. " The Lord hath prepared his throne in 
the heavens : and his kingdom ruleth over all." — Ps. 



CORRELATIVES. 235 

103 : 19. " And Jesus came and spake unto them, 
saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in 
earth. Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing 
them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and 
of the Holy Ghost."— Mat. 28: 18, 19. "In him 
dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. And 
ye are complete in him, who is the head of all princi- 
pality and power." — Col. 2 : 9, 10. 

Therefore, as Christ is prophet, priest, and king to 
all men, we conclude that even Pagans may be saved. 
" God is no respecter of persons ; but in every nation, 
he that feareth him and worketh righteousness, is ac- 
cepted with him." — Acts 10 : 34, 35. 

2. That Pagans might be righteous, and consequently 
that they might be saved, was firmly believed by the 
patriarch Abraham ; for it was on this article of his 
creed that he founded his memorable intercession for 
Sodom. " Peradventure there be fifty righteous within 
the city ; wilt thou also destroy, and not spare the place 
for the fifty righteous that are therein?" — Gen. 18 : 
24. It is true, in that wicked city, no righteous, 
except Lot, were found ; but it is equally true, that 
Abraham's prayer was received by Jehovah in such a 
manner as to confirm the idea that Pagans might at- 
tain to a degree of righteousness. 

3. What is sin according to a written revelation, 
may be no sin in the absence of such a revelation. 
Only " to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it 
not, to him it is sin." — James 4 : 17. Jacob might 
practice polygamy and concubinage, and yet be an em- 



236 CORRELATIVES. 

inent saint ; but not so might Paul. The reason is, 
that to the one these things were not prohibited in 
any revelation which he enjoyed ; while to the other they 
were prohibited in the revelation which he possessed. 
For the same reason, Pagans may at this day practice 
what Jacob did, and yet enjoy Divine favor ; whereas 
we who are better informed may not. " For unto 
whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much re- 
quired." — Luke 12 : 48. The Divine government is 
administered on uniform principles, and one of those 
principles is equity. 

The idea that what is sin to one is not in every in- 
stance sin to another, does not conflict with the idea 
that the moral quality of an action, resides in the ac- 
tion itself. It simply implies, that the moral qual- 
ity of an action, as good or evil, is derived from the 
law under which it is performed ; and that what is 
performed under a given law by some men, is not per- 
formed under the same law by others. " What things 
soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under 
the law."— Eom. 3 : 19. 

That the same action has not in every instance the 
same moral quality, is evinced in many examples ; and 
it is practically acknowledged by us all, in our daily 
intercourse with our fellow men. Our conduct admits 
that there are many actions which are morally wrong 
prior to the existence of given relations, which are 
morally right when those relations obtain ; and also 
that in the same relations of being, actions may be 



CORRELATIVES. 237 

wrong under some circumstances, which are not sinful 
under other circumstances. 

4. It is possible to be Christ's before hearing the 
Gospel. To deny this, is to fix a narrow and serious 
limit to the Divine power. It is to suppose, that since 
the death of Christ, God cannot do what he could 
previously do': that he cannot, independently of the 
human voice and of a printed book, create a belief of 
his existence, and a filial fear of his name. But we 
are reminded of the language of Paul, " How then 
shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? 
and how shall they believe in him of whom they have 
not heard ? and how shall they hear without a preach- 
er?"— Kom. 10 : 14. 

This passage teaches, not that salvation is impossi- 
ble to those who are destitute of the Gospel, but 
that the Gospel is the grand means of salvation, and 
that men cannot be saved by it unless they possess it ; 
and when they possess it, they cannot be saved at all 
unless they believe and obey it. The apostle appears 
to intimate in this connection, that the essential 
preaching is enjoyed by all mankind. His words are 
these : " But I say, have they not heard ? Yes, ver- 
ily, their sound went into all the earth, and their 
words to the ends of the world." — v. 18. In this 
verse he probably alludes to the words of the psalmist. 
" The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firma- 
ment showeth his handi-work. Day unto day utter- 
eth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge. 
There is no speech nor language where their voice is 



238 CORRELATIVES. 

not heard. Their line [or voice] is gone out through 
all the earth, and their words to the end of the 
world."— Ps. 19 : 1-4. 

" The good Shepherd" said, "I lay down my life for 
the sheep. And other sheep I have, which are not cf 
this fold : them also I must bring, and they shall hear 
my voice ; and there shall be one fold and one shep- 
herd."— John 10 : 15, 16. 

This passage should be rendered thus : " Other 
sheep I have, which are not of the fold after this man- 
ner!' After what manner ? After the manner of the 
Gospel. That is to say, he had sheep who were not 
blessed with the guidance and government of the Gos- 
pel, but who were nevertheless his own. " And they 
sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the 
book, and to open the seals thereof : for thou wast 
slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood, out 
of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and na- 
tion."— Rev. 5 : 9. 

5. Every man's duty comes, primarily, within the 
scope of his ability. " For the kingdom of heaven is 
as a man travelling into a far country, who called his 
own servants, and delivered unto them his goods : And 
unto one he gave five talents, to another two, -and to 
another one, to every man according to his several 
ability, and straightway took his journey." — Mat. 25 : 
14, 15. It will be observed that these talents were 
to be improved ; for " after a long time, the lord of 
those servants cometh, and reckoneth with them." 
The talents entrusted, were therefore a task given. 






CORRELATIVES. 239 

They comprised so much of duty to be performed ; 
but the duty of each servant, as thus imposed, was 
strictly " according to his several ability/' This para- 
ble illustrates the moral government of God. It ex- 
hibits to us the fact that God respects every man's 
capacity, in the duty which he imposes ; and that he 
requires only the improvement of blessings given. 
Consequently, salvation is attainable to all men. 

6. The possibility that Pagans may be saved, may 
be inferred from the Divine character. God is de- 
scribed to us as a benignant Being. It is written, 
" God is love ; and again, " The Lord is good to all, 
and his tender mercies are over all his works." " As 
I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the 
death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from 
his way and live." — Ezek. 33 : 11. 

If the heathen are not favored with the possibility 
of being saved, it is not God's pleasure that they 
should be ; for he says, " I will do all my pleasure." — 
Isa. 46 : 10. 

If it is not God's pleasure that their salvation should 
be possible, it must be his pleasure that it shall not 
be possible ; for we cannot suppose that he is indiffer- 
ent about it. If it is Lis pleasure that salvation shall 
not be possible to them, it must be his pleasure in 
every sense of the word, that they shall in every sense 
suffer death. 

But if it is God's pleasure in every sense, that is to 
say, both in the abstract and in the concrete, that the 
greater portion of mankind shall surfer temporal, spir- 



240 CORRELATIVES, 

itual, and eternal death, then it is in no sense true, 
that he has " no pleasure in the death of the wicked/' 
Therefore if the heathen are not favored with the pos- 
sibility of being saved, it follows, and with reverence 
be it spoken, that God's oath is not true ; for he has 
sworn by his very existence, that he has " no pleasure 
in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked 
turn from his way and live." But God's oath is not 
untrue ; and hence we must believe that even Pagans 
may be saved. 

That same goodness of God which flows to a portion 
of mankind through the channels of a spoken and 
written revelation, flows out to others through a variety 
of other channels ; and though the latter may in a 
sense be smaller than the former, the supply which 
they afford is essentially sufficient, because of the cir- 
cumstances of the case. It is in this respect, as in 
that of the manna : " He that had much, had nothing 
over ; and he that had little, had no lack." — 2 Cor. 8 : 
15. Should any be displeased with this doctrine, they 
would do well to remember Jonah, who was " displeased 
exceedingly," because God did not destroy Nineveh ; 
and they should remember what Jonah said of God. 
His words are these : "I knew that thou art a gra- 
cious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great 
kindness, and repentest thee of evil." 

Perhaps the inquiry will be made, If the heathen 
may be saved without the Gospel, why should we send 
the Gospel to them ? Are they not as well off as they 
are ? We answer, 



CORRELATIVES. 241 

1. The Gospel should be given to the heathen from 
motives of obedience to the Savior. If we could per- 
ceive no reason for the act as viewed in itself, it would 
be none the less obligatory ; because it is commanded. 
We read, " Thus it is written, and thus it behooved 
Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third 
day ; and that repentance and remission of sins should 
be preached in his name, among all nations, beginning 
at Jerusalem/' — Luke 24 : 46, 47. " And he said 
unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the 
Gospel to every creature/' — Mark 16 : 15. 

This command was not limited to the apostles. It 
constitutes the commission of all evangelical ministers ; 
and it continues in force through all ages. Nor does 
it involve the duty of ministers only. The Church, 
as well as they, must have an agency in its mlfiUment ; 
and this agency of the Church, as exercised in sup- 
porting the ministry and otherwise, is also expressly 
enjoined. Therefore, whatever view we may take of 
the condition of the heathen, our duty at least is 
plain. 

2. Obedience, as we are able to render it, is inti- 
mately connected with our own salvation. " Ye know 
the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he 
was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye 
through his poverty might be rich/' — 2 Cor. 8 : 9. 
" Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he 
is none of his." — Rom. 8 : 9. 

3. We should send the Gospel to the heathen, be- 
cause it elevates men in the scale of moral being. 

11 



242 CGERELATIVE8. 

Under the teachings and influences of the Gospel, men 
are most intellectual, and possess most scope for con- 
science and feeling ; and hence their position among 
moral agents, is generally of the highest order. The 
moral man, whether of goodness or of evil, attains a 
larger growth, because the agent acts in a wider sphere 
of accountability ; and herein lies an advantage, be- 
cause it enables the free moral agent to drink in a 
larger measure of happiness than he otherwise could. 
advantage is enjoyed by those who improve it, 
not only in this world, but in that which is to come. 
It was with reference to Gospel privileges, that Caper- 
naum was represented as being exalted to heaven ; and 
to exalt humanity, in so far as we are able, is manifestly 
our duty. 

4. Finally, we should impart the Gospel to the hea- 
then, in obedience to the Lord Jesus, because it is 
adapted to improve their temporal condition. 

Those countries in which Christianity flourishes, and 
in which social and civil institutions are imbued with 
its spirit, are so pre-eminent in all the resources of 
comfort and happiness, that even the enemies of true 
>n must acknowledge its superiority and worth. 
The nations that " sit in darkness, and in the region 
and shadow of death," are generally in a state of bar- 
barism, degradation, and destitution ; and if in either 
of these respects their condition be otherwise, they 
know not how to profit by their advantages. 

Therefore, " Blessed is the people that know the 
joyful sound : they shall walk, Lord, in the light of 



CORRELATIVES. 243 

thy countenance. In thy name shall they rejoice all 
the day ; and in thy righteousness shall they be ex- 
alted." — Ps. 89 : 15, 16. To suppose that Pagans 
cannot be saved unless they are made acquainted with 
the Gospel, and to suppose, as we must, that they 
cannot "know the joyful sound unless it be imparted 
to them by their fellow men, is to suppose that God 
cannot be faithful to them, unless man be faithful to 
them ; and that the measure of God's essential faith- 
fulness to them, cannot exceed the measure of faith- 
fulness which is exercised by the Church : cannot ex- 
ceed the integrity of a body of frail beings, who have 
lived in great remissness for ages, and who at best do 
not perform their duty fully. Such a supposition is 
too derogatory to the Divine character, to be admitted 
for a moment. " The Lord is good to all, and his 
tender mercies are over all his works." u Great and 
marvellous are thy works, Lord God Almighty, just 
and true are thy ways, thou king of saints." — Kev. 
15: 3. 



CHAPTER VI. 



$t$piito* frittrijlw 



PRINCIPLES. 

XIX. Moral freedom consists not in the possession 
of intellectual and moral faculties ; nor is it necessa- 
rily implied in the possession of faculties. 

It has been said ; "To be free is the property of an 
agent who is possessed of powers and faculties ; as 
much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous." 

Freedom, it is true, implies the existence of facul- 
ties ; but faculties do not necessarily involve freedom. 
Ability to walk is the property of an agent who pos- 
sesses inferior limbs ; but the possession of limbs nei- 
ther constitutes nor implies necessarily freedom of 
locomotion. These important members of the body 
may be in a state of paralysis ; or they may be agita- 
ted by uncontrollable and useless motions, produced 
by disease. The same thing is true, in a sense, of the 
faculties of the soul. They may be unavailable for 
obedience, and be exercised only under constraint. If 
their existence implies power, that power is wholly 
indefinite ; and in the essential respect, it may be 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 245 

wholly void. It may be power to clioose and act in one 
direction only ; and that in a disastrous direction. 

Power to love, is not of itself power to love God. 
It may be simply an ability to love evil, as in the case 
of the abandoned and lost ; and to denominate this 
freedom, or a state of exemption from extrinsic causa- 
tion, is a palpable contradiction. If the possession of 
faculties be freedom, it is freedom though the agent 
be constrained to exercise them in a given direction 
only ; and then it follows, that freedom does not ne- 
cessarily imply a correlation of liability to evil and 
capacity for good. If freedom were such a thing, it 
would be consistent with the most absolute fatality ; 
and then the lost in hell might have no upbraidings 
of a guilty conscience, but only the sense of a cruel 
and Almighty despotism. All which is not true. 

XX. Moral freedom consists not in the exercise of 
volition. 

Doctor Hopkins, in speaking of a moral agent as 
free, says, " He will doubtless find that the internal 
freedom of which he is conscious, consisteth in his vol- 
untary exercises, or in choosing and ivilling ; that he 
is conscious, that in all his voluntary exertions he is 
free, and must be accountable ; and has no conscious- 
ness or idea of any other kind of moral liberty ; or 
that the liberty that he exerciseth, hath anything more 
or less belonging to it ; or that it could be increased, 
or made more perfect freedom, by the addition of any- 
thing that is not implied in willing and choosing/' — - 
Syst. Divinity, Vol 1, p. 128. 



246 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

This definition is incorrect, 

1. Because it confounds things which in their na- 
ture are distinct and different. It confounds an act, 
with a state or condition. Volition or choice is action. 
It is that in which moral agency essentially consists ; 
whereas freedom is the state in which it takes place. 
The one is performed, while the other is enjoyed ; and 
the one proceeds from the agent, while the other is 
bestowed upon him. To speak of them, therefore, as 
if they were identical, is to do violence to the nature 
and relations of things, and to support conclusions 
which are both false and dangerous. 

The definition which we are considering, confounds 
also the absence of action or volition, with necessity ; 
for if volition be taken for freedom, the absence of vo- 
lition must be taken for the absence of freedom, and 
the absence of freedom is necessity. If the absence 
of an act be necessity, it must be the necessity of that 
absence ; and then the absence of an act, and the ne- 
cessity of its absence are one and the same thing, at 
the same time that the one is the occasion of the 
other. It is indeed the same as to say, that when an 
agent does not exercise a given volition, his not exer- 
cising it, constrains him not to exercise it ; or that 
the grand and irresistible reason why the agent forbears 
to exercise a given volition is, that he forbears. 

If freedom consists exclusively in willing or choosing, 
men are only free in so far as they actually choose ; 
and then they who do not choose to love Grod, are not 
free to love him. If therefore they perish, it is for 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 247 

lack of freedom, and for nothing else ; and hence they 
are much to be pitied. 

Hopkins' definition is incorrect, 

2. Because it makes terms interchangeable which 
are not so. " Choose you this day whom ye will serve," 
is made to signify, Free you this day whom ye will 
serve ; and, " Mary hath chosen that good part, which 
shall not be taken away from her," is made to mean, 
Mary hath freed that good part. Paul is made to say, 
u What I shall free, I wot not ; for I am in a straight 
betwixt two ; " and Job is made to say, " My soul 
freeth strangling and death, rather than my life." 

The Doctor appeals to consciousness, but he has 
misunderstood its teaching. Its voice is, that there 
is a freedom of the soul in willing or choosing, and 
that the exercise of freedom implies of course the ex- 
ercise of volition or choice ; but its teaching is not, 
that the exercise of freedom and the exercise of volition 
are identical. If the Doctor clwse to hear the voice 
of consciousness, we fear he did not free himself to 
hear it, but remained utterly creed-bound. 

His definition is incorrect, 

3. Because it creates tautology where there properly 
is none. If volition be freedom, agency is freedom : 
because volition is agency. If agency be freedom, the 
phrase, " free agency," must mean free freedom, or 
agency agency. Thus an arbitrary definition, invented 
to sustain an erroneous creed, reduces ideas to confu- 
sion, and language to nonsense. 

The definition under consideration is incorrect, 



248 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

4. Because it involves a false distinction. If moral 
freedom consists in volition, or in willing what is 
willed, the only difference between the saint and sin- 
ner is, that the one has one kind of moral freedom, and 
the other has another kind of moral freedom ; and if 
the only difference between them is a difference in the 
kind of then freedom, then that is the only difference 
between sin and holiness ; and then also a mere differ- 
ence of freedom is the only ground of difference in the 
awards of eternity. That is to say, then the one class 
of mankind are hereafter punished for their freedom, 
and the other class are reivarded for their freedom. 
On this principle, Christ will say to sinners on the last 
day, " Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire, prepared 
for the devil and his angels/' because you exercised 
freedom ; and to the righteous, " Come ye blessed of 
my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from 
the foundation of the world/' because you exercised 
freedom. How wonderful it is, that to a portion of 
mankind freedom is a crime, an endowment which con- 
stitutes them sinners and reprobates ; while to others 
it is a virtue, an endowment which constitutes them 
righteous and fit subjects for heaven ! 

And what is more wonderful still is, that, according 
to Hopkins, this freedom has not " anything more or 
less belonging to it." That is to say, the freedom of 
the sinner, which consists in exercising evil volitions, 
is not subordinate to any other freedom ; and the free- 
dom of the righteous, which consists in exercising holy 
volitions, is also not subordinate to any other. Neither 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 249 

is free in the exercise of his freedom. The sinner 
must necessarily exercise evil volitions as his freedom, 
and the saint must necessarily exercise holy volitions 
as his freedom ; and the sinner must necessarily perish 
for that freedom in which he is not free, and the saint 
will be gloriously saved on account of that freedom in 
which he is not free. What a beautiful doctrine ! 
Through much transforming, it appears like " an angel 
of light ;" but when we deprive it of its disguise, it 
stands forth in all the deformity of a fiend. 

XXI. Moral freedom consists not in power to exe- 
cute volition or choice. 

President Edwards affirms that it does. He says : 
" The plain and obvious meaning of the words free- 
dom, and liberty, in common speech, is jioicer, oppor- 
tunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he 
pleases. Or, in other words, his being free froni hin- 
drance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting 
in any respect as he wills. And the contrary of liberty, 
whatever name we call that by, is a person's being 
hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being ne- 
cessitated to do otherwise." " But one thing more I 
would observe concerning what is vulgarly called lib- 
erty ; namely, power and opportunity for one to do 
and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is 
all that is meant by it, without taking into the mean- 
ing of the word, anything of the cause or original of 
that choice, or at all considering how the person came 
to have such a volition : whether it was caused by 
some external motive. <>r internal habitual bias ; 
11* 



250 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

whether it was determined by some internal antece- 
dent volition ; or whether it happened without a cause ; 
whether it was necessarily connected with something 
foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by 
his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, 
and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing 
and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly 
free, according to the primary and common notion of 
freedom." — Inq. part 1, sec. 5. 

To understand this definition, it is necessary to de- 
termine the meaning of the following phrases : " To 
do as he pleases, doing or conducting as he wills, to do 
and conduct as he will, or according to his choice." To 
understand these phrases, we must ascertain the sense 
in which the author employs the following terms : 
pleases or pleasure, ivills or will, chooses or choice. 
These terms, it is very evident, are all employed as 
synonyma ; and as including in their meaning, the 
exercise of the affections. The author says, " The will 
and the affections of the soul are not two faculties ; 
the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, 
nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will 
and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness 
and sensibleness of exercise." — On the Affec, p. 17. 

To understand him, it is also necessary to determine 
the sense in which he employs the terms, do, doing, 
conducting, pursuing, executing. These terms are all 
employed to express every kind of positive and nega- 
tive action : action of doing, and action of refusing to 
do, action of the body, of the intellect, of the affec- 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 251 

tions, and of the will. They are sometimes employed 
by our author, in the sense of pleasing, choosing, 
thinking, loving. He tells us, the term "action," "is 
used in the same sense as doing ; and most commonly 
it is used to signify outward actions." u And some- 
times the word action is used to signify the exercise of 
thought, or of will and inclination : so meditating, 
loving, hating, inclining, disinclining, choosing, and re- 
fusing, may be sometimes called acting ; though more 
rarely (unless it be by philosophers and metaphysi- 
cians) than in any of the other senses." — Inq. } part 4, 
sec. 2. 

That Edwards employs the terms doing, conducting, 
and executing, in this comprehensive sense, is evident 
from his own explanation, as given in a letter to a 
Scotch minister. In that letter he says, " If any one 
should here say yes, I conceive of a freedom above and 
beyond the liberty a man has of conducting in any re- 
spect as he pleases, viz : a liberty of choosing as he 
pleases, Such a one, if he reflected, would either 
blush or laugh at his own instance. For is not choos- 
ing as he pleases, conducting, in some respect, ac- 
cording to his pleasure." — Inq. p. 418. 

Here we are plainly taught, that conducting includes 
choosing ; and of course that doing, pursuing, and exe- 
cuting include choosing. Edwards' definition of freedom 
is therefore this : Freedom consists in the power, oppor- 
tunity, or advantage that any one has to choose, love, and 
otherwise act, in pursuance or execution of previous will, 
choice, or affection. In other words, it makes freedom 



252 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

to consist in that power to execute, which consists in 
a man's power to will and act according to his will or 
pleasure. 

As the exercise of choice or will, and the exercise 
of the affections or pleasure, are not the same, though 
confounded by our author, the definition constitutes 
really two generic definitions. The first is, that free- 
dom consists in power to choose and act according to 
choice or will. The second is, that freedom "consists 
in power to choose and otherwise act according to the 
agent's pleasure or affections. We will answer each 
definition separately, beginning with the last men- 
tioned. Therefore, 

(I.) Moral freedom consists not in power to choose 
and otherwise act in accordance with the affections. 

1. A moral agent may have power to choose accord- 
ing to the affections, and yet be compelled to choose 
against the affections. Several different objects may 
excite the same affections, as for instance the agent's 
love and desire, of which objects he may with full 
power choose any one ; but of which he knows he may 
only choose one or neither. In this case he has power 
to choose and act according to his affections, because 
he may appropriate any one of the objects ; but to do 
so, is to forfeit all the other objects, and hence it is to 
choose and act against the love and desire which he 
cherishes for them. He must choose one or neither, 
and in either case he goes against his affections. 

Now if Edwards were correct, the agent in this 
case would be both free and not free, at the same time, 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 253 

and in the same volition or act. Therefore, as freedom 
and necessity are opposites, so that the existence of 
either one in a given respect precludes the existence 
of the other in that respect, it follows that Edwards' 
definition is not correct. 

2. A moral agent may have power to choose and act 
according to the affections, and yet in the exercise of 
that power be wholly subject to extrinsic causation ; 
and to be subject to extrinsic causation in a given 
respect, is to be necessitated in that respect. 

Suppose a sculptor, possessing the power to do so, 
should animate a statue, and endow it not only with 
intelligence, but with the affection of hatred against 
himself ; and suppose the hatred implanted should be 
so great as irresistibly to control all the other affec- 
tions, and the will itself ; so that in accordance with 
the affections, the statue should unavoidably choose to 
pursue the sculptor with curses, insults, and injuries, 
to the utter neglect of its own best interests : would 
the animated marble be free in its actions ? Would it 
not rather be the veriest and most pitiable slave ? 

It is true, the sculptor may also have given to the 
statue a consciousness of right and wrong, or an up- 
braiding conscience ; but conscience being of inferior 
power, and therefore inefficient to guide or reform, the 
case is not altered, except for the worse. This addi- 
tion merely enhances the wretchedness of the statue, 
and the cruelty of the sculptor. 

It may perhaps be said, the sculptor is very kind to 
the statue. He bestows on it freely and abundantly 



254 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

the necessaries of its existence ; and lie endures its 
annoyances with great equanimity and forbearance. 
That may very well be, and to other animated statues, 
it may occasion great astonishment. They may re- 
gard this forbearance as a wonderful mercy ; but is the 
living marble any the less perfectly and irresistibly 
controlled by the artist ? Certainly not. 

We may also be told, that the superhuman blow 
with which the good artist finally shatters the wicked 
statue to fragments, and makes the pieces quiver with 
eternal pain, is a most impressive and glorious display 
of his power ; but let not the glory of this event ob- 
scure the fact, that the statue never resisted what it 
could not resist, the laws of its being, as imparted and 
controlled by the sculptor. In other words, it never 
resisted the guiding hand of its maker ; and as it could 
not resist, its power to choose and act according to the 
affections, is merely the power of a slave. It is cer- 
tainly very far from being freedom. 

(II.) Moral freedom consists not in power to choose 
and act in pursuance of choice. 

The action which is pursuant to an act of choice, 
may be simply an act of choice, or an act of choice 
conjointly with other action, or merely other action 
alone ; and it is properly termed executive action. 
As it consists of two kinds, acts of the will, and other 
acts, it may be important to consider these two classes 
of executive action separately, in order the more fully 
to show that the power exercised in them is not moral 
freedom. Therefore, 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 255 

1 Moral freedom consists not in power to choose in 
pursuance of choice. In no instance can a moral 
agent exercise his first sinful volition in pursuance or 
execution of a previous choice. Such a previous choice 
would itself he evil ; and there can he no evil volition 
previous to the first evil volition. 

Take for example the first sinful volition of the first 
transgressor in the universe. It was impossible that 
he should exercise it in fulfillment of any previous 
choice, because all previous volitions, being absolutely 
holy, were entirely unlike such volition, and absolutely 
opposed to it. Yet in that first sinful volition he must 
have been free. It arose not as a calamity from some 
weakness in his moral constitution ; nor as a blunder 
from some defect in the Divine government. God is 
not chargeable with any such incompetency or mis- 
management. Therefore moral freedom consists not 
in power to choose in pursuance of choice. 

That cannot be a true idea, which is destroyed by a 
correlative idea. But the idea that freedom consists 
of power to choose in pursuance of an antecedent 
choice, is destroyed by a correlative idea. If this idea 
of freedom be allowed, it must also be allowed that 
the first transgressor was not free in his first sinful 
volition ; for that volition could not be exercised in pur- 
suance of a previous volition. If it be allowed that 
he was not free in his first sinful volition, it must like- 
wise be allowed that he is not free in those which fol- 
low ; for they are but necessary results of that first 
sinfnl volition. But the idea that he is not free in the 



256 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

volitions which follow his first sinful choice, implies 
that he is not free in choosing according to previous 
choice ; and hence it destroys or precludes the idea 
that the power of thus choosing is freedom. This idea 
of freedom, therefore, is like an ancient representation 
of time, under the figure of a serpent eating himself : 
as fast as it grows at the head, it dies at the tail. 

2. Moral freedom consists not in power to act in pur- 
suance of choice. No mere power to act is freedom, 
because the necessitated agent may exercise the power 
of action as well as the free ; and because the free 
agent may be destitute of the power of executive ac- 
tion, as well as the necessitated. The power to act in 
pursuance of choice, may be associated with either 
natural or moral freedom ; but of itself it constitutes 
neither. It is wholly subordinate to the power of 
choice. ' If it were not, its exercise could not be moral 
action. It is exercised, therefore, in a state of neces- 
sity, if it exists, whenever the power of volition is ex- 
ercised in that state ; and consequently it cannot be 
freedom. A correct definition of moral freedom, must 
make that freedom applicable to the agent, not only 
in his executive actions and volitions, but also posi- 
tively in his. imperate volitions. A definition which 
does not do this is false, because it implies that the vo- 
litions which constitute the essential part of moral 
agency, are not any part of moral agency ; and such a 
definition is the one of which we are treating. It is 
like a definition of duty, which implies that morality 
is the whole of piety, or that knowledge is the whole 



NEGATIVE PKINCIPLES. 257 

of wisdom : a definition which contains a predicate 
that rejects an essential part of its logical subject. If 
there is any difference, it is that Edwards' definition 
is the more faulty ; because morality and knowledge 
are essential to piety, but the power of executive ac- 
tion is not essential to moral freedom. 

In Edwards' system, the distinction between neces- 
sity and freedom, is simply a distinction between ne- 
cessity in a given case, and the same kind of necessity 
in another case. 

He says, " There can be no act of will, choice, or 
preference of the mind, without some motive or in- 
ducement." , " It is also evident, from what has been 
before proved, that the will is always, and in every in- 
dividual act, necessarily determined by the strongest 
motive ; and so is always unable to go against the mo- 
tive, which, all things considered, has now the greatest 
strength and advantage to move the will." "If it be 
so, that the will is always determined by the strongest 
motive, then it must always have an inability, in this 
latter sense, to act otherwise than it does." — Inq. pp. 
144, 232, 46. 

That is to say, in a moral sense, men cannot choose 
or act otherwise than they do ; or all their volitions 
and actions come to pass of moral necessity. What 
then is the distinction which he recognizes as existing 
between necessity and freedom 1 Simply this : in a 
state of necessity, the agent is necessitated to act con- 
trary to his necessitated will, or is "restrained" from 
acting agreeably to it ; whereas in a state of freedom, 



258 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

the agent is necessitated to possess and exercise the 
power of acting according to his necessitated will. 
Thus we are taught, that necessity consists not in neces- 
sity, nor even in a double necessity, but in the opposition 
of two necessities ; and that freedom consists not in 
the absence of necessity, but in the agreement of two 
necessities. According to this idea of freedom, slaves 
may be liberated without any pecuniary loss to their 
owners ; and without any charity from others. Let 
the persons who are held to service, wear no chains ; 
but let their minds be influenced by the strongest of 
motives. Let them possess the domestic affections in 
the fullness of their strength, and let them thoroughly 
fear the blood-hound, the lash, and the bullet ; so that 
they shall of moral necessity choose to make no 
attempt to escape, but rather choose to remain quietly 
at their toil ; and let them have " power, opportunity, 
or advantage, to do as they please " or choose in this 
respect, and they are absolutely free men. They could 
not be more free than they are, in despite of the man- 
ner in which they are made to choose as they do ; or, 
as Edwards has it, "without at all considering how 
they came to have such a volition." Such an idea of 
actual freedom, places common sense at a discount. 

Edwards himself contradicts and destroys his own 
definitions. He says, " Metaphysical or philosophical 
necessity is nothing different from their certainty/' — 
Inq. p. 33. " Philosophical necessity is really nothing 
else than the full and fixed connection between the 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 259 

things signified by the subject and predicate of a prop- 
osition which affirms something to be true/' — p. 34. 

By the terms metaphysical and philosophical, as 
here employed, he means moral. He expressly says, 
" Moral necessity is a species of philosophical neces- 
sity/' — Inq.p. 296. He speaks of the same necessity 
when he says, " And sometimes by moral necessity is 
meant, that necessity of connection and consequence, 
which arises from such moral causes, as the strength 
of inclination or motives, and the connection which 
there is in many cases between these and such certain 
volitions and actions. And it is in this sense that I 
use the phrase moral necessity, in the following dis- 
course/' — p. 40. 

Speaking of moral necessity, as inability, he says : 
" Moral inability consists either in the want of incli- 
nation, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or 
the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and 
excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent 
motives to the contrary. Or, both these may oe re- 
solved into one ; and it may be said in one word, that 
moral inability consists in the opposition, or want of 
inclination." — p. 45. 

In this very concise statement, moral necessity is 
represented to consist in the following items : 

1. Certainty. 

2. Connection of subject and predicate. 

3. That necessity of connection, which arises from 
the connection of a moral cause, and its effect. 

4. Want of inclination, or opposition of inclination. 



260 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

5. The superior strength of an inclination, which is 
contrary to a given action. 

6. Want of sufficient motives, or strength of appa- 
rent motives to the contrary. 

Here we have six different definitions of one neces- 
sity — making it six different and distinct necessities. 
If necessity, including inability, consists in the above 
items, freedom, including ability, consists in the fol- 
lowing : 

T. Uncertainty. 

2. Disconnection of subject and predicate. 

3. That freedom of disconnection, which arises from 
the disconnection of a moral cause and its effect. 

4. Inclination, or no opposition of inclination. 

5. The strength or superiority of an inclination, in 
favor of a given action. 

6. Sufficient motives, or weakness of apjwent mo- 
tives to the contrary. 

Therefore, according to Edwards, the following are 
the differences between necessity and freedom. 

1. The difference between certainty and uncertainty. 
In keeping with this distinction, if we say, the visitor 
is coming, of a certainty, we shall be understood to 
say, he is coming of a necessity ; and if we say, his 
coming is a matter of uncertainty, we shall be under- 
stood to say, it is a matter of freedom. 

Further, if we would speak with strict j^ro-juiety 
and accuracy, we should not say, free agency, and free 
agent ; but uncertain agency, and uncertain agent. 
If the New Testament were translated by this philos- 






NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 261 

ophy, some passages would be rendered quite intelligi- 
ble. We should then read, " Art thou called being a 
servant ? care not for it ; but if thou raayest be made 
uncertain, use it rather/' — 1 Cor. 7 : 21. "And the 
kings of the earth, and the great men, and the rich 
men, and the chief captains, and the mighty men, 
and every certain man, and every uncertain man, hid 
themselves in the dens, and in the rocks of the moun- 
tains/' — Eev. 6 : 15. 

The difference between necessity and freedom is, 
2. The difference between the connection and dis- 
connection, of "the things signified by the subject 
and predicate of a proposition which affirms some- 
thing to be true." 

This short sentence, the man eats, is " a proposi- 
tion which affirms something to be true;" and the 
things signified by the subject and predicate are, a hu- 
man being, and the act of taking food. When, there- 
fore, such a being and such an act are connected, or 
when the man actually eats, then we have an instance 
of moral necessity. So that, to say truthfully, the 
man eats, is to say, he eats necessarily ; and to say 
truthfully, the man does not eat, is to say, he eats 
freely. Or, which is the same thing, to say he eats 
freely, is to say he does not eat ; because, in all cases 
of moral freedom, there is no'" connection between the 
things signified by the subject and predicate." The 
same reasoning holds good of the proiDOsition, the man 
loves, or the man hates, or the man chooses. 



262 NEGATIVE PBINCIPLES. 

The difference between necessity and freedom, is 
represented to be, 

3. The difference between that necessity of connection 
which arises from the connection of a moral cause and its 
effect, and that freedom of disconnection which arises 
from the disconnection of a moral cause and its effect. 

That is to say, necessity now consists, not of con- 
nection, nor of necessity itself, nor of necessity of dis- 
connection; but of necessity of connection: and hence 
freedom consists, not of disconnection, nor of freedom 
itself, nor of freedom of connection; but of freedom of 
disconnection. Seasoning which involves such contra- 
dictory and absurd conclusions, may possibly emanate 
from a sane mind ; but only from a mind which is ut- 
terly enslaved by its creed. In the present instance, 
it is the effort of a man who is strong, but blind. His 
theological Delilah has occasioned his eyes to be put out. 

The difference under consideration, is, 

4. The difference between a want of inclination, or 
opposition of inclination, and inclination or no oppo- 
sition of inclination. • We are taught, that an incli- 
nation to perform a given act, is moral ability to per- 
form it; and that a disinclination to perform it, is 
moral inability to perform it. But an inclination to 
execute a given act, includes a disinclination to waive 
that act ; and a disinclination, we are told, is moral 
inability. 

Consequently, ability to execute a given act, includes 
inability to forbear that act ; and inability to forbear a 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 263 

given act, is a necessity to perform it. Therefore, ac- 
cording to Edwards, a moral ability to execute a given 
action, or to exercise a particular volition, involves a 
moral necessity to perform it. Thus freedom and ne- 
cessity are represented as coincident ; which is a con- 
tradiction, and proves the definition which implies it, 
to be false. 

The difference we are taught, is, 

5. The difference between the predominance of an 
inclination which is contrary to a given action, and the 
predominance of an inclination in favor of a given 
action. Here freedom and necessity are made to con- 
sist of one thing : predominance, or superior strength 
of inclination. 

If we consider the diverse inclinations as distinct, 
this identity of freedom and necessity, is generic ; but 
if we consider the diverse inclinations as identical, or 
as being only the positive and negative of the same 
thing, then this identity of freedom and necessity, will 
appear to be not only generic, but specific. Such the 
necessitarian makes it. He teaches, that the predom- 
inance of inclination not to do good, is moral inability; 
and that the predominance of inclination to do evil, is 
freedom. But a predominance of inclination not to 
do good, and a predominance of inclination to do evil, 
are specifically identical : being the same thing, viewed 
positively and negatively. Therefore, as freedom and 
necessity are not identical, that definition is also false 
which implies it to be identical, and to which we have 
just referred. 



264 NEGATIVE PEINCIPLES. 

The difference between necessity and freedom, ac- 
cording to Edwards, is, 

6. The difference between a lack of motives, and a 
sufficiency of motives ; or between the strength of ap- 
parent motives to the contrary of a given action, and 
the strength of motives in favor of a given action. 
This distinction is properly two-fold; and the two 
parts, though not the same as the two preceding dis- 
tinctions, are yet exactly like them. The former part 
makes freedom and necessity coincident, and the latter 
makes them generically identical. The latter part 
makes them to consist in the strength of motives ; and 
both parts confound the state 'of the agent, with the 
means by which it is produced. 

The strength of motives may be a circumstance, on 
which may depend either freedom or necessity ; but of 
itself it is neither, because that which produces a state, 
cannot be that state itself. 

We have now gone over Edwards' definitions of 
freedom and necessity, and we trust it has been made 
apparent, that in themselves, and in their essential 
implications, they are false. Their number and diver- 
sity destroys them in the mass, because they all con- 
tradict and deny each other ; and the specific absur- 
dity of each, overthrows them individually. 

That any should have found it difficult to answer 
Edwards, arises from the fact, that it is difficult to 
understand him, in harmony with himself; and that 
this should be difficult, is occasioned by the fact, that 
on almost every important point, he occupies a variety 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 265 

of positions. He who can adopt a variety of defini- 
tions of one thing, and then in his argument play from 
one meaning to another, must possess a great advan- 
tage, till his trick is discovered ; and till then, he will 
be very likely to confuse and bewilder his opponents. 

By a strange blending and confounding of tilings 
different, together with arbitrary distinctions and ab- 
surd definitions, Edwards has created a very dark and 
intricate labyrinth : a labyrinth in which his admirers 
are lost, and which others find it both difficult and 
unpleasant to explore. 

XXII. Moral freedom consists not, and is not im- 
plied, in ignorance of God's decrees. 

It may seem a little strange, but such is the fact, 
that mankind have been said to be free, because they 
choose and act without any knowledge of the Divine 
purposes concerning them ; as if ignorance of our state 
could change that state, or as if a knowledge of God's 
decrees could impart any new efficiency to those de- 
crees. If the Divine decrees are, as some suppose, 
absolute, all-comprehending, and efficient, they imply 
that to finite agents, every event whatever comes to 
pass of necessity ; and if this be so, no measure of 
ignorance on our part can possibly occasion our state 
to be one of freedom, and no measure of knowledge 
can by any means occasion the existing necessity. The 
decrees, in that case, provide for everything. 

If it were true, that ignorance of God's decrees in- 
volves freedom, and that a real, or proper freedom, it 
would follow, that nothing is so wonderful as the ex- 

12 



266 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

istence of harmony between the Divine purposes, and 
the actions of finite beings. It would follow, that 
during thousands of years, millions of human beings, 
under every variety of circumstances, have happened 
to think, feel, choose, speak, and otherwise act, so pre- 
cisely what God had efficiently decreed, that the effi- 
ciency of his decrees has by chance been superseded ; 
and this is brought forward as a plea to justify the 
ways of God to man ; implying that it is only by chance 
that God's honor is saved ! It implies that God would 
certainly have necessitated his creatures to do precisely 
as they do, and so would have made himself the effi- 
cient cause of all their sins and miseries, but that he 
is fortuitously relieved, and, for the sake of his honor, 
fortunately relieved of a disagreeable agency. What 
his creatures would have been compelled to perform, 
they have freely performed, in all ages, and in all in- 
stances, without any knowledge or design of such a co- 
incidence. Thus a vast series of arbitrary decrees, 
which are not allowed to be founded in Divine fore- 
knowledge, but foreknowledge in them, is in all its 
parts fulfilled as a casualty: as a mere matter of 
chance. That such should be the case, if the Divine 
purposes comprised only the thoughts of a single indi- 
vidual, for a single year of his life, would be exceed- 
ingly wonderful ; but that it should be true in respect 
to God's decrees, as comprehending every effort of the 
mind, every emotion of the heart, and every action of 
the body, of millions in all ages of the world, and 
throughout their entire lifetime, is more than wonder- 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. . 267 

ful : it is impossible and false. A different definition, 
therefore, must be given of moral freedom ; and it will 
be found that, in so far as such freedom exists at all, 
it consists in exemption from extrinsic causation. ■ 

XXIII. Moral freedom consists not of legal or 
moral right. 

It is said, " Law gives a man his rights : law secures 
them. Law gives him his liberty : law secures it. 
He has no rights, he has no liberty, without law/' 

Freedom and legal sanction are here represented as 
being the same thing ; but legal license is not of itself 
liberty. It is merely the absence of any necessity 
that the law might -create, or that the absence of the 
law might occasion ; and this is so far from being 
itself moral freedom, that it is entirely consistent with 
the most absolute moral necessity. The agent may 
still be necessitated, either to obey the law, or to dis- 
obey ; or, he may still be subject to extrinsic causation, 
in all his volitions and other actions. If right and 
wrong, or permission and prohibition, were the same 
as freedom and necessity, our expressions would some- 
times be very tautological and absurd. The phrase, 
you are free to be right, would signify, you are free to 
be free, right to be right, and permitted to be permit- 
ted ; and the phrase, you are necessitated to be wrong, 
would signify, you are wrong to be wrong, necessitated 
to be necessitated, and prohibited to be prohibited. 

Error is confusion : truth only is order. 



268 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

XX I Y. Moral freedom consists not of itself, in de- 
liverance from the power and dominion of Satan. 

" To whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his 
servants" or slaves "ye are to whom ye obey ;" and 
hence it is that sinners are " taken captive by the devil 
at Ms will." They first choose to be sinners ; and 
then they do many things which their state as sinners 
irresistibly occasions. Therefore, to deliver them from 
a sinful state, is to deliver them from a bondage : it is 
to exempt or free them from an extrinsic causation. 

This exemption may be a part of a man's freedom 
in the exercise of his moral agency, or it may not, ac- 
cording to the manner of its accomplishment. As it 
is actually achieved, it is comprehended in the agent's 
freedom. Freedom, like salvation, is general and par- 
ticular. " God is the Savior of all men, specially of 
those that believe ; " and as such, he makes all men 
free, but especially those that believe. 

1. All men are rendered free at times to choose 
either good or evil. 

2. They who exercise their freedom of choice aright, 
or in choosing holiness, are made to enjoy the farther 
freedom of exemption from the tyranny of Satan. In 
other words, this exemption is only experienced as it 
is first freely chosen ; and then as a necessary part of 
the agent's freedom, in respect to his course of life. 
" If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be 
free indeed." — John 8 : 36. 

But deliverance from the tyranny of Satan, may be 
conceived of as being accomplished by the arbitrary 



NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 269 

and irresistible action of an extrinsic cause ; or by the 
almighty and sovereign power of God, in controlling 
arbitrarily the will and affections of the agent. As 
thus achieved, it is not freedom, but necessity in moral 
agency ; for in such a case, the agent has merely ex- 
perienced a change in the source of his unavoidable 
subjection. In the essential point of an arbitrary 
subjection, his state is still the same. 

Therefore, moral freedom in the exercise of moral 
agency, consists not of itself in deliverance from the 
power and dominion of Satan. 

The true philosophy of moral freedom and necessity 
constitutes a connected and beautiful system. Like a 
stately tree, it has its several and distinct parts ; and 
all its parts are harmonious and necessary to the sym- 
metry and perfection of the whole. 

Moral agency constitutes the root, moral capacity is 
the trunk, and the two great divisions of this capacity 
into unigenous power and diversified power, are the two 
grand branches which put out from the trunk. 

The specific predominance of motive influence, ex- 
trinsic causation and moral necessity, are branches 
which belong to the great branch called unigenous 
power ; and motive equilibrium, exemption from ex- 
trinsic causation (which is freedom,) intrinsic causation, 
and accountability, are branches which belong to the 
grand branch called diversified power. 

The subordinate facts which are associated with 
these, are twigs covered with foliage and fruit. The 
fruit may be somewhat different in different cases, and 



270 NEGATIVE PRINCIPLES. 

in all cases it consists of a variety, but the honor or 
glory of Grod, in one form or another, is produced in- 
variably. In the case of the righteous, the fruits are 
also usefulness and happiness. 

In treating of the will, or of the soul in willing, 
philosophers have generally chopped away one of the 
main branches, and have thus removed full one-half 
of the tree ; marring its beauty, and destroying its vi- 
tality. May we not hope that the time for such van- 
dalism has passed : that mankind are ready to appre- 
ciate and protect the tree in all its parts, and to sit 
down in amity and peace beneath its friendly and re- 
freshing shade. 



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